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     This dissertation explores the impact of an authoritarian state on the university as 
represented by the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University in 
Cairo, Egypt.  I examine how academics negotiate their tasks of acquiring, disseminating 
and producing knowledge within the confines of an authoritarian state.  The 2003 Arab 
Human Development Report argues that a knowledge society, consisting of the 
acquisition, dissemination, and production of knowledge is needed to overcome 
developmental lags within the Arab Middle East.  My dissertation explores that argument 
within the microcosm of the knowledge society as represented by the Faculty of 
Economics and Political Science.  Most critically I ask the question of how the university 
was depoliticized by an authoritarian state.  Hence, my work begins to uncover the 
irrelevance to the Egyptian Revolution and ouster of President Husni Mubarak in 2011.  
My dissertation reveals how an authoritarian state depoliticizes a university and improves 
our understanding of the utility of elements of the social capital concept.  Known 
metaphorically as bridges and holes, the linkages or mechanisms (bridges) that span  
networks that are not affiliated with one another (holes) can inhibit or support change as  
well as inhibit or promote the introduction of new knowledge and resources.  It is this last 
conceptual finding that holds most promise for future research in diverse settings. 
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     The alleys of Cairo are quite narrow.  Despite the narrowness, cars park on both sides 
of the alleys.  Navigating the exceedingly narrow remaining space in a car becomes a 
truly daring feat.  My cabdriver, the father of an Egyptian friend, had parked in one of 
these narrow alleys off of Tahrir Square and getting out of the parking space and alley 
without hitting another car appeared to me to be quite impossible.  How would we get 
out? 
     As the cabdriver began the excruciatingly tiny back and forth maneuvering of the cab 
to get out without hitting another car, three men appeared to direct him out of the space.  
During the fifteen minutes we spent attempting to get out and straighten the cab enough 
to get through the barely car-sized space left by the parked cars, two more men began 
helping the cabdriver.  After twenty minutes of trying to maneuver the cab with the help 
of five other men without success, the five men picked up the back of the cab to 
straighten it out and we were finally free.  The spontaneous help offered to the cabdriver 





interviewed.  The professor had offered the opinion that the spontaneous cooperation 
provided by the social capital of the United States was unavailable and unlikely in Egypt.  
Far more likely, he offered, was the elite cooperation found in France.  
     While my research did demonstrate intraelite social capital efforts to reach out to the 
community, intellectuals and other elites appeared unable to tap into the spontaneous 
cooperation found on the streets of Cairo.  The divide between academics and the 
sha’abi1 is physically demonstrated by the fences and gates--manned by security 
personnel that surround the universities—making them isolated oases within the teeming 
city. 
     Had I stumbled on the reason why, despite high apparent levels of social capital, 
Egypt remains economically stagnant and far from democratic?  It could not be that easy 
and, indeed, it is not.  Within this dissertation I explore how academics function within 
the confines of an authoritarian state.  My interviews with academics2 were intended to 
elicit their view points and understand how they functioned and negotiated their quest for 
knowledge despite the controls placed on the university from an authoritarian state that 
sought political quiescence and an academy that would serve regime power maintenance 
strategies. 
     My research begins to uncover what impacts the state can have on the university 
through interviews conducted at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo 
University.  My study promotes our understanding of the lived experience of my 
interview subjects rather than generalizations and causal connections.  Although my 
methods did not seek to test causal relationships, my research does uncover how the 
                                               
1 Literally refers to the people and carries with it the connotation of popular or of the people. 




university was depoliticized by an authoritarian state and left mute and irrelevant during 




     This dissertation explores the impact of an authoritarian state upon the university as 
represented by the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University, 
Egypt.  This dissertation seeks to examine how the Egyptian authoritarian state 
successfully depoliticized the university.  Egyptian universities were, largely, irrelevant 
to the recent and dramatic events of the Arab Spring wherein the people demanded and 
obtained the ouster of longtime President Hosni Mubarak.  I argue that the irrelevance of 
the university to the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 is directly related to the success of an 
authoritarian state’s depoliticization and control of the university. 
     The university tasks, so well delineated by the 2003 Arab Human Development Report 
of knowledge acquisition, dissemination, and production have been inhibited by an 
authoritarian state.  The academic faculty, amongst those I interviewed, faces serious 
state-driven constraints with regard to their professional missions of teaching and 
scholarly research.  Throughout this dissertation, I will show that both professors and 
graduate students depoliticize as much as possible in order to undertake their teaching 
responsibilities and engage in scholarly research.  Structurally-driven theories and the 
social capital concept facilitate our understanding of the obstacles to the knowledge-
driven mission of academics within an authoritarian state such as Egypt.  These same 




buttressing our understanding and insight as to how academics seek alternative means of 
pursuing knowledge.    
     Other studies have undertaken the issue of state limitations on academic freedom.3  
My work investigates how the limitations on the university by an authoritarian state, as 
represented by the Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Cairo University, 
inhibit the university’s interaction with the broader Egyptian public.  As bridging social 
capital did play a role in the demonstrators’ successful ouster of President Hosni 
Mubarak and his most visible cronies, the inability of academics to build bridging social 
capital has been thrown into sharp relief.  The knowledge needed to strategize mass, 
cross-sectional demonstrations was not gained at Egyptian universities nor did they play a 
role as an essential site of organization.  Therefore, a related question is the role played 
by societal forces to gain the knowledge needed to organize opposition.  I will address 
that issue in a chapter that examines the Egyptian revolution of 2011. 
     My work aims to build an understanding of how the university was depoliticized.  In 
Chapter 3, I discuss the history of Egyptian education generally as well as of Cairo 
University specifically.  Attempts to harness the academy for political purposes by 
Nasser and then Sadat backfired when opposition forces were also empowered.  Both 
introduced security and surveillance measures when students and faculty proved too 
difficult to control.  The Mubarak regime’s control mechanisms of security, surveillance, 
and strategic appointments masterfully completed the depoliticization of the university 
and academic found that an apolitical posture served career advancement as is 
demonstrated throughout my interviews.   
                                               
3 “Reading  Between the “Red Lines”: The Repression of Academic Freedom at Egyptian Universities,” 




     A further contribution from my dissertation is the role played by metaphorical bridges 
and holes used in the social capital literature.  While I will explain these concepts at 
length in Chapter 2, the importance of bridges or links across structural holes of 
nonrelated networks permeates my findings.  The concepts of bridges and holes promote 
our understanding of how change does or does not occur.  Bridging mechanisms and the 
holes they may span explains the value of networks to the influx of new knowledge while 
the lack of any such bridging mechanism helps explain failures to find the knowledge or 
resources needed for change to occur. 
 
Methodology 
    My question seeks to uncover how the university has been impacted by the efforts of 
an authoritarian state to eliminate political opposition.  I used a qualitative case study 
method in order to better understand and decipher the context of the Faculty of Political 
Science and Economics.  This type of case study privileges meaning and reflexivity over 
generalization.  My questions intended to begin a discussion rather than lead interview 
subjects in a specific direction.  I wanted to uncover the reality as understood by 
members of the Faculty.  The qualitative single site case study method centers upon 
interpretation and human generated understandings within a context rather than an 
assessment of causal relationships.4  Use of this particular methodology elicited a great 
deal of information suggesting that professors found an apolitical professional profile 
most conducive to carrying out their academic mission of acquiring knowledge, 
disseminating learning, and producing research.  The qualitative case study method, 
                                               
4 A broader discussion of methodological differences in case studies can be found in DvoraYanow, 
Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and Maria Jose Frietas, “Case Study Research in Political Science,” in 





employed for my research, engendered an appreciation for the environmental context 
wherein academics interviewed must work and carry out academic tasks such as those 




     My study could have taken place in any of the Arab countries covered by the Arab 
Human Development Reports.  I chose Egypt and the Faculty of Economics and Political 
Science a for several reasons including the perception of Egypt as a leader in the Arab 
World, feasibility and access, as well as the 2003 Arab Human Development Report’s 
argument that the development in the sciences was preceded by developments in the 
humanities, law, and social sciences.  I will explain these in greater detail in what 
follows.   
     First, Egypt has long been perceived as a leader and initiator of change amongst Arab 
countries.  The Arab saying that “Cairo writes, Beirut publishes, and Baghdad reads” 
exemplifies Egypt’s perceived intellectual leadership.  More broadly it is also often said 
that “as Egypt goes, so goes the rest of the Arab world.”  Although Egypt was to the point 
of stagnation under the Mubarak regime, the perception has more than a little truth 
behind it.  Politically, President Nasser’s brand of Arab nationalism was particularly 
potent and Egypt an acknowledged Arab leader while for Westerners Egypt led by 
becoming the first Arab country to make peace with Israel under the rule of President 
Sadat.   
     Egypt, the most populous Arab country, is a country of many firsts in the Arab world.  




of influence due to its size and history.  Egypt is important as bell weather for the Arab 
world. 
     The Arab Human Development Reports were eminently suitable to bridge what could 
be done with a politically relevant question that would use the time and contacts that I 
had available.  The initial Arab Human Development Report, a publication of the United 
Nations Development Programme, described three deficiencies that plagued the Arab 
world and hindered development.5  Of these, the knowledge deficit was the most apposite 
to examining how political authoritarianism might impact the university’s ability to play 
a role as an incubator of ideas concerning political reform.   
     The Faculty of Economics and Political Science was relevant to an examination of the 
knowledge deficit.  The authors of the 2003 Arab Human Development Report that 
further explored the ramifications of the knowledge deficit argue that the Islamic Golden 
Age was preceded by developments in linguistics, law, and social sciences.The Report 
notes of the scholarly renaissance that marked the Abbasid Empire that “The third factor 
contributing to the scientific renaissance was that was preceded by a renaissance in the 
humanities and the social sciences.”6 
Cairo University was established in 1908 as the first modern university in Egypt that 
would teach subjects beyond the religious sphere.  One of the first modern universities to 
                                               
5United Nations Development Programme.Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities 
for Future Generations. Contributing Authors: M. Abido, A. A. Ali, N. Ali, M. M. Al-Imam, M. Al-
Khalidi, F. Al-Allaghi, M. K Al-Sayed, M. Badawi, G. Corm, M.Dewidar, I. Elbadawi, A. El-Bayoumi, O. 
El-Kholy, F. El-Zanaty, M. Amin Faris, N. Fergany, SalimJahan, T. Kanaan,A. Mahjoub, S. Morsy, N. 
Mosa’ad, M. A. Nassar,S. Ben Nefissa, H. Rashad, M. GawadRedha, F. Sarkis, M. Za’alouk,  A. Zahlan 
and H. Zurayk. 
6United Nations Development Programme.   2003 Arab Human Development Report: Building a 
Knowledge Society, contributing authors:   Laila Abdel Majid, Fowziyah Abdullah Abu-Khalid, 
Muhammad Hassan Al-Amin, Aziz Al-Azmeh, Sami Al-Banna, Tarek Al-Bishry, Hayder Ibrahim Ali, 
Nabil Ali, ,Sa'adallah Agha Al Kala'a, Muna Al-Khalidi, Mohamed Al-Mili, BaqerAlnajjar, Siham A. Al-




be established in the Arab Middle East, Cairo University once again raised Egypt’s status 
of intellectual leadership.  A number of recognizable names graduated from Cairo 
University including Boutrous Boutrous Ghali, Yasser Arafat, and Naguib Mahfouz.  
Cairo University was the site chosen by American President Barack Obama to deliver an 
address to the Arab world.  It was thought that an address from Cairo generally, and 
Cairo University specifically, would have greater resonance amongst Muslims and, 
particularly, Arab Muslims.7  Although Egyptian educational leadership had become 
stagnant, Cairo University has been a leading force in Egyptian higher education.  Hence, 
the Obama administration chose it as a symbolic site to give a speech addressing Muslim 
and American relations.  My research was conducted well before President Obama’s 
speech; however, his administration’s choice highlights my reasons for choosing Cairo 
University as a site for research addressing the effects of an authoritarian state on a 
university.  Too, it appeared logical to seek understanding of how an authoritarian state 
might affect research and knowledge from a historical educational leader that had become 
stagnant. 
     A college rather than department is analogous to a Faculty at Cairo University.  The 
Faculty of Economics and Political Science contains five departments: Political Science, 
Economics, Statistics, Public Management, and Computer Sciences and its application to 
social sciences.  As the Faculty includes five departments, the number of professors and 
graduate students is far larger than my sixteen interviews would indicate. 
 
 
                                               






     The overall relevance of Egypt and social sciences to the knowledge produced during 
the Islamic Golden Age was fortunate as I had better access to Egypt and Cairo 
University.  The idea of pursuing interviews with junior academics was first given to me 
by Barbara Ibrahim, Director of the John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic 
Engagement at the American University in Cairo.  She asserted that Professor Ibrahim 
Karawan, at the University of Utah, could help me gain access to interview subjects and 
what could be easily accomplished in the research time and resources I had available.  
Too, fellow doctoral student, Mahmoud Hamad had links to the Faculty of Political 
Science and Economics.  His help, in particular, proved invaluable.   
     Research in Egypt requires government–issued permits.  This is particularly true for 
statistical research, which is regulated by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and 
Statistics or CAPMAS.  Although one professor, who worked with the poor, claimed that 
she had never had a problem obtaining permits and permission for her research, many are 
not so fortunate.  CAPMAS will often delay or deny permission for research into 
controversial topics.  It is not uncommon for graduate students and independent 
researchers to bypass CAPMAS.  Indeed, one reason for choosing a qualitatively-
oriented, small-N study for this dissertation had to do with CAPMAS.  The choice of 
method for this dissertation does not require CAPMAS approval.  While the subject 
matter is not terribly controversial and some level of qualitative research was needed to 
begin the inquiry into how social capital might function with regard to intellectual elite 




design that would require CAPMAS approval was also a matter of consideration as it is a 
very time-consuming process that can easily end in failure. 
     Some Egyptian academics conduct their research with the same desire to avoid 
CAPMAS.  While some view it as just another bureaucratic hurdle, others view the 
agency as one that the state uses to inhibit research on important issues.  While CAPMAS 
was not directly involved in the case of Saad Eddin Ibrahim’s arrest and imprisonment, it 
is thought that his research practices and areas of research are really at the bottom of his 
arrest.  It is hardly likely that his arrest on the day he announced plans to monitor 
elections was a coincidence.  Ibrahim also crossed redlines concerning religion by 
researching Coptic discrimination as well as discussing the Mubarak family.  Red lines 
are unspoken “lines” that are politically or socially sensitive.  There are no specific laws 
that prohibit what someone could say concerning Mubarak and his family or religion but 
these are sensitive categories that can bring state scrutiny.  
     It is also considered possible, by Ibrahim and other observers, that his research 
without a permit might have landed him in hot water.  Ibrahim applied for permits but 
typically began his research without them as the permit process is a lengthy one.  Ibrahim 
was arrested about three weeks after he completed research on trust in public institutions 
and published without a permit.   While either or both reasons could have contributed to 
Ibrahim’s arrest, the case serves to highlight a problem regarding knowledge production 
in Egypt.  Research is often shallow and can be of very low reliability as the state places 
obstacles in the way of researchers.  An arduous permit process limits the method of 
research and many choose shallower research designs in order to avoid lengthy 




permits altogether and large studies are usually not duplicated due to the difficulties 
involved in conducting survey research in Egypt.  Controversial research subjects are also 
to be avoided and that also limits knowledge production in a very serious way.  Much of 
Ibrahim’s research concerned civil society and democracy.  He frequently violated or, at 
least, skirted red lines.  For less well known and connected researchers, the lesson of his 
arrest and incarceration was likely that research had best be done within regime-allowed 
confines or no knowledge could be produced at all.8 
     State oversight also inhibits trust between researchers and the masses.  Some of my 
interviewees wanted to know if the Egyptian state had approved my research.  However 
my study was not large enough to require their oversight and so I had obtained 
permission from the Department Chair instead.  This was quite good enough for all the 
professors I interviewed and it was also good enough for graduate students who had 
studied abroad but it produced discomfiture on the part of graduate students more 
unfamiliar with the research process.  They were concerned that participation in my 
small-N study could compromise their futures.  The families that I lived with were fearful 
of any state attention whatsoever.  I would imagine that the participant observer research 
method works far better amongst the lower and middle classes than does anything that 
might require state approval.  Academics who viewed the masses as too suspicious to 
work with were, likely, correct.  Although it is probably true that many Egyptians do not 
understand the purpose of research, it is also true that they fear the attention of state 
security forces.  A female professor I spoke with undoubtedly had worked out an 
incredible relationship of trust with the impoverished community she researched as she 
had found no problems either from the state or in gaining access to the neighborhood 
                                               




wherein she focused much of her research.  However, the length of time needed to build 
that kind of trust between researcher and subjects is difficult to duplicate and she seems 
to find herself conducting new research but always on the same subjects.  This shows that 
there is some problem with duplicating large studies cross-sectionally and that inhibits 
knowledge production. 
     Another advantage to the use of interviews utilizing a snowball method also relates to 
an authoritarian state.  The culture of suspicion is not limited to the masses but can also 
be found within the university.  While my questions were not designed to solicit 
particularly sensitive information, they also did not avoid it.  Some few of my questions 
concerning local organizations that professors might be involved with were refused 
answer and my strongest and most complete interviews came from people whom 
Mahmoud Hamad personally introduced me to as he vouched for my intentions and 
credentials as a fellow Ph.D. candidate who was conducting fieldwork to complete a 
dissertation.  Living with families in middle class neighborhoods further validated the 
culture of suspicion that inhibits research as families I lived with spoke in whispers about 
political preferences or worried that neighbors might think me a Central Intelligence 
Agent (CIA) of the U.S. Government.  
     None of this is particularly uncommon in the Arab Middle East and the tense 
international situation between the U.S. and Arab countries further contributes to 
suspicion of American motives.9  While Egypt is a longtime U.S. ally, the perceived 
support of the American leadership for the Mubarak regime creates an immediate 
suspicion and, sometimes, antagonism.  Five of the six assistant professors I interviewed 
                                               





had completed their PhD.s in the U.S. and this, along with a personal introduction, 
alleviated personal suspicions and doubts.  However, several of them pointed out that the 
suspicion I dealt with had similarly hampered their research in a post- 9/11 United States.   
     The question of conducting field research as a Western female in the Muslim Middle 
East always comes up and must be addressed.  It is far less of an issue than many 
suppose.10  My gender did not matter nearly so much as my citizenship for most of my 
interview subjects.  My American citizenship was commented upon while my gender 
never was.  It is possible that my few female interview subjects were more forthcoming 
on certain issues with a woman than they would have been with a man and more likely to 
discuss the impact of their own gender on their careers than they would have been with a 
male researcher.  However, this is unclear and the suspicion of me as an American from 
the high number of female graduate students outweighed any gains.  Only four out of my 
sixteen interviews were with women although women vastly outnumber male graduate 
students.  Despite that, the gender disparity is reversed amongst professors and far more 
men pursue a Ph.D. and return to a career in Egypt. 
     My gender and religion had more impact within the homes I lived in.  As a Western 
female convert to Islam I both gained opportunities while losing others.  Despite 
occasional worries that I might really be CIA both the shared personal connections and 
shared religion had the effect of producing far more trust from families as well as more 
inclusion in family activities.  My families liked showing me off to their friends and other 
family members.  I partook of their celebration for Eidul-Fitr and absorbed far more of 
the culture and family life than one would suspect with such short sojourns in Cairo.  
                                               
10 See Jillian Schwedler, “The Third Gender: Western Female Researchers in the Middle East.” PS: Politics 
and Political Science  39(July, 2006):  425-428 for a broader and more thorough discussion of the impact 




However, I was expected to adhere to Islamic norms for women.  This did not include 
veiling but did include where I went and with whom.  I was unable to attend events 
professors at Cairo University invited me to unless a female friend could accompany me 
and they feared to be out at night.  Indeed, I was once locked into an apartment with the 
granddaughter of the house.  While this was aimed far more at constraining the 
granddaughter than me, nobody seemed to think that this might create a problem for me.  
As an unmarried woman, I was considered a girl and a foreign one who needed to be 
protected.  Protection generally involves constraints on movements.  I was expected to 
give account of my movements and when I would return home.  Deviation did not 
produce anger or any kind of sanction but this immense worry and fear that something 
had happened to me while they were responsible for me.  While I could have done as I 
chose, I am sure, alienating those you live with is never a good idea.   
     This is an area of negotiating what I perceive to be their cultural norms and they 
perceive as religious.  This norm affects me as a female Muslim rather than as a Western 
female and trust is gained at the expense of freedom.  Within this context, it may surprise 
many that my lack of a veil was never an issue except insofar as moving about on my 
own became more of a problem as my families were convinced that I would be unsafe 
unless accompanied by another woman.  However, I was always considered a new 
Muslim that family members were anxious to instruct in Islam.  Veiling carried the 
instruction that a woman was perceived far more poorly if she started wearing one and 
then stopped than if she did not wear one at all so they approved of my caution. Further 
while religiosity and female veiling has grown in Egypt over the past twenty years, it is 




Nonetheless to veil or not to veil caused me a level of anxiety that a non-Muslim Western 
female researcher need not have in Egypt.  I feared that once I put it on, I would have a 
harder time justifying not wearing it in the U.S. and this need not be of concern to non-
Muslim women.  The decision probably did impact my ability to move around more 
freely though as at least some women in Egypt choose to veil in order to negotiate access 
to public space more freely.11 
 
Interview Methods 
     The primary method of data collection consisted of semistructured, qualitative 
interviews with faculty in the Faculty of Political Science and Economics at the 
University of Cairo.  I chose this particular faculty for two reasons.  The first reason was 
entirely practical.  The Faculty of Political Science and Economics was the one most 
accessible to me.   The second reason derives from the 2003 Arab Human Development 
Report.  The Report notes of the scholarly renaissance that marked the Abbasid Empire 
that “The third factor contributing to the scientific renaissance was that was preceded by 
a renaissance in the humanities and the social sciences.”12 
     Initial selection of faculty was largely based on their specific positions (i.e., senior 
faculty, junior faculty, lecturers as well as teaching and research assistants).  Initial 
contacts were facilitated by Dr. Ibrahim Karawan, and a fellow doctoral candidate, 
Mahmoud Hamad, with ties and contacts to Cairo University; I used a snowball technique 
to gain further interviews.  The snowball method relies on interviewees to give a name or 
other contact information of another person to be interviewed.  While this technique did 
                                               
11 See Arlene MacLeod.  Accommodating Protest: Working Women, The New Veiling, and Change in 
Cairo,  (New York:Columbia University Press, 1993) for an examination of how veiling is used to 
negotiate more freedom and access to public space by women in Cairo. 




not facilitate access across positions, it did prove helpful to gain more interviews across a 
position type.  The emphasis on within group referrals as well as an inopportune martial 
arts demonstration by student members of the Muslim Brotherhood at Al Azhar 
University led to a few interviews at the American University of Cairo (AUC)—a far 
more elite institution than Cairo University. 
     I spent four weeks in Cairo in December and January of 2005-2006 gathering 
preliminary data and December and January of 2006-2007 conducting interviews. 
Altogether I spent approximately nine weeks in Cairo across two years.  I obtained 
sixteen interviews.  I was able to interview five graduate students, six assistant 
professors, one associate professor and four full professors as displayed in Table 1.1. 
 










5 3 0 4 
Economics 0 1 0 0 
Statistics 0 0 0 0 
Public 
Administration 
0 2 1 0 
Computing for 
Social Sciences 
0 0 0 0 




     These numbers are skewed and reflect the necessity of an introduction from a person 
known to the interview subject.  Professor Karawan’s name opened doors with full 
professors while Mahmoud Hamad’s in-person introduction of me to graduate students 
and assistant professors facilitated those interviews.  Assistant professors and graduate 
students were most generous with their time and granted me two-hour interviews.  Full 
professors were only able to grant me an hour and the associate professor was kind 
enough to email me his answers.   
     Field research granted me the opportunity to better understand what it is like to 
conduct research within Egypt.  Much of what my interview subjects had to say both 
enhanced my own experience and I gained greater insights through living within Egypt 
than I would have if I had simply emailed questionnaires.  In particular, the intersection 
of gender and religion was highly informative.  Although it hampered my access as my 
families wanted me to be safe, it did generate rather more information as to what it might 
mean to be a female researcher and academic in Egypt.  It is not nearly as difficult as 
many Americans might believe but obstacles do exist due to concerns about safety and 
cultural expectations regarding marriage.  I was able to generate a lot of information out 
of a relatively small sample size and owe the families I lived with for even more insights 
gained as a participant-observer.13 
 
 
                                               
13Participant-observer was not a planned part of my methodology, just of my living arrangements.  
However, it did contribute strongly to insights I was able to form concerning the constraints of an 
authoritarian state and how that differs from cultural constraints.  With enough knowledge, cultural 
constraints are more easily escaped.  Unfortunately I did not spend enough time in Egypt to gain enough 






Advantages and Disadvantages of  
Qualitative Interviews 
     My interviews were conducted face to face and I took notes.  I had been informed 
before I began my research that tape recording would promote distrust and limit my 
information so I took notes by hand.  This in and of itself promoted my understanding of 
how a climate of repression limits research as it showed anxiety on the part of my 
interview subjects that their words could be used against them.  While full professors 
were much less anxious concerning the use of their names, graduate students were very 
fearful.   
          Use of positional “snowballing” or using a chain of referrals did increase the depth 
of interviews—particularly with graduate students.  As I was interviewing within a 
Faculty, one interview subject would generally directly introduce me to another and then 
we could exchange phone calls and emails to schedule an interview time.  It also seemed 
that when one person considered me trustworthy, another who considered my 
introductory person trustworthy would be more likely to answer an email or return a 
phone call after verifying my identity.  Name-dropping worked quite well but the initial 
points of contact were needed to vouch for my identity.  I sometimes waited days for 
those emails or phone calls to be exchanged to vouch for my identity.  Again, the more 




interviews.  The method of “snowballing” is useful in the Middle East and used by 
many.14 
     However, the snowballing method and qualitative interviews also contain certain 
disadvantages.  My sample is heavily skewed towards those initial positions wherein I 
was given an introduction by a person already trusted.  My sample contains only one 
associate professor and while time was certainly a factor for all my interview subjects, 
the issue of trust was also a factor.  Too, the sample size is too small to be considered 
very representative.  The use of qualitative interviewing techniques that are 
semistructured and reliance on open-ended questions is designed to allow interview 
subjects to volunteer information that the researcher might not have thought about and 
that worked.  However, while my interview subjects freely talked about other Faculties at 
the University as well as other universities, I did not gain any kind of access to faculty 
and graduate students at other Faculties.  Between my time limitations and constraints on 
my freedom of movement by families that I lived with, I also failed to access a good 
sample across departments within the Faculty that I studied.  If I had had the opportunity 
to stay longer and develop those networks and better learn to negotiate my freedom of 
movement without a female companion, my sample size would have been much more 
representative and the information generated could have been much greater.  As it was, I 
gained a great deal of information as once some trust was engendered, many really 
wanted to discuss issues concerning how they conducted their own search for the 
acquisition, dissemination, and production of knowledge. 
     For my study this means that generalizations across other disciplines cannot be made 
with any degree of confidence. Further the assertion made by The2003 Arab Human 
                                               




Development Report that a renaissance in the humanities and social sciences may portend 
a renaissance in the hard sciences cannot be empirically validated through my study.  The 
idea that a spirit of creativity and free and independent inquiry are necessary to 
developing new technologies and gaining new insights into the physical world would 
appear to be both logically and intuitively accurate.  Although the claim is logical my 
research cannot demonstrate the veracity of the claim.  This is disappointing and while I 
would argue that my research does show that a culture of repression fails to facilitate any 
open exchange of ideas, the small sample size and reliance on subject-generated ideas to 
lead me down unexpected paths limits and constrains the validity of my research to some 
questions.  Further, interviews with student activists would also have generated a much 
stronger understanding of how repression depoliticizes the university.  None of my 
interview subjects were willing to admit to any activism and, indeed, a known record of 
activism can spell the end of a career as a graduate student or new professor.  Full 
professors face fewer problems and are less fearful but many of their ties are with 
international institutions and think tanks.  Student activists among undergraduates would, 
doubtless, have had a great deal to say concerning repression but my method was not 
conducive to gaining introduction to undergraduates. 
Conclusion 
 
     The focus of my research concerned how the Faculty of Economics and Political 
Science carried out their work within the confines of an authoritarian state that had placed 
certain controls designed to depoliticize what had once been an important site of political 




style of ‘soaking and poking’15 and elicited information and understanding of the lived 
experience of my interview subjects but offers less in the way of determining causal 
relationships and generalizability.  Nonetheless, this type of study can generate insights 
despite its limitations.   
     In the following chapter, I will detail the concepts that are needed to understand how 
professors and graduate students negotiate conducting research and imparting learning to 
undergraduate within an authoritarian state.  In order to understand the context and how it 
functions to depoliticize those pursuing an academic career, we need to explore structural 
theories that seek to explain the persistence of the authoritarian state in the Arab Middle 
East.  The 2003 Arab Human Development Report’s conceptualization of the knowledge 
society and the obstacles faced in creating such a knowledge society gives insight into the 
environment within which academics must negotiate their task of carrying out the 
university mission that is likened to the knowledge society as explained by The2003 
Report.  The social capital concept can, in one dimension, further our understanding of 
the control exerted by an authoritarian state.  In another dimension, it helps us understand 
how academics negotiate their environment and escape authoritarian controls. 
     In order to better understand the context of Egyptian education and the 
depoliticization of Cairo University, we need to know something of the history of modern 
education in Egypt.  I will undertake this examination of history in Chapter 3 as 
previously stated.  In subsequent chapters, I will discuss the information found through 
my interviews at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science.  Chapter 7 will examine 
the recent Egyptian revolution and attempt to uncover why and how the university was 
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irrelevant while other links, sometimes facilitated by social media, were instrumental to 











     My methodology relied on a case study approach that emphasizes interpretation and 
privileges human generated meanings rather than determining directions of causality.  In 
the pages that follow I will discuss the theoretical concepts that help uncover that 
meaning and contextualize the lived reality of my informants. 
     Accordingly, this chapter broadly discusses structural theories pertaining to the 
Middle East and, in particular, why democratic transitions have failed to occur in the 
Arab Middle East.  Discussion of structural theories and persistent authoritarianism 
contextualizes the experience of professors and students at Cairo University and provides 
the concepts that explain why a transition was initiated in 2011.  Persistent 
authoritarianism and the tools of the ruling regime’s power maintenance strategies clarify 
why and how a knowledge deficit exists as outlined by the 2003 Arab Human 
Development Report.  While I will discuss cultural obstacles to further the 
contextualization of the environment in which Cairo University finds itself, the political 
obstacles outlined by the Report reinforce the findings of structural approaches to 
persistent authoritarianism and political and economic failures of Arab states.
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Finally, I discuss social capital as it pertains to the impact of an authoritarian state upon 
the university.  Ayubi’s16 contention that Arab regimes exercise power through 
politicizing bureaucratic appointments, found within structural approaches to the study of 
the Middle East, is reinforced by the contributions of Feddarke et al.17 on rationalization 
and transparency.  Together these help us decipher the puzzle of patronage politics within 
fairly well-institutionalized or rationalized bureaucratic structures.  Political 
appointments to key positions and strategic threats of the uses of security forces create 
disruptions that produce insecurity and distrust.  It is bridging social capital, as discussed 
in the work of Robert Putnam18 that allows escape from the pressures of political 
appointees and state security apparatus in order to create change. 
 
Structural Approaches 
     Reaction to the essentialism of some cultural approaches prompted structural 
approaches that emphasize political economy, colonialism, and institutions.   These 
approaches rely on concepts derived from the Western historical experience but stress 
malformation as a product of colonialism, external interference, and authoritarian 
regimes.  Culture and religion are subordinated to such structural factors as colonialism, 
external interference, and persistent authoritarianism. 
     Studies grounded in structural approaches emphasize the nature of Middle Eastern 
incorporation into the international economy and modern state system.  Structurally based 
studies do not deny the significance of culture and religion but stress the relevance of 
                                               
16 See Nazih Ayubi. Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East  (I.B. Tauris: 
1996). 
17 Johannes Feddarke, et al. “Economic Growth and Social Capital: A Critical Reflection,” Theory and 
Society.  28 (Oct., 1999): 709-745. 
18 See Robert D. Putnam.  Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2000) 
24 
 
universal theoretical frameworks to the study of the Middle East.19  That is, concepts such 
as civil society, social capital, and the knowledge economy and society can be 
successfully utilized to study the Middle East although unique histories and cultural 
specificities impact the substance within universal theoretical models, derived as they are 
from a uniquely European experience.  For example, Putnam’s study of social capital 
defines it as “norms, networks, and values.”20  Norms, networks, and values obviously 
exist in the Middle East but the content differs from European and Anglo-American 
content.  Differences in content are attributable to various causes but culture and religion 
are not perceived as deterministic as in the orientalist and occidentalist approaches.21  The 
structural position of Middle Eastern states and societies as they were incorporated into 
the international order plays the most pivotal role in determining the current content of 
norms, networks, and values.   
     One stream of structural literature concerning the persistence of authoritarian rule in 
the Middle East focuses on how any freedom enjoyed by civil society has been conferred 
upon civil society organizations by the state and not as a result of domestic pressure.    
States in the region have, in the main, tried to mobilize the masses to support the state 
and legitimize regimes.  Augustus Richard Norton observes that regime emphasis on 
creating mass solidarity has, paradoxically, had the opposite effect.  People, seeking 
refuge from a coercive state, rely on socially familiar and, yet often divisive, associations 
                                               
19Maha Abdelrarhaman, Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt(New York: Tauris 
Academic, 2004),  80-81 
20 Robert Putnam. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy(Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1993). 
21 These two approaches rely on timeless essentials of Arab and Muslim culture.  They are flipsides of one 
another with Orientalism as a Western approach that examines the Middle East as essentially unchanging.  
At its extreme it perceives the Arab Middle East as monolithic.  This approach was examined and critiqued 
by Edward Said in his book Orientalism.  Occidentalism derives from the Arab Middle East and generally 
agrees with Orientalist ideas concerning Islamic exceptionalism but argues that this is not only positive but 
that Islamic cultures are essentially superior to the West. 
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as family, clan, tribe, and sect.  These familiar associations are also the only secure place 
from which to launch even modest political and economic demands and aspirations.22   
Raymond Hinnebush affirms Norton’s observations: 
          Authoritarian-populist regimes also develop structures highly resistant to 
          pluralization.  While they exercise their power through military and bureaucracy, 
          they lack a stable social base in a dominant social class (aristocracy or  
          bourgeoisie) and therefore substitute the use of primordial (kinship, ethnic,  
          regional) ‘asabiyyah and patronage to assure elite solidarity and the deployment 
          of Leninist party organization and corporatist association to incorporate a popular 
          constituency.23 
 
     Nazih Ayubi echoes the finding that Arab regimes exercise power through 
bureaucratic means.  Rulers use bureaucracy to exert control through shifting people 
around and increasing unpredictability—contrary to Weber’s notions of bureaucratic 
utility through predictability and routinization.  Arbitrary shifts of administrative 
authority increase perceptions that all power emanates from the ruler and power and 
position is dependent on his whims.  Ruler methods of control over bureaucracy create a 
very power-conscious system that inculcates competition for access to the ruler and 
jealousy regarding any perceived encroachment upon administrative tasks and 
responsibilities.  A power conscious bureaucracy is less interested in meeting a goal than 
in defining a pecking order and hierarchy.  Competition for position or ruler patronage 
ensures that bureaucratic administrators will act as a check on other administrators and 
concern themselves more with their own power over their personnel.24 
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      More recent literature examines the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle 
East.  The authoritarian regimes of the Middle East endure even while formerly 
authoritarian states elsewhere have given way to democracy.25Middle Eastern regimes 
appeared able to manage political liberalization in the 1990s to maintain their rule,  
Similarly, despite the apparent reforms and political openings in the wake of the 
American invasion of Iraq, Middle Eastern regimes proved tenacious at hanging onto 
power.  Political reforms have stalled and, in many cases, reversed.  No authoritarian 
leader has been removed via the ballot box and of the Arab states only Lebanon has seen 
contested elections with some circulation of elites.                                                                 
    Eva Bellin explores the failure of MENA (Middle East North Africa) to initiate any 
kind of democratic transition.  Arguing that the prerequisites to democratization better 
explains failure to consolidate democracy than do explanations involving the presence or 
absence of civil society, a middle class, and other factors often considered necessary but 
insufficient to democratization,26 she relies on Skocpol’s well-known argument that 
revolution depends upon state capacity to maintain control over the means of coercion to 
better explain the marked resistance of Middle Eastern regimes to democratic transition.27  
Focusing on the robustness of the coercive apparatus, Bellin delineates four factors that 
help explore the relative robustness of the state coercive apparatus.  These factors include 
fiscal health, international support networks, the will and capacity of the coercive 
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27Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative 
Perspective,”Comparative Politics  36(Jan., 2004): 139-157. 
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apparatus to repress, and popular mobilization.   Although Egypt has a relatively well 
institutionalized security apparatus and its fiscal health is always questionable, it fares 
poorly on Bellin’s other indicators of democratic transition.  Despite poor fiscal health, 
the Egyptian regime is able to maintain itself through international support networks.   
     Bellin’s explanation of Middle Eastern failures to initiate democratic transitions as 
indicative of a robust authoritarianism rather than as symptomatic of the “absences” of 
Middle Eastern societies, escapes the essentialist trap while gaining explanatory leverage 
over Middle Eastern exceptionalism.  Bellin, like Salame,28 notes that there is an 
exceptionalism at work in the Middle East but it does not lie in the presence of Islam or 
any of the other explanations usually advanced for absent democratization in the region 
such as state-driven economies, impoverished and illiterate populations, absent or weak 
civil societies or geographical remoteness from centers of democracy.29  Instead the 
absence of democratic transitions in the region is better explained through the robustness 
of factors promoting the continuing existence of authoritarian regimes.30  Bellin’s 
approach allows the investigation of what is present rather than what is absent and, thus, 
gains better analytical purchase over Middle Eastern exceptionalism.  While the approach 
of prerequisites to democratization may hinder democratic transitions, they do not usually 
address persistent authoritarianism and failures to initiate democratic transitions in the 
first place.  Examining the factors of robust authoritarianism allows for the examination 
of the state and society and will also allow us to address the Arab Spring of 2011 in 
                                               
28Ghassan Salame notes that while Arab/Islamic exceptionalism appears to exist, the apparent continuity 
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(New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994), 2. 
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initiate democratic transitions. 
30 Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East”: 139-157 
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Chapter 7.  Factors accounting for the persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab Middle 
East reinforce the salience of political obstacles that the 2003 Arab Human Development 
Report outlines as detrimental to the formation of a knowledge society.31 
     In the following, I will apply Bellin’s explanatory factors of robust authoritarianism to 
Egypt.  Bellin’s robust authoritarianism changes our explanatory focus away from 
bottom-up factors and towards statist or top-down factors on societal formations.  While 
the explanatory shift might seem at odds with the rest of this dissertation, it allows us to 
more clearly delineate the state’s role on the societal formations indicated by social 
capital.  This dissertation’s emphasis on the state as the most important explanatory 
variable on social capital formation and salience to the knowledge deficit necessitates a 
greater articulation of the state.  Further, factors relating to robust authoritarianism as 
outlined by Bellin promote our understanding of the environment in which Egyptian 
academics live and work.   
 
International Support Networks and Egypt 
 
     Henry and Springborg hypothesize in Globalization and the Politics of Development 
the Middle East that the primary obstacles to economic development in the MENA 
(Middle East North Africa) region are political and result from regime power 
maintenance strategies.  They explore state capacity in terms of extractive capability, 
accountability, and transparency.    
     According to Henry and Springborg, strategic rents allow many states to escape the 
structural reforms required by globalization. Strategic rents include foreign aid and 
remittances.  Structural reforms would improve state capacity but would likely be the 
                                               




downfall of unpopular regimes.  The ability of many Middle Eastern states to garner 
strategic rents is a major obstacle in the reform process.  Egypt is one of the region’s 
biggest recipients of remittances and strategic rents in the form of foreign aid.  As of 
2004, the United States had delivered 50 billion USD of aid to Egypt since 1975.32  
Remittances have been estimated to be as important to Egyptian foreign reserves as 
tourism.  Too, in return for its participation in the 1991 Gulf War, Egypt garnered 
massive debt relief but came under IMF conditionality.33Macroindicators improved 
through the 1990s but failed to trickle down to popular sectors.   
     Egypt has proven particularly adept at avoiding reform or using it to further fragment 
society and prolong the rule of current elites.  Indeed, the ability of Egypt to both garner 
support from international networks in the form of aid and remittances may well be one 
factor in the failure of Egypt to initiate a democratic transition.  Although financially 
impacted by the global economy, the Middle East in general and Egypt in particular have 
managed to avoid political reform even as economic reform has taken place.  The 
relatively greater latitude of the Egyptian state in forestalling political reform can, in part, 
be attributed to the economic cushioning provided by strategic rents and remittances. 
     Henry and Springborg’s findings are in keeping with Bellin’s.  Although the poor 
fiscal health of the Egyptian regime would seem to indicate incipient failure of the state’s 
coercive apparatus, rents allow the Egyptian state to maintain and even increase funding 
for the state security apparatus even while adhering to IMF directives to cut food 
subsidies as well as following their own regime maintenance logic with regard to 
privatization.  Too, the regime has cut social welfare spending and education spending 
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but still manages to fully fund its coercive apparatus.  More dramatic failures in the 
global economy as well as in the economy of Egypt’s American patron would be needed 
to undermine the international support networks of the Egyptian state. 
 
Fiscal Health in Egypt 
     Eberhard Kienle uses the case study of Egypt to contest the neoliberal notion that 
economic liberalization will lead to political liberalization and democratization.34Kienle 
asserts that 
          This structural adjustment of liberties tended to restrict the liberties of economic 
          losers and extend those of winners, added political excorporation to economic 
          loss and recompensed economic success with a degree of political incorporation. 
          It sought to deprive the losers of the means by which they might have resisted 
          and to associate, within limits, with winners in order to create what some have  
          called an ‘alliance for reform.35 
 
Reforms undercut state patronage as directed towards the people and mass welfare and 
political competitors, primarily Islamists, rushed to fill the vacuum.  Patronage was 
turned from distribution of resources by the state to crony capitalism as the proliferating 
accusations of corruption during the 1990s demonstrate.36 
     Despite Egypt’s relative insulation from reform, the economy weakened so badly that 
structural reforms were undertaken by the Egyptian government in accordance with IMF 
demands.  Nonetheless, Egypt manages to delay reform and turn reform towards regime 
maintenance strategies.  As the regime can no longer effectively gain acquiescence to its 
rule, it has initiated political deliberalization.  Political deliberalization denies economic 
                                               






losers the means to resist and allows the regime to bring about new state-based patronage 
networks that maintain the ruling regime.  Henry and Springborg write 
          The civilian political system, in short, atrophied in the decade of the 1990’s, 
          providing a steadily smaller counterbalance to the military and security-based 
          core of the regime.  It is the need to serve that base, both directly by facilitating 
          the growth of the military economy, and indirectly through the encouragement 
          of crony capitalism, that accounts in large measure for the failure of structural  
          adjustment to be rapid or thorough…. 37 
 
As Bellin notes the military and security-based core maintains funding and support while 
the civilian system (which may be well-institutionalized) is underfunded and purposely 
fragmented.   
     John Sfakinakis asserts that the reform process of the 1990s offers insight into pre-
reform networks and the role played by policy reform in network creation.   He argues 
that a lack of transparency and accountability suited the state and networks of elite 
businessmen.  The state’s power maintenance agenda demanded allocation of patronage 
to a narrow base of supporters.  Elite businessmen wished to consolidate their monopoly 
of power over the marketplace.  Business and bureaucrat networks without accountability 
or transparency mechanisms managed to turn the privatization process into a means of 
rent distributions and political patronage.   
     In terms of Bellin’s robust authoritarianism, the crony capitalism and favoritism that 
reached unprecedented heights under Mubarak’s rule38 may have funded the sectors of 
the security apparatus but was problematic for the fiscal health of the nation.  Society did 
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not see any benefits.  Thus, crony capitalism may well have contributed to the recent 
Egyptian revolution.  I will discuss that possibility at greater length in Chapter 7. 
 
Capacity and Will of the Coercive Apparatus 
     According to Bellin, will and capacity should not be collapsed into a single category.  
A state’s coercive apparatus can have the capacity to crush a democratic movement but 
not the will or it can have the will but lack capacity.  Capacity is associated with 
institutionalization.  Bellin argues that institutionalization appeals to Weberian 
bureaucratization.  That is, how concerned is the security apparatus with rule-governed or 
proceduralized practices that are predictable and governed by merit?  In much of the 
Middle East, the distinction between the ruling regime and the security apparatus is 
difficult to discern as they are closely allied.39  Although Egypt’s military is relatively 
well-institutionalized,40  the security apparatus includes security forces other than the 
military whose affiliations are much more shadowy.   
     Four main branches are included in Egypt’s security apparatus.  These branches 
include the military, the police, the Central Security Force and the General Intelligence 
Service.41  The military, drawn from a cross-section of Egyptian society through 
conscription, is highly respected.  It is the police and Central Security Force, under the 
control of the Ministry of the Interior that is most hated by Egyptians and has been the 
primary target of Egyptian anger in the 2011 Revolution.42  The distinction drawn 
between the military and the police and Central Security is crucial to the relative success 
                                               
3939Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism”: 143-145. 
40Ibid., 149. 
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42 The Revolution will be addressed more thoroughly in Chapter 5.  
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of the revolution according to Bellin’s understanding of a robust authoritarianism.  While 
this will be addressed at much greater length in Chapter 5, institutionalization of the 
security apparatus in Egypt allowed both the Egyptian people and the security apparatus 
to draw distinctions among security branches and the ruling regime.  While capacity was 
certainly present, will amongst some branches in the security apparatus was likely 
missing.  The institutional distinction between the military and the police and Central 
Security Force was important not only to the Egyptian people but also for institutional 
calculation as to how to respond to reform demands. 
     Despite a relatively well institutionalized security apparatus, Egyptian coercive ability 
remains high.  The puzzle of relatively high institutionalization coupled with patronage is 
replicated elsewhere in Egypt.  Ayubi’s contention that the need to secure ruler patronage 
for position security ensures that bureaucratic administrators will remain loyal to the ruler 
out of self-interest may also provide explanatory power for this puzzle.   
Within the university, political appointment of university rectors and deans appears to 
also serve the purpose of maintaining regime power through patronage or as Ayubi 
contends, through the reliance of key individuals on the ruler’s power and position to 
maintain their own.  Too, the presence of security forces on campus maintains the 
visibility and threat of the regime’s coercive power at the university.   
 
Popular Mobilization 
          In Salwa Ismail’s work Political Life in Cairo’s New Quarters, the problems 
engendered by neoliberal reform and an oppressive state apparatus are confronted by 
popular sectors of society.  For the residents of popular quarters such as Bulaq the state as 
a coercive and oppressive force is everywhere but in terms of public services the state is 
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nowhere.  At one time Bulaq was one of the sites of militant Islamic activism but this was 
contained by the state in the early 1990s.  Ismail contends that a fundamental shift 
occurred with neoliberalism wherein the distributive state became the security state.  
Ordinary citizens of the popular quarters are disengaged from the state as the state 
becomes a more brutal and repressive but nonresponsive state.  People are more involved 
in the informal economy and informal networks.43 
     The militant Islamic nature of Egypt’s popular mobilization indicates the relative 
importance that can be played by real or perceived threat in garnering support from 
international networks for regime maintenance.  Indeed, the Islamist nature of opposition 
movements may well have depressed middle-class demands for democratic reforms and 
certainly contributed towards a lack of international support.  The Mubarak regime has 
long used the threat of the take-over of the Muslim Brotherhood to counter international 
demands for reform from key supporters, the United States and Europeans.   
     These factors have made the costs of repression relatively low in Egypt.  However, the 
2005 Kifaya (Enough) Movement ushered in a change in popular mobilization and 
networking capability through social media.  The trajectory of popular mobilization and 
alliance behavior amongst opposition groups has only increased over time.  Hence, by 
2011, cost calculations of repression dramatically changed in Egypt.  The change in the 
costs of repression that occurred in society did not take place at the university.  The cost 
of political activism remained high at Cairo University for students and professors alike. 
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The Arab Human Development Report and 
Obstacles to Knowledge 
 
     The 2003 Arab Human Development Report examines one of the three obstacles to 
economic development in Arab states—the failure to develop a knowledge society or the 
existence of a knowledge deficit in the Arab states.  Substantial political and social 
obstacles exist in Arab societies to the acquisition, dissemination, and production of 
knowledge.44 
     The authors of the Report chose the metaphorical concept of knowledge society over 
the far more instrumental concept of the knowledge economy.  The authors appeared to 
have wanted a concept that would emphasize how freely made linkages promoted 
knowledge acquisition, dissemination, and production.  They operationalize knowledge 
society through precisely these variables—acquisition, dissemination, and production.  
Hence, the use of knowledge society as a term within this dissertation as well as the 
exploration of the utility of the social capital concept in order to better ascertain how 
linkages and, in particular, links among persons or networks might promote or hobble 
knowledge acquisition, dissemination, and production and, specifically, how that impacts 
Egyptian academics at Cairo University as seen through the Faculty of Economics and 
Political Science.  In order to better understand what is meant by knowledge acquisition, 
dissemination, and production, a discussion of obstacles from the 2003 Report is 
necessary.   
      Political and cultural obstacles stand in the way of knowledge acquisition, 
dissemination, and production.  While my research question focuses far more on the 
political obstacles than cultural ones, I do examine cultural obstacles at some length, 
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here, in order to contextualize and give a fuller picture of the sources of the Arab 
knowledge deficit.  Further, as my methodology relies on an interpretive case study, 
cultural issues do sometimes explain problems encountered by my interview subjects at 
the Faculty of Economics and Political Science.  Hence, the 2003 Arab Human 
Development Report’s exploration of the political and cultural obstacles to knowledge 
acquisition, dissemination, and production provides a necessary context to explore how 
members of the Faculty function within an authoritarian regime. 
     Finally, throughout my interviews I encountered information that validated the 2003 
Report’s emphasis on political obstacles as the most important set of problems that 
academics encountered in carrying out the mission of universities—to acquire, 
disseminate, and produce knowledge.  Cultural obstacles, although certainly present in 
the information given to me, appeared to be more negotiable.  Nonetheless, I detail 
cultural obstacles here to provide better context for following chapters concerning the 
history of education in Egypt and information gathered in interviews. 
 
Political Obstacles 
     Obstacles to knowledge diffusion include the well-known problems facing the mass 
media in Arab countries.  Most Arab regimes are not strong proponents of freedom of 
speech and freedom of the press.  Egyptian journalists are routinely harassed, fined, and 
imprisoned under the 2006 Press Law that basically forbids the criticism of public 
officials.  An oft-cited example of the application of this law is the case of Al-Dustour 
editor, Ibrahim Eissa and journalist, Saher Zaki.  Eissa and Zaki were each sentenced to a 
year in prison for publishing a story that concerned the Mubarak family.  The paper had 
reported on an ordinary citizen’s complaint that President Mubarak had misused up to LE 
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500 billion in funds accrued by privatization of several companies.45  Although 
information technologies have allowed some to sidestep regime repression, it has also 
given the Mubarak regime new crimes to consider and new people to arrest and or 
prosecute.  Two well-known Egyptian cases include blogger Karim Amer, who was 
sentenced to three years in 2007 for sedition and insult to Islam on his blog.    More than 
one protest has been organized via the social networking site, Facebook.  The Mubarak 
regime has reacted with arrests of organizers and the use of torture in an attempt to 
extract names and passwords of participants.46 
     Obstacles to knowledge production and application include a lack of state and private 
investment into R & D and the reliance on importation of technology as a means to 
acquire technical knowledge.47  The authoritarian states prevalent in the Arab World 
place constraints on institutions that render the creativity and free spirit of inquiry 
necessary to knowledge production politically risky.  The above examples that show 
constraints upon dissemination of knowledge are equally applicable to researchers.  
These political constraints not only stifle individual creativity but also lessen the linkages 
necessary to exchange knowledge.  In other words, what might be termed social capital48 
that creates or relies on links amongst actors and groups becomes suspect and loses 
efficacy in an authoritarian environment.  The networking aspect of social capital is 
heavily scrutinized by the state as a potential site of opposition and, thus threat to regime 
power. 
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     The 2003 Arab Human Development Report notes several cultural obstacles as well as 
recounts antidotes within the religion and culture of the region.  As is often the case with 
sociocultural and socioreligious factors, the contradictions inherent in these factors mean 
that the solutions to obstacles are also a part of the Arab religious and cultural heritage.            
     This is where the Arab Human Development Reports sharply differs with popular 
imagination and, sometimes, scholarship in the West.  Europeans and Americans 
sometimes identify religion and culture as the source of Arab problems while the Report 
understands culture and religion as holding contradictory values.  Precisely how and what 
values inimical to knowledge development are currently dominant is a question that 
needs to be examined.  The indictment of an entire culture and religion risks getting rid of 
values that are positively inclined to knowledge acquisition along with those that are less 
so.   
      Islam, the religion of the majority of Arabs, encourages its adherents to seek after 
knowledge.  The marked tendency of Arab-Islamic civilization and empires, historically, 
has been to encourage knowledge and the pursuit of learning.  Currently, however, an 
emphasis has been placed upon an interpretation of Islam that encourages quiescence and 
undermines free inquiry.  The authors of the Report note that these interpretations 
promote authoritarian rule as they discourage free thinking, free speech, and free inquiry.  
Simplistic and repressive interpretations have also been picked by some of the region’s 
Islamic movements who may rely on superficial understandings in order to mobilize 
followers to violence against oppressive regimes that allow little or no resort to change 
through peaceful political challenges.  Clearly, however, the religion that once produced 
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the Golden Age and such thinkers as IbnRushd,49 al Khwarizimi,50Ibn al Haythm,51 and 
many others also contains a part of the solution to current obscurantism.  According to 
the authors of the 2003 Arab Human Development Report, the prevailing interpretation 
and understanding of Islam must shift to one that emphasizes inquiry. 
      The role played by the Arabic language is also considered by the Report’s authors.  
While Arabic is a very rich language, current failures to translate and produce new 
knowledge are implicated in two serious problems that are associated with knowledge 
acquisition, dissemination, and production failures.  First the Report discusses the 
problem of Arabization in universities.  Failures to translate enough knowledge into 
Arabic present serious obstacles to knowledge acquisition for many university students.  
Indeed, in the homes where I lived young people attending Cairo University often 
struggled over assigned reading for their classes that was written in English.  None of 
them were really proficient in English and it seemed to present yet another obstacle to 
understanding and internalizing the knowledge they were supposed to be acquiring in 
their university studies.   
     The second major problem noted by the authors of the Report had to do with the 
method and curricula for learning Arabic.  Arabic diglossia presents learning and 
teaching challenges.  Classical Arabic is far more formal than the spoken Arabic, which 
is used for everyday communication.  Classical Arabic is used in almost an elitist fashion 
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to exhibit knowledge and the ability to use formal classical Arabic.  Arabic language 
classes emphasize writing over reading and bifurcations appear to be growing—between 
highly educated elites and the popular classes as well as between a classical language and 
everyday, modern language needs.   
     The third cultural obstacle covered in the Report discusses how Arab popular culture 
is caught between conformity and creativity.  Popular or folk culture is transmitted 
through the same type of relationships that inform social capital.  While the actual 
knowledge transmitted is the commonsense described by Antonio Gramsci,52 the 
tendency towards bifurcation in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab World seems to ensure 
that the commonsense of the people and the knowledge of intellectual elites do not 
interact much, if at all.  My experience with the cabdriver coming hard on the heels of an 
interview with a professor exemplifies the gulf between the spontaneous cooperation of 
the Arab streets and the knowledge of elites. 
     The final obstacle that the Report examines is the relative openness of Arab cultures.  
Historically, Arab culture was quite open.  The Report’s authors describe the first great 
opening and assimilation as the encounter with Greek Civilization.  Seeking new 
knowledge and the translation and assimilation of it went hand in hand with the 
burgeoning Arab empire.  The second great opening discussed by the Report is contact 
with European Civilization in the nineteenth century.53  The Report’s authors do not 
examine the difference between these contacts though.  The difference is better examined 
by a review essay from Richard Bulliet.  Muslims came as conquerors to Greek 
Civilization while contact with European Civilization in the nineteenth century carries 
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with it the flavor of defeat rather than victory.  While Bulliet agrees that the contact has 
touched off substantial efforts to assimilate knowledge from non-Islamic sources, he is 
far more inclined than the Report authors to argue that this assimilation and 
diversification is still taking place.54  These ongoing efforts to assimilate new knowledge 
through Arabization and Islamization from a position of relative weakness may well 
account for some of the identity conflict and challenges faced by Arabs today. 
      For the purposes of this dissertation, the findings of the 2003 Arab Human 
Development Report concerning obstacles give background and context for the mission 
of Cairo University and some of the problems confronting the dissemination, acquisition, 
and production of knowledge.  Problems are primarily rooted in political obstacles. The 
desire of an authoritarian regime to maintain control results in overt laws to control 
knowledge and information.  However, maintaining emphasis upon cultural and religious 
values amenable to authoritarianism is also far more engendered by the state than an 
essential characteristic of Egyptian culture or the Islamic faith.  Interpretations were once 
different and, as the authors of the Report note can be changed once again. 
 
Contemporary Analyses of Social Capital 
    Pierre Bourdieu formulated one of the first articulations of the concept of social 
capital.  Bourdieu’s initial treatment defined the concept as “the aggregate of the actual or 
potential resources which are linked to a possession of a more or less institutionalized 
relationship of mutual acquaintance or recognition.”55   Bourdieu emphasizes the 
fungibility of all forms of capital; hence, his treatment of social capital is quite 
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“Social Capital: Origins and Applications,” Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998): 3. 
42 
 
instrumental.  Social capital is made up of two basic elements.  The first element is the 
access to resources possessed by associates in the more or less institutionalized 
relationships that make up social capital.  The second element pertains to the amount and 
quality of resources.  The lack of prominence of Bourdieu’s treatment of the social 
capital concept is unfortunate as his conceptualization focuses on the benefits that accrue 
to individuals based on participation in groups as well as the purposeful creation of 
sociability structures to derive benefits.56 
     This value neutral treatment of social capital avoids the ideological baggage often 
attached to the term.  Social relationships are created to allow individuals to access 
resources.  The more recent normative assumptions about the overall value of social 
capital to society in general are completely missing.   
     Economist Glenn Loury uses the social capital concept in his critique of orthodox 
economic theories.  Loury asserts that social context does matter to opportunity and that 
the merit notion fails to take into account the poorer connections of young black workers 
in the labor market.57Loury’s tentative use of the social capital concept to critique the 
overly individualist emphasis of orthodox economic theory paved the way for James 
Coleman’s more well-known treatment.  
          Social capital is defined by its function.  It is not a single entity, but a variety of       
          different entities having two characteristics in common:  They all consist of some  
          aspect of a social structure and they facilitate certain actions of individuals 
          in that structure.  Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making   
          possible the achievements of certain ends that would not be attainable in its  
          absence.58 
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Coleman’s definition does little to advance our understanding of how social capital 
generates access to resources as he generally fails to distinguish between resources and 
the personal relationships that create access.  It does, however, give us a place to begin 
looking—social structures or general frameworks for how social interactions occur.  
Coleman familiarized many with the concept of social capital but he lacks Bourdieu’s 
clarity.  Coleman’s definition suggests that we know social capital when we see it and 
conflates function with resources.  Coleman’s work on the concept lends itself to a 
propensity for tautological statements whereas Bourdieu clearly distinguishes between 
resources and the social structures cultivated by individuals to access those resources.  
Nonetheless, it is Coleman’s work that has become the better known and more used 
definition.   
     Since then several theoretical analyses of social capital have appeared.  While political 
scientist Robert Putnam will be discussed below, the most interesting of these theoretical 
treatments comes from Ronald S. Burt.   Burt’s treatment diverges from previous 
analyses because he highlights holes rather than dense networks.  Structural holes refer to 
disconnections in an individual’s network.  For example, the gap between intellectual 
elites and the masses so eloquently expressed by a professor that I interviewed in the 
introduction to this dissertation is such a hole. 
     Burt argues that it is more effective and efficient for a person to cultivate smaller and 
more diverse networks.  Smaller, diverse networks can bring in new information and new 
opportunities whereas dense networks repeat information, thus opportunities are 
limited.59 
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Social Capital in the Work of Robert Putnam 
 
     Robert Putnam is the most well-known articulator of social capital in the political 
science literature.  No discussion of social capital within the field of political science 
would be complete without an examination of his work.  Putnam’s work is as important 
for its flaws as for its virtues.  It is the flaws in his work that have led to a refinement of 
many questions concerning social capital as a useful concept, the role of civic 
engagement in successful democracies and vibrant economies, as well as the role of 
political culture and path dependency as determinants of modern political realities.  
Hence, I will discuss the flaws in Putnam’s work while acknowledging that his work 
makes a significant contribution to political science.  
     In Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy,  Putnam’s original 
intention was to examine how a new administrative reform was institutionalized.  
Specifically, Putnam asked the significant question “What are the conditions for creating 
strong, responsive, effective representative institutions?” (Italics in original).60   The 
Italian central government devolved power to regional governments in 1970 and, thus, 
provided a rare opportunity to study institutional effectiveness.  The quantitative portion 
of Putnam’s study makes a strong case that the same institutions perform differently in 
different contexts.  These findings caused Putnam to expand the scope of his study to ask 
how civic regions became that way and how civic engagement promotes good 
governance.61   Putnam shifts from quantitative to qualitative methodologies and while 
reviewers such as Sidney Tarrow applauded Putnam’s linkage between quantitative and 
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qualitative data,62 the qualitative portion of Putnam’s study was carefully scrutinized by 
reviewers and found wanting.  Putnam’s problematic use of Italian history63 to explain 
differences in civic engagement is, perhaps, the most oft-cited issue with his enlarged 
study.  However, a greater problem may lie in the second question of how civic 
engagement promotes good governance.  The phrasing seems to eliminate the possibility 
that good governance may promote civic engagement.  In other words, the specification 
of good governance as the causal agent promoting civic engagement obviates the 
possibility that good governance may well be the crucial causal factor that promotes civic 
engagement. 
     In Putnam’s argument social capital, defined as “features of social organizations such 
as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society facilitating 
coordinated actions,”64  promotes civic engagement and, thus, is the backbone of good 
governance.  According to Putnam, horizontal associational activities are the networks of 
social capital and by promoting group norms they facilitate the emergence of trust which, 
in turn, is associated with civic engagement and, hence, good governance.  Nonetheless, 
there is an important problem with Putnam’s understanding of trust.  While associations 
may promote within-group trust, it is not clear how that trust is translated into the broader 
society.65   Norms constructed within a network or association does not automatically 
translate into expectations that those outside the network will follow the rules and norms.  
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Indeed, the more highly developed the rules and norms of a specific community, the more 
likely it is to be closed to outsiders.66   In order for rules and norms to be generally 
understood by those outside the community, they must be codified and enforced.  This 
brings us back to the role of the state.  While habits of association may indeed facilitate 
good governance, good governance may also facilitate social capital. 
     Levi suggests that it is Putnam’s romanticized vision of community that accounts for 
his failure to clarify the links between social capital, civic engagement, institutional 
performance, democracy, and a vibrant economy.67   This romanticized vision leads 
Putnam to neglect possible structural factors that might be implicated in low social 
capital.  Tarrow argues that it is possible that “while the indicators of malaise might be 
civic, the causes are structural.”68   A romanticized vision of social capital may well be at 
the root of the conceptual confusion in Putnam’s work as, despite an attempt to clarify his 
murky understanding of trust, Putnam’s subsequent work, Bowling Alone, has similar 
conceptual confusions. 
     While Putnam clarifies trust to a certain extent in Bowling Alone, he still fails to 
adequately address how societal trust is translated into trust for institutions or even how 
this might matter.  This failure produces something of a problem as trust is one of the 
components in Putnam’s definition of social capital.  Putnam’s distinction between 
bonding and bridging social capital serves as a metaphorical device whereby social 
capital as a concept might escape the particularistic bonds of communities. “Bridging” 
does elucidate how an ethic of societal pluralism might form. 
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       Bridging social capital is a civic and inclusive type of capital.  It is outward looking 
and provides linkages to external assets and provides a means to gain and disseminate 
information outside of a person’s community.  Bridging social capital generates broader 
or multiple identities and linkages amongst diverse social groups.  Putnam likens this 
type of social capital to WD-40 that greases the wheels of social interaction amongst 
social groupings or communities.  Groups may build relations with other groups in 
common interest areas, thus, linking diverse groups into social relations via issue areas.   
Putnam argues that it is bridging social capital that facilitates the emergence of 
generalized reciprocity that is necessary to build broad societal trust.  Broad societal trust 
generates efficiency.69 
     Why should bridging social capital be considered superior to bonding social capital in 
generating a societal norm of generalized reciprocity or trust? Burt’s examination of 
structural holes has some relevance to the bridging metaphor.  Burt asserts that emphasis 
on a bridging or linking metaphor misses the real causal agent which is the hole or chasm 
that is spanned.  The actual strength of the relationship or bridge is of less interest than is 
the information and opportunities that can span the hole or chasm.70  For example, 
Mohammed Adel, an activist from the Egyptian April 6 Movement, went to Serbia to 
gain knowledge from CANVAS.  CANVAS and the April 6 Movement were not and are 
not the same network.  Mohammed Adel created the bridge by seeking a relationship.  
This, in essence is how social capital can be used to bring in new information and or 
resources from outside a network.  We might also begin to examine social media with 
this type of conceptualization in mind.  Facebook was not important in and of itself.  Its 
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importance lies in how it serves as a mechanism to bridge holes.  Generally, my research 
indicates that dense networks are less advantageous than some sort of mechanism that 
bridges a hole or provides a link between networks.  New knowledge is better acquired 
across networks than within densely connected networks.  A bridge is simply the link that 
disseminates the new knowledge. 
 
Social Capital and Bureaucracy 
     Accordingly, then, in order to examine how social capital pertains to bureaucracy in 
Egypt we need to focus on whether bureaucracies function  more often as a source of 
institutionalized sources of rationalized procedure or are mired in the arbitrary shifts of 
administrative power that encourage the perception that the ruler can rule by arbitrary 
whim as outlined by Ayubi.  This question revolves around autonomy or how the 
bureaucracy is rationalized and procedures made explicit and how the regime may insert 
patronage into otherwise Weberian rational bureaucracies. 
Feddarke et al. suggest that rationalization or formally codified rules and norms facilitate 
the growth of linkages outside the community.  Rationalization is a process of abstracting 
rules and norms so that they are procedural rather than substantive.  Proceduralization 
improves the comprehensibility of rules and norms to agents outside of the community.  
Transparency is tied to the specifics of community agents who understand the rules and 
norms, rationalization abstracts and codifies those rules and norms.  Rationalization 
promotes the gradual replacement of informal associations with formal administrative 
structures.  Individual identity or leadership lessens in importance as rationalization 
improves the flexibility of social capital.71 
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     The distinction made by Feddarke et al. between transparency and rationalization is 
quite useful.   Their minimal definition of transparency as comprehensibility is 
potentially far more functional than they appear to give credit.  While rationalization as a 
proceduralized, codified and abstracted mode of delivery can promote institutionalization 
of previously informal structures, too much rationalization also stifles economic 
development.  Rationalization must also be transparent or comprehensible.  Otherwise it 
crowds out the flexibility of informal associations and replaces it with cumbersome 
bureaucracy that has too many procedures for people within and without a given society 
to gain opportunity and advantage.   At a state level rationalization needs to occur but 
more is not necessarily better.  It is far more advantageous for a state to effectively 
enforce a few codified procedures than continue to ineffectively build a mountain of 
regulations—none of which can be enforced.   
     Rationalization and enforcement relate to Peter Evans’ notion of embeddedness. In 
Evans’ thought, the concept of embeddedness relates to the ties that develop between 
bureaucrats and businessmen.  While this is a form of social capital, there is frequently a 
tendency for these types of relationships to deteriorate into crony capitalism.  Another 
way we could look at embeddedness in terms of comprehensibility as well as legitimacy 
and credibility is to examine precisely what states are rationalizing.  This may well be a 
particular problem for many postcolonial states that might be following well-meaning 
developmental advice or codifying law based upon norms left by the powers that 
previously controlled them.  Rationalization should proceed from traditional norms and 
rules.  That is, states should be concerned with the codification of rules and norms of the 
community they purport to rule.  This is a better way to understand embeddedness.  
50 
 
Rationalization should be embedded within the society that the state rules as that will 
produce better transparency.   
     Unfortunately, as Ayubi notes, bureaucracy may be predicated on patronage and used 
to maintain regime power and, in particular, to maintain a particular leader.  Egyptian 
bureaucracy contains a mixture of rationalization and patronage with certain bureaucratic 
positions and occupants of those positions owing far more to the state’s leadership than 
bureaucratic channels of merit.  The Faculty of Economics and Political Science finds 
itself here as, although strongly committed to Weberian bureaucratic norms, some 
appointments are entirely political.  The security presence on campus also functions as 
Ayubi argues—a point of disruption to rationalization or institutionalization that 
maintains the regime as the focal point of power and access.72  These positions wherein 
the regime maintains its power by making itself the guarantor of pay, power, and prestige 
depoliticize the university through the politicization of appointment.  The work of Ayubi 
and Feddarke et al. contain insights for the puzzle of an Egypt that is relatively well-
institutionalized or rationalized as Feddarke et al. would have it while mired in patronage 




     Persistent authoritarianism and failure to initiate any kind of democratic transition is 
what truly marks the Arab Middle East as different and, indeed, exceptional.  Structural 
explanations that examine the effects of colonialism, place in the world economy, or rely 
on other institutional or structural mechanisms have all sought to explain the persistence 
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of authoritarianism in the region.  Eva Bellin’s explanation relies upon Theda Skocpol’s 
key insight that it is the will and capacity of security forces to contain the people that 
explain when a social revolution will occur.  This insight also explains whether or not a 
democratic transition or political revolution can occur.  Bellin’s novel approach does 
contribute strongly to our understanding of the failure of Egypt to initiate a democratic 
transition before the Arab Spring through the provision of a matrix of variables pertaining 
to the will and capacity of the security apparatus that interact to produce transition or 
continuation of the status quo. 
     Persistent authoritarianism is the political context within which Cairo University 
operates and impacts the Faculty of Economics and Political Science.  It is a strong 
contributor to the knowledge deficit or failure to create a knowledge society as outlined 
by the 2003 Arab Human Development Report.  Indeed, the cultural obstacles that the 
Report details provide context.  However, it is the political obstacles that more strongly 
hinder research and the quest for knowledge on the part of professors and students alike. 
The state controls the university in such a manner as to render it a neutered political force 
that does not organize opposition or initiate calls to reform.   
     While control is well outlined by Bellin’s approach, I will argue that the environment 
that affects university is better understood through the social capital concept.  
Specifically, I will show how the rationalization and proceduralization that constitutes a 
Weberian type bureaucracy has been impacted by strategic political appointments that 
allow the state to exert control over the university.  This question strongly relates to how 
the Faculty of Economics and Political Science operates within the context of an 
authoritarian state.  What networks are formed?  How have state controls inhibited the 
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interaction of intellectuals and the masses?  How do the political obstacles used by the 
state to inhibit democratic transitions contribute to a knowledge deficit? 
     In the following pages, I will address these questions that I have raised as they relate 
to my argument.  The theoretical concepts of structural theories, particularly Bellin’s 
articulation of the factors that impact initiations of democratic transitions, as well as the 
2003 Arab Human Development Report’s examination of obstacles to a knowledge 
society and social capital are all concepts that can structure our understanding of the 
environment in which the Faculty of Economics and Political Science carry out scholarly 
tasks.  Further this promotes understanding of what factors changed to allow the Egyptian 
Revolution of 2011 and why youth were so strongly represented in demonstrations but 
the university appeared completely irrelevant.  Inquiry into a depoliticized university by 
an authoritarian state and the protests that emerged in 2011 to overthrow Mubarak can be 
explored with the same concepts.  These concepts include Bellin’s international support 
networks, fiscal health, popular mobilization and will of the coercive apparatus as well as 
social capital and the 2003 Arab Human Development Report’s concept of the knowledge 
society and obstacles to building it.  The issues are interrelated and within the following 
pages I will tease out those relationships.  First, however, I will briefly examine the 
history of modern education in Egypt in order to better establish our understanding of 
how the university became depoliticized as well as the particular issues Egypt has faced 











     In the following pages I will discuss the historical role of scholars and the quest for 
knowledge within the Islamic Civilization. I will further contextualize our discussion of 
current problems at Cairo University with a brief discussion of modern political uses of 
education generally before proceeding to a brief history of the Cairo University and its 
depoliticization.  University professors and graduate students I spoke with at Cairo 
University’s Faculty of Economics and Political Science were generally personally 
devoted to knowledge but also needed to maintain their own job security.  They were not 
interested in losing opportunities but sought to acquire, disseminate, and produce 
knowledge within the confines of an authoritarian state that places controls over 
academics and university life.  This chapter elucidates the background of how that 
unfolds through a discussion of Egyptian educational history. 
     Before proceeding to the current findings and modern research, I discuss the historical 
foundations of the Islamic Golden Age for the type of knowledge society that The 2003 
Arab Human Development Report seeks to emulate.  The historical antecedents for free 
inquiry are present without solely emulating the West.  How this was done may prove 
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important to reproducing bridging social capital within the region that facilitates rather 
than inhibits the search for knowledge.  I will explore the history of modern education, 
largely held to have begun with the reign of Muhammad Ali.  I also briefly discuss the 
origins and history of Cairo University and the gradual imposition of control mechanisms 
by the state.  The founders and early scholars of Cairo University dreamed of an 
institution that would promote research and knowledge.  Today’s scholars also dream of 
that and have ideas about how that might be accomplished despite funding constraints 
and state control mechanisms.  In order to better understand both their hopes and 
constraints, we need to know something about history. 
 
The 2003 Arab Human Development Report 
and the Islamic Golden Age 
 
     Currently the state of Arab knowledge is marked by importation and imitation rather 
than innovation.  However, this was not always the case.  A scholarly character that 
flowered in conjunction with Abbasid rule marks historical Islamic culture.  The 
Abbasids ruled from Baghdad and supported a renaissance under the auspices of Qur’anic 
injunctions to seek knowledge as well as more practical and mundane needs.  The 
humanities and social sciences were the first to flower under Abbasid rule but a growing 
empire needed to address practical problems.  Many of the scientific applications 
contributed by Arab scholars were in response to genuine needs of administration and 
development.   
     The authors of the Arab Human Development Report remark at some length how 
translation preceded and encouraged innovation.  Albert Hourani also remarks upon the 
support the Abbasids gave to the translation of Greek knowledge into Arabic.  While 
55 
 
some of this was purely practical, Hourani asserts that intellectual curiosity was also a 
significant factor that encouraged innovation and promoted the Islamic Golden Age.73  
Too, knowledge from Iran and India was translated into Arabic.  This produced a 
synthesis of far-flung knowledge and scholars who were able to build upon that 
knowledge.  This stands in stark contrast to the situation in modern day Egypt wherein 
translation is scarce74 and students and professors struggle to gain access to scholarly 
materials.   
     With the support of rulers and religion an open scholarly culture developed.  The 
Islamic civilization, in which Arabs played a large role, significantly contributed to 
human knowledge.  Two of their greatest achievements include development of 
mathematical rationality and the use of experimentation as a method of proof.   
     Currently that open, innovative culture bequeathed to modern Arabs has stagnated and 
a certain reluctance towards critical inquiry prevails in the present-day Arab states.  
Educational systems and authoritarian states may be, at least partly, to blame.  The 
authors indicate that reliance on rote memorization is prevalent in the region and the 
humanities and social sciences that have such strong impact on creativity, innovation, and 
critical inquiry are controlled by the state.   
     The 2003 Arab Human Development Report postulates three factors as important to 
the development and establishment of the Islamic scholarly city. The first pertains to the 
provision of resources by political and social authorities. The second factor arose from 
the practical needs of the community. The diversity of the Abbasid Empire required 
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organization and science was needed for practical problem solving. Finally, the authors 
note that the explosion of research and practical applications of sciences was preceded by 
development in the humanities and social sciences as previously stated. 
     Humanities and social sciences developed first largely as a means to better understand 
the Qur’an.  As the early Muslims spread through conquest of surrounding areas they 
encountered new situations as well as peoples with other knowledge bases.  Linguistics—
the study of Arabic—emerged to better understand the word of God and imbued Arabic 
with words and concepts better able to handle philosophy, theology, and scientific 
abstraction.  Arabic grammars were also constructed fairly early on in order to aid new 
converts in understanding the Qur’an.  The need to make vague Qur’anic principles 
applicable to everyday life drove a fair amount of intellectual activities.  The science of 
hadith (narrative of actions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) stemmed from just 
such practical needs as did the limitation on what was accepted as authentic hadith.  
Beyond hadith came law and the foundation of legal schools to interpret the Qur’an and 
hadith as a guide to everyday behavior.  
     The second factor asserted by The 2003 Arab Human Development Report that 
practical problem solving drove the search for new knowledge and its practical 
application also finds substantiation in the literature.  For example, Stanton notes that al-
Khwarizimi developed algebra as a practical tool to solve problems in inheritance, 
commerce, and lawsuits.75 
      The provision of resources by political and social authorities may be somewhat more 
problematic and is certainly less straightforward.  A system of education and higher 
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learning did develop in the Islamic Civilization quite early in its history but it may well 
be that this system served more to create civil servants than to foment research and 
development.  In other words, the educational system most patronized by rulers and 
societal benefactors may have functioned more to promote a particular point of view and, 
thus, support a certain social order.  This type of traditional education that relies on rote 
memorization usually serves to reinforce social hierarchies and traditional authorities.     
     The modern Arab state appears to rely on traditional methods of rote memorization to 
teach modern subjects as well as reinforce compliance to state hierarchies and authorities, 
hence, reinforcing its own rule.  Like classical authorities within the Islamic Civilization, 
modern rulers prefer to institutionalize methods of learning that lend themselves to 
stability and hierarchy over free inquiry.  
     Intriguingly many of the practical issues and encounters with diverse knowledge 
sources that drove the Islamic Golden Age to achieve advances in knowledge are also 
present in the current era.  It is curious that the challenges incurred by a growing empire 
were met with an attitude of inquisitiveness and exploration of knowledge while the 
challenge that came from Europe in the nineteenth century has been met with a less than 
open attitude and a strategic importation of knowledge.  Religious culture cannot possibly 
be dismissed as a component of this puzzle.  While it is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to sort out such startlingly different reactions to similar problems, the 
difference does need to be noted as the Arab Middle East grapples with significant 







Historical Overview of Education in Egypt 
  
     The traditional systemic order of education was destabilized in the nineteenth century 
as a new order rose but did not supplant the old system.  Instead the new existed right 
alongside the traditional.  Heyworth-Dunne notes that 
It is in the nineteenth [century] that we get, not exactly a complete change in  the 
social and intellectual life of Egypt, but the introduction of another culture, quite 
new to Egypt, the growth of which was encouraged  at the expense of the old 
system.  The methods and ideas of the old intellectual world were not only still 
used, however, but largely determined the new methods and the conflict of two 
cultures became the dominant feature of the nineteenth century.76 
     Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman General sent to roust the French out of Egypt, 
introduced a number of educational innovations in his quest for a powerful, modernized 
state.  Like the Ottomans in Istanbul, Muhammad Ali was interested in matching 
European power and many of his educational reforms showed this intent.  The religious 
education traditional to Egypt did not prepare Egyptians to fulfill the technical needs 
required by Muhammad Ali’s ascent to power.  He required specialist training and skills 
to modernize Egypt.  Traditional religious instruction had not been designed to educate 
the technical specialists needed to build a modern state able to hold its own with 
European powers.  Traditional education was designed to perpetuate and maintain the 
traditional systemic order—not to meet the European challenge. 
     Muhammad Ali developed a strategy of education predicated on specialist training to 
produce the military and technical personnel needed for his modernization plans.77    He 
sent missions to Europe to acquire the technical training and skills not found in Egypt’s 
traditional educational institutions.  Muhammad Ali established institutions of higher 
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learning and technical training before establishing a basic mass education consisting of 
primary and secondary schools.78  Schools were administered by a central educational 
administration called the Diwan al Madaris.79 
     Centralized administration and a bifurcated educational process were evident at the 
advent of modern reform.  Centralized administration encouraged the subordination of 
education to state purposes and bypassed the traditional elite.  General mass education 
was rather poorly developed.  Muhammad Ali’s reforms thus established divergence as a 
structural feature into Egyptian education.  First a bifurcation occurred between 
traditionally educated religious elites and a technically trained elite influenced by Europe.  
A further differentiation was introduced between basic mass education still largely 
influenced by the traditional method of schooling the kuttab, which aimed to instill an 
Islamic code of conduct supportive of the traditional order and the technical and 
specialist needs of a modernizing state. 
     Muhammad Ali’s reforms hardly survived the gutting of his power in the 1840s and 
the profligacy of his heirs.  However, modern education can be traced back to his rule.  
Muhammad Ali initiated the conditions that would sustain further demands for 
modernization and independence by Egyptian elites.  Williamson writes, “The roots, 
therefore, of powerful expectations about education and national independence can be 
traced to the period of Muhammad Ali’s reforms and the changes they unleashed on 
Egyptian society.”80 
     The British invaded in 1882 with the stated intention of restoring order and revamping 
the Egyptian administration to ensure prompt payment of Egypt’s large foreign debt.  The 
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British perceived finance and debt as particularly acute and of the utmost importance to 
address and, thus, gave low priority to education—an expenditure.  When the British 
finally turned their attention to education they were anxious to avoid perceived mistakes 
in India.  Largely molded by Lord Cromer, Egyptian education was intended to produce 
masses instructed in basic rudimentary subjects.81   The British articulated minimal 
educational goals that included “staffing local civil service, the creation of a thrifty 
peasantry, and an artisan class skilled in European manufactures.”82   The British wished 
to avoid the creation of an intellectual class resistant to colonial authority as in India.83   
Education was to be limited to the needs perceived by the colonial authorities.   
     The British also deepened the bifurcations and divisions introduced by Muhammad 
Ali. 
          In Egypt, educational effort was therefore to be split along class and geographical 
          axes, reinforcing barriers between country and city and maintaining an appropriate 
          class hierarchy.  The course of instruction in elementary schools or kuttabs— 
          usually the only school available outside the provincial capitals—did not allow 
          successful students to continue on to European-language education in preparatory 
          and technical schools, or obtain the certificates that would allow them employment  
          in the civil service.84 
 
Further, the British solidified the connection between education and civil service.85      
Consistent with their goal of producing a compliant Egyptian administration, the British 
system discouraged independent thinking and, instead, promoted memorization.    
Memorization was a crucial component for civil service exam preparation.  
Governmental needs, as determined by the British, dictated secondary exams and 
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educational opportunities.  The intent was to discourage, if not prevent, students from 
seeking further education.  Critical thinking and free inquiry were also discouraged.  
Opportunities were restricted through examinations, fees, and a lack of facilities.86 
     The differentiated track of religious education underwent no changes and “the 
curriculum of elite government schools encouraged submission to authority and 
passiveness which limited independent thought.”87   The British were not interested in 
either the personal development of Egyptians or the needs of a society undergoing a late 
modernization process.88 
     The British conceded nominal independence to Egypt in 1920.  Egyptian nationalists 
had severely criticized British policy as retarding educational development.89   The 
nominally independent Egyptian state inherited a system that enhanced class and 
geographical cleavages and was further limited by a lack of financial resources.  
Nonetheless, and not surprisingly, the Egyptian Constitution of 1923 “mandated that 
primary education be free and compulsory for all children from six to twelve.”90   In the 
best tradition of nationalist and industrializing policy the Egyptian administration had, as 
its first goal, the elimination of illiteracy as well as the creation of a unified, basic 
education for the entire country.91 
     The constitutional mandates of 1923 reflect Gellner’s observations that industrializing 
and modernizing societies require a unifying, school-transmitted culture and not a 
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traditional folk-transmitted one.92  Gellner’s work explicates why traditional Islamic 
education with its emphasis on inculcating an honor code and stabilizing and maintaining 
a traditional systemic order is ill-suited to the needs of an industrializing and centralizing 
state.  Industrialization requires a literate workforce that will allow for technical 
specialization.  Literacy promotes adaptability while unification and centralization of a 
school system provides a pool of similarly educated workers.  However as a late 
industrializer and modernizer, Egypt needed to educated leaders able to develop an Egypt 
competitive with the advanced, industrialized powers.  The sheer difficulty of 
simultaneously creating a national educational system and developing elites competitive 
with European elites coupled with a lack of resources made a dual track system nearly 
inevitable. 
     Elementary and compulsory schools were intended to “provide a tuition-free 
education to the masses with great stress on religion, reading, writing, and arithmetic.”93   
The goal of universal literacy went largely unmet due to the financial limitations of the 
nascent Egyptian state.  The primary school system was meant to provide an education 
for the future leaders of Egypt, but charged tuition until 1943.  Primary schools delivered 
a superior education but further enhanced class and geographical divisions.  Rural and 
poor students had better access to elementary and compulsory schools while the urban 
and moderately well to do filled out primary school enrollments. 
 
Egypt, Knowledge and the State 
     The socialist reforms of Nasser finally centralized the educational administration and 
standardized curriculum throughout Egypt.  Nasser believed the army to be the only 
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institution able to create a national educational system that would eliminate or, at least, 
ameliorate class and geographical differences and conflicts, hence the extension of 
military influence into schools.94    Emphasis on the military is consistent with Nasser’s 
conviction that only the army was capable of producing a single, unified Egyptian 
identity.  As in Gellner’s work, schools were the medium of transmission for a national 
culture and identity.  In practice, Nasser’s regime adopted the French model that had 
already taken root in Egypt but placed a stronger emphasis on Arabic and incorporated 
military training.95    Nasser’s intention was to promote patriotism and nationalism.  A 
strong emphasis on Arabic promoted Egypt’s Arab identity and a sense of Arabism while 
turning away from European languages as the source of modern education. 
     Despite numerous difficulties, the educational system was unified and standardized by 
1970.  Typical of the French system, students were required to pass centrally 
standardized examinations to proceed to the next level.  While testing had the advantage 
of encouraging a unified and standardized national educational system, it had the 
unfortunate side effect of strengthening an already existing tendency towards the 
memorization of material to pass exams.  The British who, by no means, wanted 
independent thinkers sitting for civil service examinations had also encouraged rote 
memorization, already evident in traditional education.  Too, Nasser’s promise of 
government employment to university graduates echoed a British policy that associated 
education with civil employment. 
     The Nasser regime was responsible for: 
(1) the rationalization of educational provision and removal of fees (2) the 
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         expansion of education at all levels in the system and (3) the inclusion of an Arab 
         nationalist orientation into the curricula of both school and university courses and 
         the use of schools as agencies of political socialization.96 
 
Although not eliminated, illiteracy was greatly reduced by Nasser’s reforms.  Despite 
success in a number of areas, Nasser’s reforms are also associated with a number of 
problems.     
     Nasserist ideology required that Egypt, as an Arab leader, share resources with other 
Arab countries as well as extending a general invitation to all Arabs to study in Egypt.  
Resource sharing very nearly overwhelmed Egypt’s educational system.  Added to the 
burden of education of the Arab World were Nasser’s military commitments that further 
depleted financial resources.    In other words, Nasser’s ideological commitment to 
leadership and unification of the Arab World overextended Egyptian resources.  Cochran 
writes 
          While Nasser remained an idol to the rest of the Arab World, his use of military  
          force and Arab nationalism to implement a unified philosophy overwhelmed 
          Egyptian education.  The elite-masses dichotomy had been destroyed in favor of 
          mass-secular education of questionable quality….The theory seemed humanitarian 
          but its implementation proved unmanageable.97 
 
Nasser’s overextension, due to ideological commitments, undermined the achievements 
of his regime.   
     Intending to improve Egypt’s educational system as well as improve the overall 
Egyptian economy, Sadat’s infitah or open door policy reintroduced class and 
geographical differences into education.  The masses attended overcrowded, poorly 
funded government schools, while once again private foreign language schools produced 
graduates better able to compete for high-paying jobs in the private sector.   
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     Educational reform is now a near perennial project of the Egyptian state.  Sadat’s 
policies, intended to raise educational quality, exacerbated divisions and conflicts 
between rich and poor, rural and urban, foreign and Egyptian.  Infitah rapidly reproduced 
the conditions found in the nominally independent Egyptian state of the pre-Nasserist 
period.   The population explosion put further pressure on an already severely constrained 
educational system.  Egypt is unable to sustain the mass educational needs of its rapidly 
expanding population while simultaneously improving educational quality.  While the 
Egyptian state and people are clearly committed to the goal of an education that 
effectively enables Egyptian youth to participate in the global economy, implementation 
of policy goals is problematic and the prioritization of power maintenance by the ruling 
regime further hinders the development and implementation of educational policy that 
will produce a truly competitive Egyptian youth. 
     Sadat’s infitah policy encouraged foreign investment in the Egyptian educational 
system.  The Camp David Accords also resulted in a strong American aid presence—
administered by USAID.  The reintroduction of foreign investment and aid means that 
extranational actors also set educational policy goals.  While popular support for 
improving modern education is extensive and foreign and national actors display an 
apparent commitment to common goals, a greater number of actors exacerbate conflict 
over implementation. Ayubi’s contention that Arab bureaucracy is marked by power 
consciousness is applicable here. Access to the ruler, to funding and maintenance of 
administrative power bases likely undercuts coherent policy formulation and 
implementation.  The efficient hierarchy and routinization of Weberian bureaucracy is 
personalized by power considerations.  Conflict is usually further heightened when some 
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of those actors are foreign and the state is a late modernizer once administered by a 
European colonial authority.   
 
Cairo University: Its foundation and history 
     As noted in Chapter 1, Cairo University was founded in 1908 with the mandate of 
‘knowledge for knowledge sake’ as a secular alternative to the education offered at Al-
Azhar.98  Cairo University, once known as the Egyptian University, was founded as a 
liberal arts college that made research a cornerstone of its mission.  Originally a private 
institution, Cairo University became Egypt’s first state university in 1925 when it found 
itself unable to generate sufficient funds to meet the growing demand from Egyptians for 
a secular, liberal arts education founded on the European model.  The university 
demanded as much autonomy as possible from the Ministry of Education as a condition 
for accepting a reorganization that turned it into a Faculty of Arts and added a Faculty of 
Science.99 
     Overall quality of education deteriorated under Nasser’s popularization of the 
universities.  University enrollments exploded and Cairo University’s student population 
grew two and one half times.100  The idea was quite similar to the ones implemented by 
Nasser at the primary and secondary levels.  As Cochran notes, however, although the 
ideas seemed good ones and far more egalitarian than previous policies, the 
implementation was impracticable as funding could not keep up with burgeoning 
enrollments.  At the root of popularization was an overall political agenda that promoted 
                                               





the idea that the university and, indeed, knowledge was not for knowledge sake but for 
the state’s sake. 
     The mandate that emphasized a liberal arts education and university autonomy too 
foundered upon Nasser’s emphasis on technical learning to industrialize Egypt and his 
use of the university as a means of inculcating a national ideology.  Nasser wanted 
professors to articulate an Arab nationalist ideology and freedom of thought, speech, and 
action were suppressed in favor of a state-sponsored use of the university as a tool of the 
regime’s development goals.  The goals at the university level were the same as those for 
primary and secondary schools.  A people would be built that were unified and able to 
contribute to the economic development of Egypt as envisaged by Nasserist ideology.  It 
was in the Nasser era that police informants became ubiquitous and Cairo University lost 
substantial autonomy and became, instead, a government bureau.101 
    Sadat initially reversed some of his predecessor’s policies.  Sadat reduced some 
restrictions on the university by allowing professors to elect their deans and removing the 
police presence on campus.  Student activities were also facilitated although Sadat 
reversed this policy with the University Law of 1979.   The University Law of 1979 was 
part of a two-prong strategy meant to counter Marxist-Nasserist student activism.  First 
Sadat increased surveillance and control by augmenting the numbers of student 
informants and using presidential security men to masquerade as students.  The overall 
purpose for the masquerade was to infiltrate student organizations.102   The second part of 
the strategy was to encourage what was then, Islamic religious activism to counter the 
left.  Sadat’s two-prong strategy used to rid the ruling regime of troublesome radicalized 
                                               
101Ibid., 24. 
102Kirk J. Beattie.Egypt During the Sadat Years  (Palgrave-MacMillan, 2000), 102. 
68 
 
leftist elements appears to have strengthened the politicization of Islam, resulting in a 
stronger Islamist presence. 
     The overall legacy from the Sadat years is continued state repression of the academy 
and the promotion of a sociopolitical movement that is not necessarily friendly to 
academic freedom.  Further in attempting to curb the problems caused by Nasser’s over 
reach through infitah,103Sadat reproduced many of the problems that plagued newly 
independent Egypt.  The Mubarak regime has consolidated repression of academic 
freedom.  Curbs on freedom are pervasive although not generally visible.  
 
Conclusion 
    Although the current era shares certain issues with the era of Islamic empire, solutions 
have differed dramatically.  The initial spread of Islam out of Arabia advanced an 
atmosphere of translation of foreign knowledge and critical inquiry to support the needs 
of burgeoning empire.  The modern era appears to view both foreign knowledge and 
critical inquiry with suspicion.  In the post Golden Age of Islam, rote learning was 
institutionalized to promote stability within the Islamic Civilization.  Rote memorization 
has persisted into current times and is one of the hobbles to a free spirit of critical inquiry 
that The2003 Arab Human Development Report insists the region is capable of.   
     The support for rote memorization had its political uses traditionally as well as 
currently.  Just as the British found it expedient to discourage independence of thought, 
so too, does the Egyptian ruling regime.  Surveillance, coercion, and legal controls have 
been established to depoliticize the university and maintain the population, particularly 
the student population, in a state of political dormancy.  In this atmosphere a knowledge 
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society cannot flourish.  Inasmuch as a university is a microcosm of a knowledge society 
wherein knowledge and information are freely acquired, disseminated, and produced the 
university also cannot freely flourish in its mission.  In order to accomplish the minimal 
tasks pursued by a university, professors and students must depoliticize. 
 
CHAPTER 4 




     The senior professors I interviewed asserted that they were short on time and preferred 
to answer the questions they thought most important first.  The two questions that they all 
found most important were those having to do with funding and academic freedom.  The 
importance and urgency that senior professors attached to the issues of funding and 
academic freedom deserved to be treated separately.  They spoke at length on either one 
or both of these issues and echoed concerns and problems that have plagued Egyptian 
education since the time of Mohammed Ali.  Senior professors were quite concerned 
regarding the overall deterioration of Egypt’s educational system.  Several had some 
ideas concerning how funding for higher education could be improved as well as some 
suggestions for some of the private institutions that are being built to give students unable 
to go to the national universities another option.   
     While some senior professors claimed that academic freedom was not much of an 
issue and that red lines are easily sidestepped by the use of alternate language, at least 
one asserted that “there is no academic freedom in Egypt.”  Both the state and societal 
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actors hamper the free exercise of thought and speech in Egypt.  There is on the one hand 
state prosecution of academic Saad Eddin Ibrahim.  On the other, the charges brought by 
Islamists against Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid served as notice that the state would not protect 
academic research from societal pressures.104 
     The people ought not to be romanticized.  Egyptian society is not at all liberal in the 
classical sense of the word.  Removal of the state apparatus would not necessarily reveal 
a liberal democracy waiting to spring forth.  Nonetheless, individuals have shown 
themselves to be able to take advantage of different structures that facilitate the bridging 
kind of social capital.  The culture, history, and religion of a society do matter, as 
Putnam’s study in Italy asserts.  However, the state’s efforts to depoliticize and render the 
university quiescent as well as its refusal to defend academics from Islamists makes the 
authoritarian state a far more important force here contributing to the knowledge deficit 
and hence the restrictions on knowledge found at Cairo University.   
      An emphasis on funding and academic freedom may well serve to give some ideas 
concerning how reform of the state could facilitate a knowledge society or once again 
promote Cairo University’s original mandate of ‘knowledge for knowledge sake’ rather 
than hindering it as it does now.  This is less the romanticized, bottom-up version of 
social capital causing good governance and economic efficiency as Putnam appears to 
argue but, rather, the better use of the state’s ability to constrain as well as to build 
bridges (or at least remove impediments) that can cross the structural holes that this 
dissertation is finding to be applicable to Egypt.  These holes have, in turn, promoted the 
depoliticization and irrelevance of the university to modern political life in Cairo. 
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     University inability to maintain autonomy and the use of positions reliant on state 
patronage have undermined the search for knowledge that Cairo University was 
originally charged with and rendered the university less able to be the site that serves to 
produce challenge and reform.  Indeed, traditional methods of instruction and the 
strategic use of patronage positions within the university have turned it into an institution 
that helps maintain regime power and is subservient to the state.  The original mandate of 
‘knowledge for knowledge sake’ might be more appropriately rendered ‘knowledge for 
the state’s sake’.  In other words, the political obstacles outlined by The 2003 Arab 
Human Development Report inhibit and constrain the university mission.  The university 
mission is quite similar to the knowledge society as described by the 2003 Report that 
acquires, disseminates, and produces knowledge. 
 
Education and Money 
     Lack of funds affects the entire Egyptian educational system.  Public learning facilities 
are inadequate and outdated throughout the system.  Overcrowding begins early with 
primary school classes often containing around fifty students.  Teachers are poorly 
compensated and while some will try to educate all of their students, most devote their 
time to the tutorial groups that they teach for a fee after regular school hours.  Those 
tutorials are designed to maximize student scores on exams and teachers may spend their 
days off, afternoons, and evenings with smaller more manageable groups of students that 
pay for the tutoring needed to get high exam scores.  While private schools are the best 
ones in Egypt, all Egyptians effectively pay for education.  Those who cannot pay for 
tutoring cannot hope to improve their children’s prospects.   
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     Exams culminate into the al thaniwiyya al‘aamiyyaor leaving exam.  It is that exam 
that determines which Faculty a student can enter after secondary school.  The university 
is free to all students with satisfactory al thaniwiyya al‘aamiyya scores and students who 
score better than 80 percent get financial awards from the state.  One professor told me 
that hundreds of thousands are enrolled at national universities.  According to the 
Egyptian constitution higher education is completely free to students—although there is 
some indication that free is becoming free like primary, middle, and secondary schools.  
Many students come from very poor families and are also eligible for financial awards.  
In fact, with subsidies available for texts and housing as well as free dorms, students 
should not, theoretically, have to pay for anything.  The state is overwhelmed with the 
financial burden.  In other words, the lack of money is a part of the problem fueling the 
knowledge deficit and constraining university personnel.  This also has an impact on the 
structural hole between intellectuals and the people or society that a social capital lens 
can help us uncover.  The people are a part of the problem and recipients of education 
and financial aid but not really addressed as a part of a possible solution. 
     A professor who informed me of the financial failures that caused the Ministry of 
Finance to look to the university as a fund raiser also shared some possible solutions.  He 
suggested a nominal tuition be imposed for students who had the financial means.  He 
was not suggesting that students foot the entire bill or even match state funds but that a 
low tuition imposed upon middle class students would alleviate the financial strain 
somewhat.  The law was rejected and many professors and university administrative 
officials and staff actively opposed the law as it would have meant the abolition of free 
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education.  The abolition of free education was perceived as further fragmenting a society 
already fragmented by class and social inequalities.   
     Another possible solution my informant argued for was the reactivation of the waqf.  
The Islamic waqf(pl. awqaf) is an endowment made for religious or charitable purposes.  
Historically, waqf (endowment, public trust) institutions funded the madrassah105 system, 
hospitals, medical schools as well as students.  According to my informant, Cairo 
University was initially established as an NGO or endowment from Ismail Pasha’s 
daughter who donated jewelry and then Egyptians came up with the rest of the money to 
build the university.   In 1952 a law was issued prohibiting Egyptians from leaving 
money to awqaf.   Abolishing the anti-waqf law could alleviate some of the funding 
problem as many Muslims might be willing to leave money to a waqf established for 
education.  Well-off Muslims might also be willing to create such endowments.  While 
the state may look in askance at the reassertion of an Islamic institution and state officials 
might fear them as promoting an Islamic backwardness and parochialism, the waqf  has 
strong legitimacy among the masses as well as an historical legacy that dates back to the 
institutionalization of education, hospitals and so on within the Islamic civilization.  
Waqfs also endowed several of the halaqas that lent themselves to the type of free inquiry 
The 2003 Arab Human Development Report wants to see reestablished.   
     Waqf would, however, would mean a competitor to the state in terms of funding to 
universities and, hence, it would loosen some controls that the state has put into place.  
While the state might find traditional methods of learning useful, the ruling regime does 
not appear to want competition from traditional means of societal and individual 
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exercises of power.  A reintroduction of awqaf would gain the benefit described by 
Feddarke et al in Chapter Two.  It would bring in a society-centric solution to funding 
problems that is transparent and comprehensible to the public.  Hence, awqaf could 
partake of the positive type of bureaucratic social capital examined by Feddarke et al. and 
reiterated by Bellin in terms of institutionalization. 
     Students who are not eligible for financial awards frequently attend private 
universities.  Other than the American University of Cairo, these schools are of low 
quality.  My informant argued that the money rich businessmen spend to found and own a 
university would be better utilized by the national universities.  If the waqf system were 
revived, there would be greater incentive for wealthy businessmen to establish awqaf in 
their names or to leave money to established awqaf as a form of zakat or sadaqa 
(charity).  This sort of system would be analogous to the endowment of chairs at 
American universities or scholarship funds set up by private individuals for specific types 
of students.  Endowments and scholarships would, then, be a form of bridging social 
capital that would act as a mechanism spanning a hole between the public and the 
university. 
     Another senior professor felt that the private universities had potential.  Unfortunately, 
she claimed, they were undermined by poor quality students as only students who do not 
get the required grades to attend the free national universities enroll in them.  She said 
that exceptions were increasing though as private universities have fewer students and are 
often more conveniently located.  Nonetheless, these private universities kept very lenient 
standards so that all might pass.  Lenient standards do not make a degree worth too much 
on the job market. 
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     It is possible that private universities may have some potential but their very low 
quality does not appear likely to rise without some form of incentive.  Whether, as the 
second professor would have it, that would come in the form of student demand as more 
qualified people opted to attend a private university or came from above in the form of 
higher standards set by the university founder and administration is a social capital type 
of question.  Will demand for better education come from the bottom-up or the top-
down?  There is a case to be made for both.  Students and their parents want a degree that 
will help them get a job in a job market that is not producing nearly enough employment 
for its youth.  If someone founds a university for reasons of prestige and Islamic charity, 
they might find it more prestigious and worthwhile from a civic point of view to promote 
higher standards.  Which has more impact?  Further, does this problematique run into the 
same obstacles that the national universities encounter wherein students expect to 
memorize to pass an exam?  Will student expectations quash reforms that improve 
standards as much as the authoritarian state does?  Arguably such solutions that are to be 
found in the revival of the waqf might very well serve to produce a linking mechanism or 
bridge whereby such questions are constantly negotiated by institutions and the society 
they serve to educate. 
     All professors spoke highly of the quality of education found at the American 
University of Cairo—a private university.  With its American-style liberal arts emphasis, 
the AUC educates Egypt’s elite.  Professors have more freedom at the AUC than at Cairo 
University and many professors teach at both institutions and are in a position to speak of 
those differences.  There are two noticeable differences between the private American 
university and the national universities.  First is the level of academic freedom and 
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expectations of students.  Second, the students at AUC are different.  They are a part of 
the westernized elite of Egypt.  AUC is expensive and most Egyptians cannot afford to go 
but would they, if they could? 
     A very new professor (fresh from her dissertation defense) suggested that they might 
not.  She asserted that private foreign universities were not in harmony with society.  
Differing teaching methods and administrative structure at private, foreign universities 
advances a divide between society and these universities.  The elite, Westernized 
education offered at private foreign universities was superior to Egyptian education but 
too alien and too expensive to have much impact on most Egyptians.  Rote learning is not 
conducive to the American liberal arts style education purveyed by the AUC.  Other 
private foreign universities are generally European and are also grounded in a Western 
style liberal arts education.  There is a structural hole here then wherein only already 
Westernized elite students—likely products of foreign run private schools—are best able 
to take full advantage of private foreign universities while most of society’s students 
would struggle academically and financially.  Is there any bridge for this structural hole? 
      There very well may be a bridge.  There was once an Islamic liberal arts education.  
A liberal arts education was called adab and someone who had mastered the polite 
generalized knowledge of adab was called adib. Adab was pursued by those of the 
middle and upper socioeconomic classes and was particularly encouraged for government 
officials. Adab was thought to facilitate administration of government affairs as it 
promoted the generalized knowledge and rational faculties that underpin the ability of 
individuals to understand, extrapolate, and problem solve.  The study of adab was 
pursued quite informally and a number of Muslim polymaths authored texts covering 
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general knowledge. One of the most comprehensive of these was Abu Abdallah al 
Khwarzimi’s (not to be confused with the famed mathematician Musa Al Khwarazimi) 
two-volume encyclopedia of knowledge.106 
     So why did adab die out? Like the informal halaqa that produced prodigious 
knowledge during the Islamic Golden Age, the Islamic liberal arts education was not 
institutionalized. Muslims institutionalized the kind of learning that lends itself to 
stability–rote learning. The emphasis on rote learning continued even as Muslims 
generally and Egypt specifically imported knowledge from the West.  Muhammad Ali, 
considered Egypt’s first modernizer of education, was not interested in revising the 
method of learning—just the subjects studied.  Like many Middle Eastern rulers, 
Muhammad Ali was a defensive modernizer.  Ali wanted European learning and 
technology so as to defend Egypt from European encroachment and compete more 
effectively with European power.  Maintenance of traditional rote learning and the 
bifurcated system that Ali introduced also ensured relatively greater political stability 
during a time already marked by significant change.  Traditional learning is to teach 
everyone their place and role in society.  The introduction of modern subject matter while 
retaining traditional rote learning appears to have much the same effect.  Rote learning is 
not conducive to creativity and will not produce another Golden Age for the Arab world.  
Unlike the period of collection and translation of knowledge that began the Golden Age, 
knowledge from Europe was not Islamized and, thus, authenticated.  As noted in Chapter 
3, responses to the challenges of expanding empire and Western encroachment have 
differed dramatically, no matter how similar the underlying problems are.   
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    Reintroducing adab or an Islamic liberal arts education could encourage Egyptian 
society to perceive this style of learning as authentic—not just an alien Western import 
that might be destructive to Islamic values.  Currently most Egyptians consume 
information quite strategically and only learn or memorize for exams.  General 
knowledge is not perceived as useful.  Much as Muhammad Ali imported only 
knowledge that would serve his defined purposes, Egyptians currently import the content 
of Western scientific and technical knowledge in a strategic manner.  The Islamization of 
knowledge by scholars from the Golden Age has not been replicated as modern Muslims 
encounter new sources of knowledge.  Unfortunately, the failure to Islamize knowledge 
through scholarly debates means that knowledge has never been authenticated and 
internalized.  A liberal arts education with its emphasis on development of the individual 
is similarly viewed with suspicion as something that could be destructive of Islamic 
community.  An Islamic liberal arts education would likely encounter less resistance from 
society and would encourage scholarly debate conducive to the Islamization of 
knowledge. 
     While the reintroduction of an Islamic liberal arts education could possibly bridge the 
structural hole between society and the intellectual elite, it could also deepen the growing 
chasm between Egyptian Muslims and Egyptian Coptic Christians.  The new professor 
who expressed that the AUC was out of harmony would likely be quick to question just 
what an Islamic liberal arts education would mean.  This professor was the only one to 
make a point out of letting me know her religion—Coptic Christian.  The growing 
Islamization of society was of deep concern to her as she felt it promoted a black and 
white type of thinking and, not infrequently, was targeting Copts as other.  This is a point 
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that must be taken very seriously.  Does Egyptian education, as it currently stands, 
promote a national identity as Nasser had wished?  A senior professor I interviewed felt 
that the university played an important role in the development of a common national 
experience and identity.  Would a reintroduction of an Islamic liberal arts education 
further the bifurcation between Muslims and Copts?  Would it promote black and white 
thinking and destroy secularism?  Would it be even worse than the current authoritarian 
regime for the acquisition, dissemination, and production of knowledge? 
     In terms of social capital an Islamic liberal arts education could bridge some structural 
holes while deepening others.  What kind of role it plays depends upon the content as 
well as the method of teaching.  Currently critical thinking about Islam is not welcomed 
by either state or society.  As critical thinking is not much welcomed at all, it is hardly 
surprising that the dominant religion should be perceived as beyond question.  However, 
like many Muslims, Egyptians have tended to sacralize human interpretation without 
realizing it.  An Islamic liberal arts education could ameliorate this tendency and, 
perhaps, allow for a better and more solid bridge between Muslims and Christians.  It 
might also promote a broader questioning of what secularism is and what it might mean 
in a predominantly Muslim state. 
     In terms of a knowledge society, the emphasis on building an individual able to 
understand, extrapolate and problem solve through the development of rational faculties 
found within an Islamic liberal arts education would serve to return dynamic creativity to 
the Arab world.  This is particularly so if some means of institutionalizing the 
spontaneous halaqa of the Golden Age could also be found.  In order to accomplish this 
sort of change, resources must be invested in education.  Education should have a higher 
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priority than security services if Egypt is to flourish politically and economically.  State 
investment choices have a strong impact.  Private universities could, as one senior 
professor argued, change the learning dynamic and are probably currently the best hope 
for doing so.  Nonetheless, the state plays a strong role as it is the state that decides if 
these universities will be allowed to operate at all and, if so, under what conditions or 
standards. 
    Another substantial problem that came up in nearly every interview was the lack of 
funding for libraries.  There is a shortage of access to databases and to peer-reviewed 
journals at Cairo University.  There is also a shortage of hard copy materials in the 
library.  Recent Ph.D.s usually maintain some sort of subscription to the university in the 
West that granted them a Ph.D.  However, the lack of funding impacts the ability of 
scholars at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science to acquire, produce, and 
disseminate knowledge. 
    The lack of funding hampers the ability of professors to stay up to date in their field.  
This, in turn, hampers their ability to acquire new knowledge.  Dissemination is also 
impacted as professors cannot impart what they do not have to students.  Moreover 
knowledge production is limited by the lack of databases for research purposes as well as 
the overall lack of peer-reviewed journals and hard copy materials.  In order to become a 
knowledge society or even the more limited knowledge economy, the free flow of 
information is a necessity.  Indeed, the availability of books, databases,  peer-reviewed 
journals, and other sources of knowledge of information that have been translated into 
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Arabic might also provide a bridging mechanism between the Arab Middle East and the 




     One senior professor informed me, rather dramatically, that there was no academic 
freedom in Egypt.  Another asserted that there was complete academic freedom—you 
just needed to be careful of how you said things.  The evidence supports the former more 
than the latter.   
     The professor who asserted that academic freedom did obtain in Egypt illustrated his 
point by quoting Taha Hussein’s assertion that Egypt was European Mediterranean and 
that freedom and liberty were important values in the European Mediterranean tradition.  
Cairo University, he argued, had a tradition of academic freedom and this is true.  Taha 
Hussein’s case demonstrates this professor’s assertion that constraints came from society 
rather than the university.  Taha Hussein, of course, was at the center of one of the most 
well-known debates over Arabic literature in the twentieth century.  The Islamic 
university of Al-Azhar condemned Hussein’s book On Pre-Islamic Poetry as blasphemy.  
Despite becoming a part of intense parliamentary debate, Hussein received support from 
the rector of his university.  As this professor noted, this is hardly a case of the state 
limiting academic freedom.   
     However this was also a pre-Nasserist state that, however complicit with British 
interests, ruled through a monarch and a parliament.  It has been classified as a 
                                               
107 The same could be said of knowledge produced in the Middle East and disseminated in the West.  Some 
translating agencies exist but the best of these are rather obscure and  many scholarly works produced in 
Arabic go untranslated into English.  As much more work is already in English or translated into English 
from around the world, it is quite critical to address the failures to translate from English into Arabic as too 
much of the world’s production of knowledge is entirely inaccessible to Arabic speakers. 
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democracy but suffered from the distortions of colonialism.  Nonetheless, Cairo 
University functioned as a private institution within a putative democracy at the time of 
the accusation leveled against Taha Hussein for blasphemy.  There is also a critical 
difference between a private university with the stated mission of providing a liberal arts 
education and a national university that has been subordinated to the interests of an 
authoritarian developmental state. 
     However, the commitment of Cairo University to finding a balance between the 
secular and the religious as well as between imported and local knowledge was severely 
strained by Nasser’s cooptation for political purposes. 
          Nasser, who took power in 1954, sought to shape higher education to serve his  
          political  purposes. He wanted academia to articulate an ideology for his brand of  
          Arab nationalism and tried to enlist its support by controlling the campuses.  
         “[F]freedom of thought, speech, and action was squelched. Police informers  
          saturated the campus, and professors never knew the exact limits of permissible  
          debate,” Reid writes.  One academic described the blow as a watershed in  
          university history. “Academic freedom in Egypt ended in 1954 when the soldiers  
          threw out the liberal professors and decided to turn Egyptian universities into a                 
          government bureau,” said poet and former professor Ahmad Taha. Nasser also  
          emphasized technical learning rather than “knowledge for knowledge’s sake,”  
          Cairo  University’s original mandate. As a result, the Faculties of Engineering and  
          Medicine  replaced those of Law and Arts as the most prestigious and popular.  
          While such disciplines are important fields of study, the head of state’s influence  
          over curriculum represented a loss of university autonomy. The universities’  
          institutional problems started in this era, too.  The numbers of students increased  
         dramatically after Nasser eliminated tuition, but the quality of education  
         declined because the faculty and facilities were not expanded at the same time.108 
 
The professor who claimed complete academic freedom considered the real problem to 
be a lack of political freedom coupled with some societal constraints.  However, the 
Hussein case, while illustrative of what the university could be, conceals more than it 
reveals here.  Nasser did revamp the educational system quite significantly and used it to 
promote a national ideology.  While it is usually considered a part of the task of the 
                                               
108 Human Rights Watch, “Reading Between the ‘Red Lines’”: 24. 
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educational system to inculcate a national identity, this is generally considered the task of 
primary and secondary schools in the West.  The university has the responsibility of 
building a well-rounded individual through a liberal arts education.  A liberal arts 
education has some connection with the knowledge society touted by The 2003 Arab 
Human Development Report wherein a spirit of critical inquiry should prevail through the 
free dissemination, acquisition, and production of knowledge. 
     A single interview subject mentioned that security approval was a prerequisite to T.A. 
appointment.  The procedure of security approval was only a problem for students who 
were politically active as undergraduates.  Further my informant was unaware of any 
appointment where security intervention had taken place.  However, the threat of security 
intervention was pervasive and promoted self-censorship.  In addition to cumulative 
achievement as a prerequisite to advancement in academia there must also be a very 
strong awareness of the opportunity costs of political activism.  In other words, not only 
must a student be a high achiever, he or she must also be equally adept at self-censorship 
in order to pursue an academic career.  Self-censorship particularly obtains with regard to 
the red lines outlined in Chapter 1 and detailed by Human Rights Watch.  No written 
prohibition exists or existed with regard to criticism of Mubarak and his family, free 
discussion of the Islamic religion and what it means in state and society, or on how Israel 
is discussed but unwritten rules exist called red lines that greatly inhibit what can be said 
and how it can be said.  All academics self-censor and the most junior of them are the 
most cautious as they have the least familiarity with the precise boundaries of the 
unwritten rules and the most to lose in terms of opportunity costs. 
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     Although it was senior professors who emphasized the topic of academic freedom, 
they were rather less anxious about security intervention.  The pervasive fear was much 
more strongly felt by graduate students who likely had less familiarity with Egypt’s 
omnipresent red lines.  Crossing the wrong line at the wrong time and censure from a 
security institution could destroy one’s future.  In a society where jobs are scarce and 
opportunities few, this is a substantial threat.  Hence, the connection between theory and 
practical politics is often left unclear as T.A.s fear that using the wrong example might 
well result in security institution intervention.  While many T.A.s do their best to 
explicate such connections, a confused undergraduate is more tolerable than a sacrificed 
future.   
     It is likely that the security officer who is on each Faculty stimulates greater fear on 
the part of undergraduates and junior graduate students.  Junior scholars are advised to 
avoid collaboration with the security officer as it undermines academic freedom.  
However, it could be argued that the very presence of a security officer on each Faculty 
undermines academic freedom of any sort.  This is, at least in part, what the 2005 Human 
Rights Watch Report on academic freedom in Egypt means by pervasive security with 
little visibility.  The threat alone is enough to create an academic culture of self-
censorship rather than one of academic freedom. 
     Another area of concern for academic freedom is political appointment of university 
rectors and the subsequent appointment of deans by university rectors.  While not all 
deans come from the ruling NDP, most do and one senior professor asserted that due to 
his refusal to join the NDP, he would never be a dean.  A graduate student reinforced this  
concern by explaining that although joining the NDP might be a way to bridge the state-
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society gap it was not looked upon as something one did to better elite-mass relations but 
something one did for personal gain.  Joining the party thus increased distrust from 
fellow academics as well as from the broader society.   
     My interviews tended to echo the findings of the much broader survey put together by 
Human Rights Watch in 2005.  Their report, titled “Reading between the ‘Redlines’,” 
found three main instruments of government repression.  These tools include police 
presence, political appointment of university rectors, and deans, as well as a series of 
laws and regulations designed to maintain state supervision over the universities.  The 
violation to university autonomy, an essential component to academic freedom, is fairly 
clear.  My own interviews and experiences at the gates of Cairo University reiterate and 
reinforce the problems concerning the ubiquitous police presence on campus and the 
climate of fear that it generates.  The University Law of 1979 is also a serious obstacle to 
academic freedom as it gives deans the power to approve student clubs and student union 
nominees.   Also noteworthy is Law No. 20/1936 that requires all imported printed 
materials to pass through a censor.  All imported printed materials, of course, include 
textbooks and other material chosen for courses.    Universities have also felt the effects 
of Egypt’s notoriously lengthy resort to Emergency Law.  
 
Implications for Knowledge 
 
     Lack of funding for education is part of the knowledge deficit problem acknowledged 
by the 2003 Arab Human Development Report.  At the primary and secondary levels 
students in overcrowded classrooms are encouraged to consume information strategically.  
Strategic knowledge acquisition is promoted both by the need to pay for tutoring aimed at 
helping students gain good scores on exams.  The exams, themselves, also promote a 
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limited and strategic vision of knowledge consumption as good scores are needed to 
advance to another and better level of study.  In a state mired by a lack of employment 
opportunities, these exams have an exaggerated effect on one’s future opportunities and 
life prospects—particularly in the absence of personal connections.  While exams are 
likely meant to eliminate the effects of patronage, they have failed to do away with the 
need for personal connections to enhance job opportunities and further limited chances 
for students unable to pay for the tutoring needed to do well on exams in a poor state that 
underfunds education. 
     In addition to a failure to adequately fund education, the state is further implicated in 
the knowledge deficit through its use of the security apparatus to monitor the university.  
The linkage between the ruling NDP and academic appointments limits university 
autonomy and, thus, enhances the knowledge deficit.  It further inhibits trust.   
The security apparatus maintains a presence on campus that also undermines ‘knowledge 
for knowledge sake’ as it produces a climate of fear and inhibits what can be discussed in 
the classroom.  It also contains a chilling effect on student activism.  
     Bellini’s factors of robust authoritarianism are also found here in the form of fiscal 
health and the coercive capacity of the security apparatus.  Poor fiscal health in the form 
of underfunding the university coupled with more robust funding for coercive functions 
such as maintaining a monitoring presence of the security apparatus on campus acts to 
further the depoliticization of the university as a whole.  It is quite similar to Salwa 
Ismail’s observation in Bulaq that ‘the state is everywhere, yet nowhere.’109  In addition 
to providing an obstacle to the free acquisition, dissemination, and production of 
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knowledge, starvation of funds and the presence of the security apparatus have a chilling 
effect in terms of popular mobilization on campus. 
     In the pages that follow I will discuss how information obtained in my interviews 
concerning funding and freedom at the university relates to the three parameters of the 
knowledge society as outlined by the 2003 Arab Human Development Report—




     Knowledge acquisition is severely impacted by short funds and the presence of the 
security apparatus on campus.  Funding issues limit both access to university study and 
are primarily responsible for a decrease in the quality of education offered. 
     The costs of access to the university begin almost as soon as a child enters school.  
Although exams modeled on the French educational system might have seemed a means 
of introducing standardized instruction and expectations in a highly socially stratified 
country, funding failures severely undercut a system that was imposed in order to 
increase fairness and reduce if not eliminate the prominent bifurcations exhibited within 
Egypt.  In order for children, across economic classes, to get the same education public 
schools need to have enough funding to educate each child.  Current underfunding has 
contributed to overcrowded classrooms and underpaid teachers who cannot hope to fairly 
educate all children.  Moreover, in order for teachers to make a survival wage, they must 
supplement their income.  A solution has been found in giving tutorials to smaller groups 
of students that will enhance their ability to do well on exams.  Knowledge acquisition is 
thus limited in two ways.  First parents must find the money to pay for tutoring and 
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second, due to the funding outlay, students and their parents are encouraged to view the 
consumption of knowledge as a strategic commodity. 
     All of these factors impact university studies.  By the time Egyptian students qualify 
into particular Faculties, they have already internalized a method of education based upon 
rote memorization to pass exams.  Knowledge acquisition is geared towards passing an 
exam in order to advance to the next level, thus enhancing prestige as well as promoting 
opportunities for gainful employment.  For those unable to get good exam scores, private 
universities have emerged but are considered of low quality and degrees are of low value.  
The exception to the rule of poor quality private universities is the American University 
of Cairo.  Students that can afford to go to the AUC and have the necessary English 
language skills are far more likely to acquire the knowledge necessary to fully participate 
in a competitive world knowledge economy.  Arguably, however, as the children of 
Egypt’s elite, students at AUC were already products of a different system from the one 
attended by middle class and poor students.   
     Funding solutions offered by the professors I interviewed generally involved more 
society-centric solutions than the state appeared to prefer.  The awqaf could, in particular, 
produce scholarships as well as endow chairs.  Anti-waqf laws were aimed at 
undermining the power of the ulema as well as the power of Islam and traditional sources 
of authority as well as traditional means of civic participation.  Modeled on Kemalism, 
Nasser’s placement of religious endowments under the control of the state was meant, as 
in Turkey, to use the power of the state to drag a reluctant society into modernity.  
However, as Vali Nasr argues in Forces of Fortune, Kemalism has become a problem 
and inhibiting force in the region.  Kemalism, which strongly resembles Nasserism, 
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views society as part of the problem and is, thus, reluctant to view any solution that uses 
society as any kind of solution at all.110 
     National universities are also poorly funded.  The problems that accompany a student 
into higher education will not be resolved at the university.  Paid tutorials are gaining 
popularity at the university as a means to increase income.  Too, teaching towards exams 
allows graduate student T.A.s as well as professors an opportunity to avoid any type of 
controversy that may attract the attention of the state security offices located in every 
Faculty.  Although the strongest impact on knowledge is to dissemination and production, 
the chilling effects of security upon student acquisition of knowledge should not be 




     Knowledge dissemination is also harmed both by lack of funding and security 
intrusions by the state.  First is simply the availability of funds for libraries.  This 
problem was mentioned in nearly every interview I conducted as it inhibits knowledge 
dissemination and production as well as acquisition.  Professors cannot acquire up to date 
knowledge in order to disseminate it without databases, subscriptions to journals, as well 
as books.  The problems related to translation failures that I previously mention are also 
pertinent here. The low rate of translation often has students trying to learn from 
materials in the English language.  Most students are not proficient enough with English 
to strongly benefit from materials written in the English language.  Cairo University’s 
language of instruction is Arabic and class materials should be in Arabic.  All too often, 
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though, the most recent information has not been translated and students must struggle to 
acquire information through a foreign language.   
     Further inhibiting the free flow of information are laws designed to accomplish 
precisely that—inhibiting the free flow of information.  The previously cited Law No. 
20/1936 is a case in point.  All imported printed material often includes textbooks and 
other course materials and, thus, the task of the university to disseminate information is at 
the mercy of a censor.  National universities, such as Cairo University, face less of a 
problem than the American University of Cairo, which imports much of its course 
material.  However, in order to be safely within the law, the national universities adhere 
to a strictly routinized and rote-based curriculum.  My interview subjects who worked as 
T.A.s were highly conscious of this problem.  Many asserted that a subject such as 
political science required critical thinking and, yet, they felt constrained by student 
expectations that the T.A.’s job was solely to help them pass exams based on rote 
memorization and the state security apparatus’s system of surveillance.  Hence, 
knowledge dissemination is constrained by the state in two ways.  Fear of security 
interference limits what can be taught and the exam process limits how it can be taught. 
 
Knowledge Production 
     In Chapter 1 I discussed the problems caused by the Central Agency for Public 
Mobilization and Statistics or CAPMAS at some length.  CAPMAS regulates statistical 
research.  The process for obtaining permits is arduous enough to inhibit research.  Many 
choose shallower studies so as to avoid the permit process.  The control here exerted by 
an authoritarian state, fearful of the production of knowledge, stifles overall knowledge 
production and hinders knowledge production.  CAPMAS serves a dual function.  First it 
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exerts surveillance over researchers and knowledge production.  Second it ensures that 
the sha’abi’s suspicion of research as a means of exerting surveillance over them has 
some foundation in fact.  Any bridge that might serve to link the sha’abi and the 
knowledge producing academic elite is rendered tenuous by the use of an agency that 
should be used to protect people from unethical research as a surveillance mechanism.          
     Further inhibiting knowledge production is the idea transmitted that knowledge should 
be of immediate use to Egyptians.  One of the graduate students I interviewed asserted 
that one professor argued to his class that research that was not of immediate use to the 
state might well be a waste of time.  This particular student was from an academic family 
and did not quite agree.  He was of the opinion that all knowledge was useful even if that 
usefulness was not immediately practically relevant.  The dissemination of the attitude 
that research ought to be in service to the state is a perspective that is common in 
developmental states.  The idea, of course, is that a postcolonial state, such as Egypt, 
needs to catch up and cannot waste time with extraneous knowledge.  Unfortunately this 
attitude has a deleterious effect on critical inquiry and appears to hamper the very 
knowledge production needed in a postcolonial developmental state.  The use of 
ideological guidelines, meant to build national unity, restrains many from asking and 
following certain lines of questioning that could result in significant knowledge 
breakthroughs.  In other words, the belief inculcated by a Nasser’s nationalism that all 
knowledge should serve state development has negatively impacted Cairo University’s 








      Academic freedom and funding were thought to be two of the most important issues 
in higher education by senior professors.  Suggestions for the improvement of funding for 
higher education tended to involve greater societal participation.  Suggestions from 
professors included reactivation of the Islamic waqf system and requirement of minimal 
tuition from middle class students. 
     While these suggestions would seem to reinforce problems exacerbated by Sadat’s 
infitah policies of educational opportunities bifurcated according to class, this was 
nowhere the intent of the professors who suggested it.  They were most concerned with 
reviving a sagging higher educational system that desperately needed more funding to 
acquire instructional material as well as improve student learning opportunities.  Free 
education is, in principle, desirable.  However, in a poor state, such as Egypt, it has 
overburdened the system and produced an education that is not globally competitive for 
graduates.   Although no one explicitly made the point that societal involvement in higher 
education could produce some changes in the strategic consumption of knowledge, the 
point must be considered here.  While endowments for scholarships or academic chairs 
usually contain some agenda from the donor, this is not, altogether, a negative.  Rather 
than the state imposing its agenda, there could be competing agendas that would increase 
debate and intellectual production.  Dissemination and acquisition would be furthered by 
more funds.   
     State funding is necessary but when funding comes in its entirety from the state, a 
single agenda can be imposed and is imposed in Egypt.  Nasserism, like the Kemalism it 
emulates, perceives society as a backwards force that must be overcome in order to 
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achieve modernity.  Social capital in its positive and civic sense cannot be fostered within 
this type of system as the state seeks to disseminate a singular vision of a modern state 
that will reeducate the people into proper citizenship.  This allows and, indeed, reinforces 
structures of social capital that allow the penetration of the state’s coercive apparatus into 
all arenas within a knowledge society and the people remain too suspicious for any kind 
of bridge or linking mechanism to occur between societal sectors and academic elites.  
Scholars are constrained to produce knowledge that serves the state.  The system is top 
down and enforced from above.  Funding scarcity and state security intrusions ensure that 
a top down approach is enforced.  Both of these features are also found in Bellin’s 
delineation of factors that maintain robust authoritarianism in the Arab Middle East. 
      This problem of a state that seeks to implement an agenda on its society while 
maintaining elite privilege will be further examined in a chapter on the Egyptian 
revolution of 2011.  Although revolution is something of a misnomer here, that is the 
popular title for the peaceful uprising of the Egyptian people that removed Hosni 
Mubarak.  Control and order still prevail over inquiry in the Arab states and that shows in 
the context of the Faculty of Economics and Political Science wherein scholars are not to 
‘seek knowledge for knowledge sake’ but to serve the state.  The modern state has done 
little to promote knowledge acquisition for the sake of knowledge and certainly does not 
promote critical thought.  Regime maintenance strategies increase access costs for 
knowledge diffusion.  Regime reliance on coercion fragments societal actors and 
increases access costs as societal groups fear bridging the gaps amongst groups. 
     The second factor that inhibits the development of a knowledge society is associated 
with the service of knowledge to the state.  As a late developer, there are solid reasons for 
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the political authorities to make resources available to that which serves the state.  The 
type of political and social patronage that the authors of the Human Development Report 
laud depend on a desire to have the most knowledgeable and learned around for the 
benefits that such research might accrue.   The modern Egyptian state has yet to be 
convinced that pouring scarce resources into uncontrolled knowledge centers will benefit 
the regime and it probably will not benefit the ruling regime.  It would benefit Egyptian 






THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE AND SCHOLARS 
 
Introduction 
     In patron-client associations or clientelism and distributive politics in more complex 
societies, holes or chasms are not spanned by coherent and rationalized structures or do 
not mesh well with society and, hence, may lack transparency. It is also possible to have 
a well-rationalized and codified structure or bridge that is not transparent to society or has 
patronage style appointments that enhance a leader’s power as Ayubi argues.  It is semi-
autonomous but not embedded in Peter Evans’ terms of embedded within society.  In 
other words, the system is well enough institutionalized to be considered mostly 
autonomous but is marred by patronage style political appointments that depend upon a 
leader’s whim.  Evans’ understanding of embeddedness had to do with networks between 
bureaucrats and businessmen wherein knowledge could be exchanged informally while 
autonomy meant that the bureaucracy was well enough institutionalized to act 
independently of the blandishments of particular businessmen or of the whims of 
particular political leaders.  This produces spots of distrust in procedure and disruptions 
in bridges between networks. 
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     In terms of the development of a knowledge society, mechanisms that are not 
assimilated or trusted by users do not bridge holes.  This means that knowledge has no 
conduit for exchange. Despite rationalization and proceduralization, the hole or chasm 
cannot be crossed by individuals or collectivities as the bridge cannot be trusted.  
Knowledge acquisition and dissemination is hobbled by the lack of transparency or 
legitimacy of the transporting mechanisms.   
     The Faculty of Economics and Political Science is known for its quality and adherence 
to rationalized procedures.  Thus my questions were designed to elicit some 
understanding of how social capital might function as a bridging device or be confounded 
by lack of clear proceduralization.  Analysis of the answers provided by my interview 
subjects suggested that bridging social capital, that is international networks, provided 
intellectual elites with more access to knowledge acquisition and production than did 
local sources that might come under state constraints regarding funding or freedom of 
inquiry. 
 
Bureaucracy: Rationalization and Transparency 
     Feddarke et al. assert that rationalization abstracts rules and norms into codified 
procedures that promote the replacement of informal associations with formal 
administrative mechanisms and structures.  They argue that rationalization encourages 
flexibility as individual leadership lessens in importance.
     The Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Cairo University is very well 
rationalized.  Promotion into graduate school within the faculty is based upon merit.  
Grades, exams and class standing determine a student’s appointment to T.A. status.  The 
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top two or three in a graduating class are promoted and hired as T.A.s.  With very high 
unemployment among Egypt’s youth it is viewed as a good opportunity by many but not 
all as many will refuse the appointment because they have the personal connections 
outside the department to make money while others are just not interested.  As testing and 
grades determine promotion and appointment to T.A. status, a much higher number of 
women are T.A.s than one might expect.  Nonetheless, a number of women turn it down 
or drop out due to what one informant perceived as a lack of interest but other reasons 
cannot be discounted.   
     Procedures also exist for exceptional cases to reapply for a T.A. position and, hence, 
admission to graduate school.  These are decided upon a case by case basis in which a 
student who has been denied a TA position may ask for a review of his or her case.  For 
example, if people from a later class year are hired with lesser grades a student may ask 
for a review of his or her case and gain appointment based on higher merit from a 
previous class year.  Other unusual appointments exist but, again, have a strong merit 
component.  While it is not common to gain appointment at an IGO and then decide 
one’s real calling is scholarship, it has and does occur.  In the few cases where it occurs, 
the individual obtained degrees at a foreign and, usually, Western university and returned 
to be nominated for a position.  Unusual channels can raise suspicions in the highly 
rationalized environment of the Faculty of Political Science and Economics.  This is 
particularly so due to the larger Egyptian environment wherein appointment to posts and 
promotions is frequently the result of political connections. 
     Indeed, everyone I spoke with was very proud of their Faculty’s excellent adherence 
to rationalized procedures as that adherence was rather unusual among Faculties at Cairo 
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University and very unique in Egypt wherein corruption and nepotism run rampant.  
There has been no scandal associated with the Faculty in decades and the Faculty, 
graduate students and professors are quite proud of that.  One young woman suggested 
that I might be studying the wrong Faculty as it was so unusual in this regard.   
     The only possible irregularity in the Faculty’s highly rationalized system of 
recruitment of graduate students came from outside the Faculty.  As discussed in the last 
chapter, one interview subject mentioned that the approval of security institutions was 
required before appointment to T.A.  That particular procedure was only a hindrance for 
those who were politically active and as self-censorship is the norm, direct intervention 
from security institutions does not occur.  However the perception of omnipresent threat 
of intervention meant that discussion occurred in generalized and abstract terms 
regarding sensitive issues involving political corruption, succession and anything else 
that might be perceived as sensitive in nature to the ruling regime.  While my informant 
was not aware of any intervention by security in the appointment or lack thereof to a 
graduate student, the informant did perceive the threat as promoting self-censorship based 
upon individual perception of what could or could not be said without losing future 
opportunities.   
     Although the role of security institutions was never mentioned again, it seems 
reasonable to assume that self-censorship might very well be habitual among junior and 
senior scholars at the Faculty.  Nonetheless appointments are highly rationalized and 
bureaucratic procedures for appointments routinely followed.  An M.A. degree must be 
obtained within five years of appointment to graduate student/TA status.  Once an M.A. 
is obtained, one achieves assistant lecturer status.  A governmental scholarship may be 
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granted to gain a Ph.D. abroad.  This all begins with achievement at the undergraduate 
level as students are ranked by grades over the course of their four years of study.  Once a 
Ph.D. is obtained, an individual can become an assistant professor at the Faculty.  There 
is a five-year minimum at this level before an assistant professor can submit academic 
production for promotion.  Rules and regulations regarding publications are very specific 
and a committee judges the body of work with an emphasis placed upon prestige of 
publication.  This process is replicated for appointment to full professor.  Tenure begins 
with appointment to assistant professor.  This very systematic and well-proceduralized 
system does not take student evaluations into account though. 
     Teaching ability may be completely discounted in this system.  The system of 
promotion followed depends upon publication and western publications carry more 
prestige.  Student evaluations are new to Cairo University and are used give a professor 
more information about what students need as well as how to improve teaching.  
However, large class sizes (often consisting of hundreds of students at the undergraduate 
level) hamper the ability of professors to create greater convergence between professor 
expectations and student expectations.  T.A.s coordinate with a professor to simplify 
material for their own sections of a large class.  While one professor expressed that this 
should be a coordinated and mutual process so as to better coordinate expectations and 
avoid rote learning, some T.A.s may be subverting that goal somewhat as a T.A. may 
very well teach solely towards exams thus replicating student expectations of 
memorization for exams over professor expectations of analysis and thought.  T.A.s are 
junior scholars and their futures are more heavily impacted by fears of security 
intervention.  Self-censorship likely plays a role in the decision to teach more towards 
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exams than critical thinking as does the relative ease of teaching towards what students 
are used to doing and expect over trying to inculcate a different approach to learning.   
Feddarke et al. argue that the rationalization of administrative features will promote the 
ability of insiders and outsiders to interact in a productive manner.  Indeed, individuals 
from this Faculty perform exceedingly well at Western institutions.  However, within 
Egypt, they appear an isolated academic community that insists upon Weberian 
bureaucratic methods while other Egyptian institutions act with different, less 
proceduralized mechanisms that may promote privilege over merit or, as Ayubi notes, 
prize power over efficiency.  The Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Cairo 
University is a prestigious one and deservedly so.  It regularly sends graduate students to 
the U.S. and Europe who are well-deserving, good scholars; however, the spirit of critical 
inquiry and love of knowledge do not appear to make many inroads into Egyptian 
society.  These scholars can bridge the gap between themselves and the international 
community but are continually frustrated within their own state and society. 
 
Support for Research and Academic Pursuits 
 
     Complaints about lack of funding and enough monetary support to fully engage in the 
academic life appear universal among graduate students.     Graduate students in the 
Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Cairo University were no exception in this 
regard.  All graduate students at the Faculty felt that the emotional and academic support 
from professors was quite strong but had mixed opinions concerning funding.  A first- 
year student said the procedures to obtain funding seemed opaque while a senior graduate 
student said that it is not so much opaque as just very difficult to gain research funding 
and fellowships due to a lack of resources.   
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     Much of this was echoed by junior professors.  While leaves of absence can be taken, 
these are not sabbaticals.  A professor would have to find another source of income in 
order to take advantage of a leave for pure research.  Too, professors said there was no 
funding from the university or government for paper submissions and conference 
participation.  In order to obtain monies for research and academic conferences, 
professors applied to private think tanks, USAID, and other international academic 
funding sources.  Salaries are also low.  Several of the junior professors I interviewed 
worked at three or more institutions.   
     Only one of the professors I interviewed felt that research monies were adequate and 
did not express dissatisfaction with salary.  While this was not the only woman I 
interviewed, she was the only person I interviewed to make a point out of explaining how 
cultural gender expectations made the academic life a good one for women.   
     More women than men make it into graduate school.  This is partially due to an 
adherence to cumulative grades and class standing in making the appointment and the 
lower likelihood of women refusing the appointment due to a better opportunity 
elsewhere.  Nonetheless, females are more prone than males to drop out of graduate 
school.  However there was nothing to suggest that they ran into particular gender 
discrimination within the Faculty and rather more evidence to suggest that the pressure 
may come from family and neighborhood community.  This was certainly true in one of 
the families I lived with where one young woman was pursuing a Master’s degree at 
another Faculty.  She was considered rather odd and out of step for not being much 
interested in marriage.  The older she got, the more vocal her immediate and extended 
family about marriage.  The teasing was gentle but a little relentless.  I would assume that 
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female graduate students at the Faculty for Political Science and Economics came under 
the same kinds of family and communal pressure. 
     For those women who live in more understanding or academically oriented 
environments or those just able to withstand the pressure from family and friends, the 
academic life offers advantages and opportunities that women might, otherwise, not have.  
One informant explained that, for example, “a diplomat is sent out and the spouse is a 
dependent so cultural values inhibit diplomacy  as a career path for women and women 
must make sacrifices but within academia female scholars can make a balance between 
home and career.” 
     Cultural norms may render the academic path both more difficult for women to travel 
and more beneficial once a certain level of achievement is gained.  While women were 
more likely to be appointed as a T.A., thus entering graduate school, they were also more 
likely to drop out than men.  The very strictly merit-based system of class ranking does, 
at least initially, greatly reduce gender inequalities.  What it cannot do is eliminate 
cultural norms surrounding expectations of women and men.    However, if a woman 
either perseveres through the marriage expectation or has a supportive family, she does 
not face the same financial obligations that men face.  Male associate professors were 
usually working at other institutions in order to support the lifestyle expected of a 
university professor while the few females I interviewed (only one-third of the sample) 
were more likely to express dissatisfaction with the emphasis placed upon money and 
prestige by colleagues.  Men were also more likely to complain of the low salaries and 
difficulty in gaining funds for research as well as the inability of the university to give 
sabbaticals to pursue research.  Egyptian gender norms offer women a greater degree of 
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financial freedom.  However, this is no female utopia despite the very high number of 
female graduate students as the number of female professors is low. 
     Generally speaking the men are correct that the university generally as well as the 
Faculty more specifically is underfunded.  There are not enough fellowships or enough 
monies for research.  Further many expressed particular disappointment with the 
university library.  Periodicals are very limited and newer books unavailable.  This is not 
just a problem for research but for teaching.  I walked away with a very strong 
impression that one of the best aids to this university would either be money for libraries 
to have better access to electronic subscriptions of periodicals and, perhaps, a 
subscription to ebrary or for Western institutions to consider partnering with universities 
in developing countries to reduce access costs to written knowledge.  In any case, The 
200 3Arab Human Development Report’s emphasis upon translation of knowledge and 
accessibility are not misplaced. 
 
Relations with the Community 
 
     Another common research complaint concerned research into local communities.  The 
ordinary person was considered as suspicious of elites by the academics I interviewed 
and, therefore, less than forthcoming.  One academic noted that as ordinary people do not 
see the benefit of research, they see little use in participating in any research studies.  The 
problem is at its worst with public officials but it permeates community-intellectual 
relations as well.  A researcher would need to spend significant time building a 
relationship with community informants in order to gain their trust and respect.   
     A senior graduate student asserted that collaboration with community activists and the 
private sector had declined over the past twenty or so years. However my informant 
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hastened to add that in the past few years the university has begun to organize awareness 
campaigns such as promoting better understanding of good health in marginalized 
communities.  These programs were added to the university administrative structure and 
run by the University VicePresident.  Another informant noted that qawwafil 
(missionaries) would go out to communities surrounding the university during summer 
months and perform services.  Medical students, for example, might give free checkups 
while the group supervised by this professor pursued environmental care awareness and 
creating symposiums advising ordinary people of the dangers of pollution, smoking, and 
other environmental issues.   
     A few professors were relatively active with community organizations although at 
least one refused to discuss what community associations he was working with so it is 
possible that some that said they were not involved in any simply did not want to make 
their ties to certain community associations known.  Such discretion would imply 
involvement with a group that could be perceived as too political by the state wherein too 
political usually implies Islamist.  Intriguingly these professors were the most likely to 
express some hope of following a development trajectory more similar to that of Turkey 
that involved reform and to strongly fear the further economic maldevelopment that could 
occur if Egypt followed a more Iranian style revolution trajectory.  Most of those who did 
not mind specifying what community service they were affiliated with were affiliated 
with official university programs or orphans and services to the poor.   
    A gender difference also emerged with regard to activity with community association.  
While most women in the sample just said it was a nice idea but they did not have time to 
participate in such associations, one revealed a bit more.  She said that her personal life 
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and academic life were completely separated.  To a certain extent this is also likely a 
result of differing gender expectations in the home.  The freedom women gain by not 
being the primary financial support for the family is offset by greater expectations for 
women with regard to home and child care.  Indeed, this particular subject and I found 
ourselves on a bit of a tangent with regard to the differences in our respective cultures 
concerning familial support and freedom of action.  Freedom of action is much greater 
within the U.S, but familial support can be lacking.  My informant, who studied the poor 
in Egypt quite intensively, noted that an Egyptian woman would never find herself and 
her children out on the streets—a family member would always step in.  However, the 
price of that support is greater family control over a woman’s decisions and life.  While 
we had a great deal of fun playing with this idea, it does go some ways towards 
explaining why Egyptian women might not agitate for their freedom of action as much as 
Western women think they should.  Family and kinship groups make up very basic 
survival networks.  The social capital of the Egyptian patriarchal family makes up a type 
of very dense network that enhances survival. 
     A more broadly based question concerning the role of the university in the community 
elicited some very interesting responses.  While all felt that universities and intellectuals 
had a great deal to offer society, responses were mixed as to effectiveness as well as 
community responsiveness.  One scholar argued that the bifurcation between intellectuals 
and society is too great to be successfully bridged.  
     Most asserted, however, that the university should play a very strong role as it can 
contribute to development in various ways such as providing information, exerting 
influence on behalf of citizens, providing a link between state and society, as well as by 
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educating Egyptian youth and promoting Egypt’s store of human capital.  Organizing 
public debates sometimes ran into problems with security services though.  Indeed it is 
difficult to ascertain how much of the gap or bifurcation between well-intentioned 
university intellectuals is due solely to the lack of education and apathy in society or due 





     Most of my informants spoke of the ideal relationship they would like to have with 
undergraduates but were forced to concede that the reality of very large class sizes (150 is 
the average size of an undergraduate political science class at Cairo University) rendered 
this idea impossible.  Professors preferred a more direct academic relationship with 
students and felt that the large average class size made it difficult to create much 
convergence between professor expectations and student expectations.  They also 
expressed some frustration with the need to fully impose their own agenda.  While 
professors always impose something of an agenda upon students as they know more, 
these professors were frustrated at the lack of a feedback.  They all felt strongly that 
critical thinking was an important component of political science and that component 
suffered from the sheer impossibility of a professor establishing more one-on-one 
academic relationships with undergraduate students.  As the rote memorization for testing 
is strongly inculcated into most students before they ever enter the university, professors 
are acutely aware of the need to build the critical thinking faculties of their undergraduate 
students.  How can this struggle to redirect how students learn be accomplished with such 
huge average class sizes?  One of the roles of a T.A. is to bridge this gap.  
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     The appointment as a T.A. and entrance into graduate school are concurrent at Cairo 
University.  Graduate students or T.A.s are generally expected to qualify students for 
exams.  There are no university guidelines for T.A. duties at the Faculty and a T.A. works 
with professors to establish expectations and guidelines for a specific course.  Generally, 
a professor might focus on the abstracts of theory while a T.A. focuses on practical 
application.  For example, in a course on statistics the professor would lecture on the 
theory and abstracts of generalized problem solving while a T.A. would help them 
actually solve the problems in their course sections.   
     As I noted previously, some T.A.s may actually avoid practical examples.  Graduate 
students seemed generally more anxious about security institutions.  The most senior 
professors were completely unconcerned in interviews.  I would posit that graduate 
students are more nervous due to fears for their future and less knowledge of what could 
be safely said.  While one graduate student T.A. explained that security interventions 
never really happened, the fear was omnipresent.  If anything, undergraduates are likely 
to be even more fearful.  However, this fear—exaggerated or not—has the effect of 
avoiding what might be the most relevant and well-known practical examples.  Self-
censorship, then, would partially block those links between intellectuals and practitioners 
that Mokyr111 found important to propelling England’s industrial enlightenment into an 
industrial revolution.  While students are not generally involved in the practical 
                                               
111 Joel Mokyr investigates the process whereby knowledge production leads to invention.  While ideas and 
knowledge can be costly to generate, spillovers and externalities of knowledge production can lead to 
increased economic growth that sustains itself.  Mokyr examines growth in knowledge bases combined 
with changing attitudes towards knowledge, its dissemination, and technologies.  A marked shift occurred 
in the period between the Enlightenment and the Industrial Age.  Mokyr call this period the Industrial 
Enlightenment.  He writes, “Modern economic growth demonstrates that in some societies, people 
overcome the tendency of accepting that techniques work without worrying about why they did so.”  Joel 
Mokyr, The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 22-26, 26 
110 
 
applications of solutions for various problems, the perceived need to be somewhat less 
than concrete in what could be sensitive areas, render a connection between theories and 
practice even more opaque.  While most T.A.s I spoke with did their best to bridge these 
gaps without sacrificing their own futures, at least one of my interview subjects taught 
specifically towards exams, thus avoiding the problem altogether.   
     As salaries are, of course, very low T.A.s said they need to feel a special sense of 
mission or passion for promoting knowledge acquisition among undergraduates.  The 
most frequent metaphor used was that of family.  Most asserted that they felt themselves 
to be like older brothers or sisters who are tasked with helping undergraduates learn.  
Some said they stay in touch with former students.   
     The use of the family metaphor is interesting as family is definitely about a dense 
network.  Although the elder sibling metaphor implies an awareness of hierarchy, the 
framing of T.A.-undergraduate relationships as familial rather than formal suggests that 
T.A.s are trying to set up a particular relationship regarding obligation and expectation.  
Egypt is an extraordinarily patriarchal society.  The family is demonstrative of traditional 
patriarchal relations wherein status is conferred by age almost as much by gender.  As an 
older brother or sister a T.A. may feel more entitled to express certain expectations 
concerning undergraduate learning and studying behaviors.  They appear well aware that 
framing their relationships with undergraduates in such a manner also produces 
obligations on their part.  The expectation/obligation reciprocity demonstrated by the use 
of the family metaphor extends to emotional support as well as academic support.  The 
use of a sibling metaphor in particular sets up a certain amount of authority without 
presenting it as the all-powerful paternal figure.  It is a very interesting dynamic.  
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Graduate students also relied on the family metaphor to explain their relationships with 
their advisors or mentors. 
     Graduate students felt that good personal relations with professors were important 
because promotion was a committee decision and if relations were not good that could 
affect judgment.  While strict guidelines and procedures are present with regard to 
promotion for graduate students and junior faculty, personal relations were perceived as 
important both for the evaluation of one’s scholarly pursuits as well as to improve access 
to professors that usually work elsewhere and have little spare time.  In the first case of 
evaluation, graduate students argued that good personal relations promoted understanding 
of their research interests and scholarly pursuits.  In stark contrast to how much of Egypt 
functions, there was no indication that anyone believed that personal relations alone were 
enough for appointment or promotion.  Instead they asserted that by maintaining good 
personal relations wherein their work and interests were known and valued, the second 
component of access to a professor for advising as well as for helpful information became 
both easier and more rewarding.  For example, professors are more likely to pass on 
information concerning opportunities for graduate students to further their studies or 
research.   
     Junior professors also felt that good personal relations were important but did not 
stress them nearly as much as graduate students did.  Promotion was very well 
proceduralized although the five-year minimum was somewhat inconsistent as sometimes 
the five-year minimum would take into account work at other universities and sometimes 
only Cairo University counted.  Nonetheless merit and academic achievements were 
perceived as the main factors governing the granting of promotion and tenure.  Personal 
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relations and/or political factors might only account for about one-fifth of the decision.  
Junior professors laid much less emphasis upon personal relations than did graduate 
students.  Senior professors preferred to skip this question entirely in order to spend more 
time with questions they found more interesting. 
     Everyone I interviewed observed that written guidelines and proceduralization made 
appointment and promotion relatively transparent.  It was the most powerless who felt a 
stronger need to emphasize personal relations as a necessary component.  While even 
here emphasis was laid on the type of rational, proceduralized social capital highlighted 
by Feddarke et al., it is worthwhile to question whether some of the emphasis on family-
type obligation reciprocity from graduate students had anything to do with framing 
relations within a familiar type of association wherein relations are not purely 
exploitative but hierarchy does exist.  
 
Social Capital and the Implications for Knowledge 
     While Putnam emphasizes the lack of trust and cooperation inherent in unequal power 
relationships, this did not appear a significant problem within the Faculty of Political 
Science and Economics at Cairo University.  Everyone I spoke with at the Faculty 
emphasized the hierarchical nature of bureaucratic proceduralization within the Faculty 
but declined to describe personal relations as strongly hierarchical.  The most often used 
metaphor from graduate students was that of family.  The family is a dense network with 
hierarchical undertones—particularly within the patriarchal culture of Egypt.  However, 
graduate students chose a sibling metaphor to describe their relations with professors and 
students.  The sibling relationship is more equal than that of parent-child and this creates 
some interesting implications for reciprocity.  The patron-client relations stressed by 
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Putnam fail to emerge in the elder-younger sibling metaphor.  While graduate students 
did mention that stronger personal relations might mean more work, they declined to 
perceive this as exploitation on the part of their older sibling/professor.  Instead, they 
portrayed the interaction as one wherein being first on the mind of professors brought 
both benefits in the way of greater information and more help with research as well as a 
possibly greater workload.  While completely aware of the unequal status of graduate 
students and professors, graduate students did not perceive themselves as clients but as 
younger siblings who could expect professors to honor obligations to a younger sibling.   
     The family metaphor tended to be dropped with professors of all ranks.  Hierarchy 
clearly mattered for promotional procedures but the perceived need to bind superiors into 
the obligations of a familial sort dropped.  This difference is intriguing to note as it 
suggests that the longer one is in a highly codified and relatively transparent network, the 
more secure an individual might become with reliance upon formal mechanisms and trust 
in the system than with informal personal ties.  In other words, the highly Weberian 
bureaucratic procedures used by the Faculty of Political Science and Economics seem to 
be assimilated over time.  While the familial sibling metaphor equalizes reciprocity 
expectations within a familiar framework, it does betray a profound preoccupation with 
individual status within the relationship.  No one, at any level, expressed that bad 
relations got you anywhere, but the preoccupation with someone else’s individual status 
and pleasing a superior as a means of gaining access to information and knowledge 
disappeared.  To a certain extent, graduate students everywhere are preoccupied with 
their relative powerlessness and lack of familiarity with the system and everywhere 
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graduate students expect faculty mentors to help them learn the ropes and Egyptian 
graduate students were no different from American graduate students in this regard.     
     However, whereas American graduate students would find the elder-younger sibling 
metaphor disconcerting, Egyptian graduate students used the metaphor to help them 
define their relationships and better understand their obligations and expectations.  The 
family metaphor carries a strongly cultural component that is ameliorated over time as 
the procedures used to govern hierarchical relations were assimilated. 
     The role of security institutions at the Faculty is far more opaque.  A security officer is 
on each Faculty and junior graduate students are advised to avoid collaboration as it 
undermines academic freedom.  However, junior scholars noted that the presence of a 
security officer breeds rumor and self-censorship that also undermines academic 
freedom.  Senior scholars (graduate students and professors) may advise care on an exam 
or intimate certain red lines exist but security intervention is not formalized.  Senior 
professors were less likely to express security interventions as a serious problem.  A 
scholar knows the red lines and adjusts language accordingly.  In this instance though, the 
junior scholars may have the more realistic assessment that fear undermines academic 
freedom.  Senior scholars may have simply learned to live with and around the situation.   
A Human Rights Watch Study of Academic Freedom in Egypt notes the following: 
Self-censorship influences class discussion as well as syllabi. Human Rights 
Watch found comparatively few examples of direct government interference in 
class discussion, but red lines limit the topics that can be addressed. “People are 
so used to it they censor themselves. They already know what’s acceptable,” the 
AUC theater professor said. Politics, for example, are largely off limits. “Most 
professors are quite cautious,” said Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyid, a political 
scientist who teaches at Cairo University and AUC. “Very few would dare to 
express views critical of the government in classes or public meetings. Those who 
do are a minority.” Even professors who said they felt free to discuss most 
subjects in the classroom avoided a topic as significant as the rule of Egypt’s 
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president, Hosni Mubarak. “I haven’t felt in the classroom much restrictions,” 
said one sociologist. “I don’t say Mubarak is a dictator, but I do say some states 
like Egypt have a lifetime president.” A Cairo University professor who said there 
is “100 percent academic freedom in the classroom,” later clarified, on condition 
of anonymity, “You can’t attack Mubarak but anything else is OK.” While not a 
specific response to direct repression, the self-imposed limits on class discussion 
show the power of red lines in Egyptian academia.112 
 
Knowledge Acquisition and Dissemination 
     Egyptian primary and secondary education inculcates a certain learning culture into 
students.  Students learn through memorizing material for exams.  Rote memorization 
serves Egyptians well through primary and secondary schools.  They memorize and do 
well on exams.  Their performance on those exams determines the next phase of their 
education.  Students take an exam as a part of graduating from secondary schools.  Their 
scores determine what Faculty they can study with at the university.  It is permissible to 
study with a faculty that is below your test ranking but not one that is above your test 
ranking.  Undergraduates do not exactly choose which Faculty they will matriculate into 
although they are able to choose their majors from within the Faculty they have tested 
into.  All in all they may be less than enthusiastic about the curriculum assigned to them 
at the Faculty as their choice of major is constrained by the limits of the system.   
Students may not choose a major from a Faculty that requires a higher test score than that 
received by the student.   This system can lead to problems in knowledge acquisition on 
the part of undergraduate students in at least two ways.  
     First as rote memorization geared towards exams has served them well all their lives, 
they are highly resistant to changing the formula.  One graduate student T.A. said that, 
for the most part, students are fully justified in learning for exams as grades translate into 
                                               
112 Human Rights Watch, “Reading Between the ‘Red Lines’”: 80 
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appointments or opportunities.  Students perceive any information extraneous to exams as 
a waste of their time and only want the information that will get them a high grade and a 
good employment opportunity.  By the time students reach the university, they have been 
thoroughly socialized into a system that rewards rote memorization for exams.  Critical 
thinking and analysis are not perceived as necessary for success.  Students expect their 
exam scores to get them good jobs.  Hence, they memorize and discard information for 
exam purposes.  Indeed, a senior T.A. informed me that as his classes had no midterm 
exam, very few attended at all and so he had the more enjoyable task of teaching to the 
most interested students which, apparently, were few in number.  He said it was ideal. 
That lack of interest from the majority of students points out another flaw in the system.  
Students do not choose the Faculty they want to study at, their test scores determine that.   
While I was unable to interview undergraduates, the perspectives of graduate student 
T.A.s and professors concerning undergraduates offered some insight into how Egyptian 
society views knowledge acquisition.      
     Knowledge is a good that is acquired strategically.  Students acquire the knowledge 
they need to do well on exams and then move on to the next acquisition-exam experience.  
Time and energy are deployed strategically and knowledge that is not immediately useful 
to exams is either ignored or discarded as completely extraneous.  While this scenario 
does resemble the clientelism and distributional politics that permeates Egypt, it has a 
concealing mechanism in grades or exam scores.  If jobs are distributed based on grades 
then employment seems merit-based rather than a matter of personal connections.  In 
other words, human capital should dominate over social capital and likely that is the 
theory behind the system of using exams.  However, parts of the bridge are missing 
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linkage between undergraduate and professor in the Egyptian exam-based system.  The 
knowledge that the student seeks to acquire is not the knowledge the professor is trying to 
disseminate.  There is an expectation gap.  The professors I interviewed all spoke of a 
lack of convergence between professor and student expectations regarding knowledge.     
     The missing pieces of the bridge were filled in by graduate school or so those I 
interviewed suggested.  Not only are graduate students the best test takers, they were 
interested in the subjects covered in the Faculty of Economics and Political.  Likely that 
was particularly true for those who consented to an interview with me.  As graduate 
student T.A.s share an office, I know that the majority were uninterested in allowing me 
to interview them.  In any case graduate students showed much greater convergence with 
professor expectations concerning critical thinking and analysis.  Although one T.A. 
asserted he taught to student expectations, the others spoke passionately about the need 
for critical thinking and analysis on the part of students at this particular Faculty.  
However, even the most idealistic felt that only 20 percent or less retained critical 
thinking and analytical abilities.   
     For themselves, graduate students I interviewed were quite engaged in critical 
thinking and analysis.  They all felt a strong sense of social responsibility with regard to 
their research; however, they would stop to ask the question of whether only research that 
appeared to be of direct benefit to society should be a limitation.  For example, one 
graduate student shared the perspective of one of his professors that Egyptian graduate 
students should only pursue research of direct national value.  Egyptian scholars should 
not adopt a Westernized research agenda that might undermine the state and should only 
study the roles of other states in international relations as it affected Egypt.  This 
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anecdote provided some insight into the reflective and analytical abilities of graduate 
students at this Faculty as this student analyzed this professor’s viewpoint from three 
different perspectives.  He concluded his analysis by arguing that blind spots are not 
useful and that gaps between state and researcher expectations are not only the 
responsibility of the researcher.  His remarks also indicated certain problems within the 
knowledge production process that I will address more fully in the section concerning 
knowledge production.   
     In addition to their willingness to critically examine knowledge acquisition and 
dissemination, graduate students who were a part of this study strongly valued their own 
acquisition of knowledge.  Those pursuing nontraditional topics that did not have a 
mentor available were quite willing to travel and study at foreign universities to find that 
knowledge.  One of the female graduate students decided to go to a European University 
as she could not find anyone at Cairo University with either the knowledge or the interest 
in helping her with her Master’s thesis.  Her research focused on the internet and 
networking and she found little enthusiasm for the topic at the Faculty and, hence, could 
not find a mentor.  She brought up an interesting constraint on knowledge acquisition that 
was somewhat surprising and may kink the linkages that can bring in new knowledge.   
     My informant asserted that while Egyptians face serious constraints on academic 
freedom due to state control, other constraints are to be found in Europe.  While 
Europeans had greater academic freedom, it did not extend to non-Europeans.  
Opportunities for graduate study were based more on European perceptions of 
marginalization and national origin and that perception contributed to the more serious 
constraint found by my informant.  She asserted, in no uncertain terms, that Europeans 
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had the perception and expectation that Middle Easterners should be more stupid and that 
expectation of stupidity creates pressures that limit academic freedom and, hence, 
knowledge acquisition, dissemination, and production.  She changed the focus of her 
research from Egypt and the Arab world to Europe as she gained the strong impression 
that research of places outside Europe was not really appreciated or valued.  While this 
also contains strong implications for knowledge production that I will discuss elsewhere, 
it also showed a kink in what might be considered a vertical linkage between a young 
scholar from the developing world and mentors in advanced industrialized countries.  The 
knowledge my informant sought to acquire concerning the uses of the internet and 
networking in politics was gained but she felt patronized and unvalued.  The mentors she 
sought out expected her to be more stupid and that expectation undermined the purpose 
of the knowledge she sought to acquire.   
     On the one hand, expectations from the Egyptian state concerning useful knowledge to 
acquire perpetuated a very instrumental view of knowledge acquisition—particularly 
from undergraduates.  On the other, students wanted an atmosphere of free inquiry might 
be stymied by racism in the advanced industrialized countries that supposedly prize 
academic freedom for all.  While those missing pieces of my bridge metaphor are filled 
in, there appear to be serious obstacles here.  Other obstacles will be examined and these 
revisited in another chapter concerning academic freedom and funding issues for 




    As I have discussed the issues brought up most frequently by professors concerning 
funding and academic freedom in a separate chapter, I will only address the knowledge 
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production issues brought up by the two graduate students previously discussed in the 
section on knowledge acquisition.  It is posited that the industrial revolution did not occur 
in France first, not due to a lack of knowledge but due to the French emphasis on 
knowledge in service to the state or nation.  Within Mokyr’s framework of access costs to 
knowledge, this emphasis on instrumental knowledge driven by service to the state found 
in France may have limited the bridging mechanisms found in England wherein those 
with propositional knowledge interacted more freely and strongly with practitioners at the 
dawn of the Industrial Revolution.   
     Egypt is, if anything, even more centralized and state-oriented than France.  Their 
educational system based on examinations is also heavily influenced by the French model 
and has all the same weakness and, perhaps, none of its virtues.  With regard to 
knowledge production, the emphasis on what is most useful to the state or nation 
increases access costs as first the question of utility to state or nation must be examined.  
Further the emphasis on research in service to the state or nation can greatly constrain 
knowledge production and this will severely limit beneficial externalities of knowledge 
production.  In particular, society is not included in the loop of knowledge production and 
the virtuous cycle of knowledge that begat the industrial revolution in England is missing 
a crucial input element.  The state, while a participant in the knowledge loop through its 
unique ability to build institutions as well as fund them is not a good replacement for 
societal inputs.   
     Knowledge production can also find a quite different problem though and that 
problem is more societal and cultural in nature although it has an institutional mechanism 
as well.  In their efforts to grant opportunities to marginalized scholars from developing 
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countries, European universities have found themselves duplicating some of the problems 
associated with affirmative action programs in the United States and elsewhere.  There is 
a perception that a student from the Middle East is there based upon something other than 
merit and that perception promotes the belief that the Middle Eastern student is less able 
or, as my informant said, there was an expectation that she should be more stupid.  The 
institutional reality that merit was not the sole criterion governing admission of non-
European students coupled with a longstanding European tradition of the Muslim Middle 
Easterner as ‘other’ and inferior  caused my informant to question the importance and 
utility of the focus of her research if not its topic.  The impact of that for knowledge 
production is enormous.  This student pursued information at another university in order 
to bring in the new knowledge that the bridging type of social is supposed to do and 
found that while she could gain access to that knowledge the access cost was the 
applicability of that knowledge to Egyptian society.  Intriguingly, however, the European 
devaluation of Egypt may replicate the same knowledge production hole that is produced 
by the emphasis upon knowledge production in service to the state.  Society is missing in 
both.  The particular topic of the internet and networks is society-centric with its 
emphasis on societal networks found online and it was deemed of low value.  Similarly in 
our first example, society is not perceived as an important or valuable part of the 
knowledge production loop.  That low value on society as a part of knowledge production 
likely plays a role in the dissemination of knowledge problems. 
     Social capital of the bridging kind is a more civic and inclusive social capital.  It can 
generate new opportunities and increase social interaction as well as lessen tensions 
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amongst societal groups.  Putnam argues that it is this type of social capital that builds 
societal trust and generates efficiency as well as civic participation.  
Egypt is a relatively homogenous society ethnically and religiously.  They are estimated 
to have a Coptic Christian population of around 10 percent.  Their relative homogeneity 
is thought by some analysts to have contributed to their relative stability.  However, as 
examined previously, trust and efficiency are not products of that relative homogeneity.  
Indeed, the lack of trust amongst social classes and particularly a lack of trust in the state 
may well be a part of Egypt’s development failures.  Too, as Ayubi notes, bureaucracy in 
most of Egypt is about power and it contradicts efficiency.  The Faculty of Economics 
and Political Science at Cairo University is something of an anomaly in this regard.  They 
are squeezed from below as well as from above as society views the knowledge they 
disseminate and produce through strategic lenses while the state has various mechanisms 
to keep the university on a short leash and in check.  
 
Conclusion 
         The use of procedure to develop social capital, as outlined by Feddarke et al., 
provides a backdrop to examine the gradual assimilation of a Weberian type of 
bureaucracy by budding Egyptian scholars that replaces their view of the dense networks 
of familial expectation and obligation with a bureaucratized one.  That assimilation 
facilitates the understanding of network relations undertaken in the next chapter wherein 
knowledge is brought in across holes or gaps rather than densely situated within a tightly 
knit network. 
     Too this chapter also explored the relatively high institutionalization of the Faculty of 
Economics and Political Science with the intrusions made by the state that undermine the 
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academic mission of knowledge acquisition, dissemination and production.  
Institutionalization was also a factor noted by Bellin that can act to inhibit democratic 
transitions.  Relatively high institutionalization coupled with strategic bureaucratic 
appointments and the presence of security forces has acted to depoliticize the university.  
As noted in Chapter 3, the strategy of surveillance was deliberately deployed by Sadat 
and was refined under the Mubarak regime.  Nasser’s primary legacy, inhibiting 






SCHOLARS AND NETWORKS 
 
Introduction 
     Networks most clearly bring together the concepts used within this dissertation to 
analyze the context within which Egyptian academics live and work.  The idea of 
networks can be found within the literature surrounding social capital, understandings of 
knowledge networks, and Eva Bellin’s identification of international support networks as 
one of the factors promoting robust authoritarianism in the Arab Middle East.  Within 
this chapter I will examine the networking activity of the professors and graduate 
students I interviewed.  An examination of networks provides us with some 
understanding of how and why the university has been depoliticized by the regime and 
knowledge is acquired, disseminated, and produced with more international support and 
recognition than national or regional recognition.  The bridges that are meant to span 
holes are far more functional internationally due in part to the state’s successful political 
containment of the university.  That depoliticization stifles a knowledge society, as 
understood by the 2003 Arab Human Development Report.   
 
Egyptian Professional Associations 
 
     By law all professors are required to be members of a university staff association.  It is 
this association that provides staff with social and medical benefits and manages 
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scientific affairs.  Professors were not very interested in elaborating upon this association.  
Despite the disinterest in elaborating upon this particular association, they sounded 
similar to professional syndicates found throughout Egypt.  Egyptian professional 
syndicates play an important role in the provision of social, economic, and professional 
services.  Syndicates have experienced increasing government interference, largely due to 
the successes of Muslim Brotherhood members in capturing leadership positions and 
control through elections during the 1990s.  Some of these professional syndicates, 
controlled by the Brotherhood, became increasingly effective at providing services to 
members.   Elections in Egypt have never been noted for freedom and fairness and 
government interference hobbled the professional syndicates severely over the decade.  In 
the realm of higher education, government controls also increased.   
     One area of control includes political appointment of university rectors or presidents 
and deans at the university.  Faculties at Egyptian universities were allowed to elect their 
own deans until 1994 when the government gave the power of appointment to university 
rectors.  Deans are usually members of the NDP (National Democratic Party—Mubarak’s 
ruling party).   A senior professor I interviewed noted that while he was made department 
head due to his seniority, he was unlikely to become a dean as he refuses to join the NDP.  
He said that he found administrative work unpleasant anyway and could not find it in 
himself to be obedient and fall in line with conditions placed on deans.   
     Generally control is subtle but pervasive and professors did not comment much on 
intra-university relations.  Similarly, while several noted that some efforts had been made 
to create linkages among professors at different state universities, these efforts 
encountered considerable difficulty due to time and money constraints.  Additionally, a 
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junior professor noted that joint projects are rare as the promotional system does not 
encourage joint work.  It is perceived as second class.  My informant, who had recently 
obtained his PhD in the U.S. found it a little strange as the same professors would work 
on joint projects outside Cairo University in think tanks.  It is impossible to discount fear 
of the state as a contributor to the lack of interest in joint work within Cairo University as 
well as with other national universities.  While no professor mentioned state scrutiny as a 
reason for the lack of joint research projects within the university, several asserted that 
international donors give staff more freedom.   
     A few of the assistant professors I interviewed who had obtained their PhDs from the 
U.S. said that self-education seminars were a regular occurrence.  These self-education 
seminars went in a circle so that every professor would teach the others at least once and 
a positive horizontal bonding teaching circle was created.  These professors were the 
most optimistic and creative concerning all sorts of social capital and the creation of a 
knowledge society within the university, nationally, regionally, and internationally.  
However, they all said that their ties to the U.S. were currently stronger than to anywhere 
else.  Senior professors were, overall, less optimistic and mostly spoke of memberships in 
human rights organizations and think tanks or institutions that appeared to have 
international linkages, although they declined to specify much about them making it very 
unclear as to what kind and type of social capital might be at work here. 
     Yet another reason that cannot be discounted for the lack of joint work has to do with 
the Faculty’s insistence on strict Weberian bureaucratic methods.  This is particularly true 
when it comes to other university Faculties as well as with other national universities.  
Senior professors, in particular, spoke of failures they perceived in some of the other 
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Faculties at Cairo University.  They regarded the problems as primarily due to financial 
shortfalls and increasing student enrolments.  For example, the Faculty of Law was 
criticized as they had tiers of education depending upon whether or not students could 
afford to pay for quality instruction.  This was regarded as resulting from an 
underfunding and overcrowding situation that plagues the entire university.  National 
universities are completely free; however hundreds of thousands are currently enrolled 
across the country.  Many students come from poor families and are state-subsidized but 
professors’ salaries do not increase.  The Faculty of Law was said to be resolving this 
particular problem by giving students who could afford it the extra instruction needed to 
enhance their ability to land a good job after graduation and be well-paid.  Although 
professors related these sorts of non-Weberian practices sympathized, all found it 
problematic and preferred the emphasis upon merit found in their own Faculty.  It is 
possible that other university Faculties were viewed as unreliable partners due to the 
failures of the merit system within certain faculties.  A fear of taint could also be at work 
here.   
     Graduate students declaimed any involvement with associations although one senior 
graduate student claimed that membership in the Cairo Student Union was mandated by 
law.  He said he was not very active.  Other graduate students might simply have not seen 
this as terribly important to their academic pursuits and may well have asserted no 
associations out of fear of the state.  Surveillance and harassment of undergraduate 
students is far more pervasive and threatening for students than professors.  Most 
Egyptian students avoid involvement in student unions and associations.  While graduate 
students are likely a little freer than undergraduates, they do not have the same freedoms 
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as professors.  Graduate students are between cultures in a manner of speaking.  They are 
in the process of gradually being inducted into an academic culture that functions 
differently from the rest of Egypt.  They assert strong bonds with other graduate 
students—particularly those of the same year.  As they all share one office bonding is 
facilitated.  However, despite a very small sample size, I did obtain interviews with 
people at various stages of the process.  The most advanced were least interested in 
bonding with fellow Egyptians and spoke most of their experiences and links made 
abroad.  Additionally, one graduate student spoke quite frankly that the main tendency 
recently was to bridge the gap between state and society through joining the NDP.  
However, he asserted that this means of bridging by intellectuals between state and 
society was usually negatively evaluated as a pure search for satisfaction of personal 
interests.  Further, my informant argued that what this really meant was that the 
intellectual was most likely actually acting as a measure of legitimacy of the system 
rather than really playing a bridge role.   
 
The Regional Networking Experience 
 
     Regional contacts and conferences were thought to be important and some graduate 
students and professors had even attended a few.    More than one mentioned that certain 
problems were associated with regional projects and conferences as Egypt had relatively 
more academic freedom than many.  While there is no monolith here, the Gulf countries, 
with the exception of Qatar, were perceived to have nearly zero tolerance.  The professors 
with American PhDs enjoyed pointing out to me that I should understand this as the 
atmosphere regarding free inquiry as well as the perception of certain groups of people 
changed perceptibly after September 11, 2001.  Indeed, discussion of national and 
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regional constraints often sidetracked us a bit as the politicization of anything to do with 
the Middle East and Islam within the U.S. were hardly anything that I could disagree with 
and we would end up discussing whether greater constraints came from society, the state, 
or just perceived state intervention.  We all found it likely that constraints were mutually 
constitutive in the U.S. as well as Egypt and the Arab region. 
     One of the graduate students opined that regionally Arab academics tend to want to 
study topics that draw consensus.  Controversial conferences have occurred but tend to be 
very low profile while consensus conferences were well-publicized and had high 
attendance. He suggested that this was likely due to strong Arab preferences for 
consensus both culturally and politically.  Regional conferences, in particular, emphasize 
consensual topics.  For example, a conference discussing international law defending the 
independence of Arab states against foreign invasions was a noncontroversial consensus 
builder in the Arab world that did not cross any state or societal red lines.  What this 
might contribute to regional social capital and an Arab knowledge society is rather 
inconclusive though. 
     Another issue inhibiting the development of regional ties concerned the tendency of 
many Arab nationals to study for their PhDs abroad.  One of my informants estimated 
that approximately 90 percent of Jordanian PhDs obtained their PhDs in the U.S. or the 
U.K. Despite being a graduate of an American institution himself he suggested more 
should be done with Egypt as a resource for higher education.  Indeed, senior professors 
more or less agreed with this assessment as they complained of an Egyptian brain drain 
although the brain drain occurs at various levels of education and the Egyptian export of 
unskilled labor may now be greater than its export of educated persons to the larger Arab 
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world.  Senior professors tended to have two major emphases in my interviews with 
them.  Some emphasized academic freedom and the constraints placed upon it by the 
state and society. Others strongly emphasized the decline of Egyptian education and the 
lack of money for education, research, and knowledge acquisition, production, and 
dissemination.  I will cover this in much more detail in the next chapter.   
     That Egypt was the brains of the Arab world was expressed quite freely by a professor 
who never had time for the full interview but did find the time for a short, informal chat 
with me.  It is most unfortunate that we were never able to find a time for an interview as 
this professor is known for her work with Yusuf al Qaradawi and on Islamic feminism.  It 
would have been useful to know if Islamists have a greater density of regional relations 
and, if so, is greater consensus needed or does consensus on the importance of Islam 
allow for more controversy?  However, this professor is so busy and involved in so many 
projects—including global interfaith ones that I am fortunate that I received the ten 
minutes I did receive.  In contrast to two other female professors who gave me full 
interviews, this professor was very engaged in associational activity and public life.  This 
would likely surprise many Westerners as she was the only female professor I 
interviewed who wore a headscarf and is openly Islamist in orientation.  This professor 
appeared to experience much lesser dichotomization between the role expected of her at 
home and her scholarly and public intellectual roles.  She raised more questions than 







International Social Capital:  Networks 
     It was frequently unclear as to whether some associations were more local or 
international.  Professors did not wish to specify and Egyptian law concerning funding 
sources and government oversight likely has a great deal to do with what can be only be 
called evasiveness in this regard.  The most senior professors had multiple affiliations and 
likely relied a great deal on foreign funding.  They all emphasized the responsibility of 
intellectuals and researchers to investigate and resolve societal problems and contribute 
to development and all noted that funding is problematic.  While the government talks a 
good game, the reality is that a system of competition for professors was under 
consideration to replace tenure.  Further all universities are required to place funds in the 
central bank that is under the control of the Minister of Finance.  Rather than supporting 
research, the ministry of finance appeared to think that research centers were a source of 
funding for the government.  Under these conditions, professors are understandably a 
little cagey. 
     While monetary support for conference attendance was not given by national 
universities, junior professors noted that private think tanks—mostly international—were 
willing to fund conference participation.  At many of these conferences, professors were 
free to pursue or reinforce international contacts.  Maintenance of these contacts has been 
greatly facilitated by the internet, despite the unreliability of Cairo University’s network 
access.  The group of recent PhDs from American universities maintained online 
subscriptions to their former university library system in order to maintain access to a 
reliable data base as Cairo University has had to cancel a number of subscriptions and 
will likely be cancelling more due to lack of funds.  All had maintained memberships in 
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American academic associations although all agreed that multicultural ties were positive 
for scholarship and mentioned international consortiums of universities as well as 
membership in regional organizations such as the African Political Science Association 
and the Arab Political Science Association.  One mentioned that after the peace treaty 
with Israel multicultural and international ties grew for Egyptians.  These same 
professors also joined email groups.  One professor told me that with the internet creating 
and maintaining links to academics in other countries was quite easy.  He would email if 
he had questions about their work or was interested in what they might have to say about 
aspects of his.  He said most people would answer and, if they did not, it was a small 
investment for possibly great rewards.  However, these were junior professors and they 
all emphasized that they needed to pursue opportunities that would pay them for their 
time and expertise.   
     The graduate student from the last chapter who complained that she was expected to 
be more stupid did find numerous horizontal contacts in Europe.  While seemingly almost 
completely disengaged from other graduate students at Cairo University and quite 
skeptical of organizations and associations, she kept in contact with people she had met at 
the university in Maastricht.  She said that Maastricht was very international and that 
people came from all over.  She enjoyed the extensive interaction and said it was the best 
experience of her life.  Her contacts would invite each other to their home countries or 
countries of residence, disseminate information concerning good positions and 
opportunities, as well as engaging each other in the exploration of projects that might be 
done together.  The bridging social capital between peers she gained in Europe was really 
quite extensive.  Intriguingly as it involved sojourner students it was both bonding and 
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bridging in nature.  She had every intention of pursuing a PhD in Europe—not so much 
because she enjoyed the Europeans but because sojourner students in Europe were so 
dynamic and well-connected with each other. 
 
Social Capital and Implications for Knowledge 
 
     Critics who accuse Robert Putnam of an overly romanticized view of bottom-up 
processes and the bridging types of social capital may well have had Egypt in mind.   
Faculty members become increasingly adept at discovering and managing the bridging 
kind of social capital or networking.  Their work and interests are often facilitated by 
international contacts.  However, none of this has promoted research into knowledge that 
would lead to overall good governance in Egypt.  In fact, the Faculty appears squeezed 
between a controlling state and an apathetic distrustful society that perceives a university 
degree in a quite instrumental manner.  Their international contacts and networks far 
exceeded local ones in number, depth, and quality.  As these people are social scientists, 
they want to be engaged with society but are seemingly better able to interact 
academically with international contacts. 
     To a certain extent, the ability of intellectuals to communicate and interact more with 
other intellectuals regardless of national origin may be universal.  However Putnam’s 
work posits that horizontal associational activities promote trust more broadly than is, 
perhaps, the case.  While one could argue that the networks of academics have promoted 
trust among academics, it has clearly not promoted trust within Egypt.  Other Faculties, 
buckling under the sheer weight of being asked to do too much with too little, were not 
completely trusted as the merit system declined.  The security presence on campus and 
the political appointment of deans does not seem conducive to building trust and it is not.  
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It cannot be ascertained how much the decision not to work on joint projects within Cairo 
University can be ascribed to the pervasive security presence and state controls over 
research.  It would seem, though, that it must play a role if the same professors have no 
issue with joint work when done within think tanks or international research centers that 
“allow for more freedom.”  If professors and graduate students trust each other more on 
international sites or privately held ones, what can we learn about the role of the state in 
facilitating or undermining social capital? 
     Once again, my female graduate student informant demonstrates an issue that can 
occur with regard to overly romantic notions concerning dense locally networked types of 
association.  She was quite disengaged from fellow graduate students.  She said that this 
was because the office was too crowded and computer access to limited for her to get her 
work done and, likely, there is a lot of truth to that.  However, her increased international 
contacts—other sojourner students in Europe—received far more animated attention from 
her than did local contacts.  What this appears to demonstrate is that adherence to 
Weberian norms within the Faculty as well as emphasis on academic excellence meant 
that those people who became more and more acculturated to an academic understanding 
of rules and norms of conduct became more disengaged or even alienated from a state 
and society that were conducting themselves and their personal relations by other criteria.  
Escaping an overcrowded office to work alone and maintain contacts via the internet also 
means escaping the real or perceived scrutiny of security as well as escaping other 
graduate students that might not really have acculturated into the critical and analytical 
types of thought of the dedicated graduate student.  This is a marked instance of one way 
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bifurcation between the intellectual and society can occur.  They do not trust each other 
and more association appears likely to create more contempt than camaraderie and trust.   
     My female graduate student informant is at an early stage of perceiving society 
similarly to the professor I discussed in the introduction to this dissertation.  He perceived 
the urban masses as incapable of spontaneous social capital.  He is not quite right but 
there is a problem within society and particularly between social classes with regard to 
trust.  The professor does not see the spontaneous social capital that the masses are 
capable of because they do not trust him.  He does not really trust them either.   
     An incident outside my formal research illustrates some of the fear that animates this 
lack of trust.  I was in Egypt when student members of the Muslim Brotherhood chose to 
have a martial arts demonstration at Al-Azhar.  The next day, I could not gain admission 
to the Cairo University Campus at any gate.  The gates are managed by security 
personnel and, in my case, they usually accepted my I.D. card from the University of 
Utah.  Sometimes they would want a Cairo University student to accompany me or at 
least drop me off at the gate.  There did not appear to be tremendous consistency and the 
day after the demonstration, I could not gain entry onto the campus.  All security officers 
said absolutely not until one told me I could go on campus if I left my passport with him.  
Needless to say, I returned to my Cairo home and called my interview subjects to inform 
them that I could not interview them that day.  Some said they would leave my name with 
security on another day while other senior professors suggested I come to their office at 
the American University in Cairo instead.  Professors trusted that I was what I said and 
were completely familiar with research as well as knowledgeable about many aspects of 
my topic and never questioned whether I might really be a CIA operative or whether 
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what I was doing would actually bring the ire of the state upon their heads.  However, the 
mother of the family I lived with panicked when she first heard I could not get onto 
campus.  When I was finally able to fully explain what happened, she calmed but was 
uncomfortable with me for a few days.  Her first fear was really that I would get the 
whole family in trouble with state security.  Denial of entrance onto campus by security 
indicated to her that they thought I was doing something wrong and the whole family 
would be vulnerable as they were giving me a home in Egypt.  When no security ever 
showed up at her door, she relaxed.  Her other fear that I might really be affiliated with 
the CIA was put to rest by her brother, an acquaintance of mine in Philadelphia.  
     This incident and my host mother’s fears demonstrate the lack of trust that inhibits 
connections between intellectuals and society and provides a reason for that lack of trust.  
It also demonstrates Ayubi’s contention that bureaucracy is more about power than 
efficiency.  I rather doubt that security on campus thought I was dangerous.  They had 
seen me before and people known to them had vouched that I was not a journalist out to 
get a story embarrassing to the Egyptian state.  They did not know what to do with me 
and all feared doing the wrong thing.  They would send me to other gates, saying I could 
get admission onto campus at that gate.  Of course the next gate wanted to pass me along 
to the next and the next until finally someone particularly brave offered to allow me on 
campus in exchange for my passport.   
     The fences and gates that surround the university are indicative of why Egypt has 
failed to become a developmental state as can happen with the correct kinds, types, and 
overlaps of social capital.  The people do not trust intellectuals and are not very interested 
in exposing either their own cooperative efforts or allowing glimpses into how they might 
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deal with what Ismail noted as the perception that the state is nowhere and yet it is 
everywhere.  Intellectuals and the people are almost two different cultures inhabiting the 
same space.  The senior professor who argued that the urban masses were unlikely to 
develop spontaneous social capital was not completely wrong.  That spontaneous social 
capital that can bridge gaps amongst unequals is problematic in Egypt and his contention 
that intraelite cooperation was far more likely reflected actual experience with the urban 
masses.  However, no one discusses how the security apparatus may block those bridges. 
 
Implications for Knowledge and the Faculty 
 
     Hilaire-Perez, in a critique of Mokyr’s work asserts that the horizontal transmission of 
knowledge facilitates the micro inventions that can lead to more efficient production 
techniques.  Horizontal transmission debugs, adapts and improves techniques.  The 
virtuous horizontal teaching circle is a good example of how horizontal transmission can 
improve teaching techniques.113  Asking questions via email even to strangers as fellow 
academics shows how work can be debugged through the use of information technology 
to bridge a hole.  Too, horizontal bridging types of links across networks may facilitate 
research, job and scholarship opportunities, as well as providing links for joint projects.   
     Undergraduate students are a major point of contact.  Socially relevant research may 
also bring academics into local communities.  While I did speak with one professor who 
had worked with a couple of impoverished communities and had obtained their trust, 
most professors asserted that society does not understand the purpose of research and 
does not see the benefits and will not participate.  That breakage has some greater 
consequences than the inability of those possessing propositional knowledge to really 
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pass that onto those who have practical knowledge.  This break impacts the horizontal 
transmission of knowledge as well.  Refinement of technique and the attendant 
phenomena that Hilaire-Perez argues is an important component of development occurs 
among intellectuals but without linkages to practitioners.  What, then, is refined by 
society?          
     A major difficulty with ascribing the greater share of responsibility to society is that 
the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University comes out of that 
same society.  If the merit-based structure of the Faculty and study abroad and interaction 
with fellow graduate students from diverse backgrounds at Western universities 
contributes to a certain change in perspective concerning the utility of horizontal and 
vertical pathways of knowledge acquisition, production, and dissemination, then it 
becomes very difficult to argue that society determines social capital and access to 
knowledge.  Structure appears to have a stronger role than culture does.  While the 
Egyptian state sometimes appears willing to sell academics out to society in exchange for 
a little legitimacy they also contribute towards a climate of fear and distrust.  State 
limitations on academic freedom may have greater consequence for knowledge 




     The state’s educational system promotes an instrumental view of knowledge 
acquisition.  Egypt uses the French model of exams.  Exam scores determines what 
schools a child can go to and a child’s future is largely determined by the fifth grade 
exam.  That exam will determine where a child can attend middle school while the eighth 
grade exam determines secondary school and, of course, the leaving exam 
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(althaniwiyyaal’amiyya) determines the Faculty a young person can enter.  Schools are 
quite overcrowded and teachers are quite underpaid and a system has developed wherein 
teachers do their real teaching with tutoring.  Students’ parents pay for the tutoring that 
students need if they are to get good exam scores.  The higher the grade, the more the 
tutoring costs.  Students and parents are encouraged to think strategically in terms of 
knowledge acquisition for two reasons.  First, the exams depend upon student 
memorization of material.  Students want to know what will be on the exam and 
memorize prodigious amounts of material geared strictly towards the exam.  Knowledge 
not on the exam is not even acquired as it could possibly interfere with knowledge 
needed for those all important exams.  Second the increasing need to pay extra in order to 
get a child adequately educated to obtain a job later in life, encourages instrumentalized 
and strategic acquisition of information.  When real instruction costs in scarce resources 
all knowledge acquisition is subject to a cost/benefit analysis.   
     The habit of acquiring knowledge strategically is ingrained by the time students reach 
the university.  Also some Faculties are adopting the primary and secondary school 
answer to overcrowding and underfunding so the tendency of the people to perceive 
knowledge acquisition in terms of a cost/benefit analysis is perpetuated.  That type of 
strategic acquisition of knowledge thoroughly undermines a knowledge society wherein 
knowledge is pursued for the sake of knowledge.  It also undermines the development of 
a knowledge economy and the developmental state as both of these perceive knowledge 
in positive sum terms rather than the zero sum terms encouraged by Egypt’s educational 
structure and its failings.   
140 
 
     Classroom discussions are something of a mixture of horizontal and vertical paths of 
knowledge.  In Egypt, classroom discussion is constrained by the security presence, self-
censorship from professors and overt censorship.  This greatly inhibits knowledge 
acquisition.  Much of this begins well before university and again demonstrates the state-
society interaction that inhibits the pursuit of knowledge. 
Long before university, Egyptian students are conditioned to regard censorship in  
the  classroom as acceptable. Journalist Bahega Hussein, for example, described  
how the Ministry of Education censored the romantic subplots in plays taught in  
secondary school. “It creates a generation of boys and girls. . . who find 
everything can be treated as against their own tradition and country. When they 
reach the university they cannot appreciate freedom,”  SamiaMehrez and other 
professors blame the rigid educational system for producing weak university 
students. “Students are heir to a national education system based on hierarchy and 
oppression and memorization. It kills their brains; thinking in itself is horror 
because if they do, they are defying the authority of the teacher,” Mehrez said. 
This early training makes it more difficult for professors to explain the dangers of 
censorship.114 
 
     One obstacle to knowledge acquisition of the higher sort may stem more purely from 
society than the state.  The girls who drop out of graduate school may well do so from 
societal pressures to get married and have a family.  As boys need to have money in order 
to get married as well as be able to demonstrably support a family, they would not get 
societal or familial pressure to just drop out of school—unless it was for a good paying 
job.  The female graduate student that appeared so disengaged from other graduate 
students might well be dealing with pressure by avoiding it and it may well come more 
from her fellow female graduate students than her family.  Urban Egypt does not 
demonstrate any particular prejudice against educating girls.  However, although many 
Egyptian women work, the societal myth of normalcy is that the woman stays home and 
manages the house and children, while the man earns money to support them.  In a 
                                               
114 Human Rights Watch, “Reading Between The ‘Red Lines’”: 40-41. 
141 
 
certain sense, then, society expects all women to have the same career path—wife and 
mother.  In a sense then, society views women in higher education as delaying growing 
up; despite the substantial respect most people have for education.  Friends and 
classmates may play a far stronger role in pressuring young women to conform than does 




     It is, indeed, quite odd that professors who have no problem with joint work in an 
international research center or think tank assiduously avoid it at Cairo University.  The 
notion that it is due to the emphasis on individual work in the promotion process does not 
actually work all that well unless all work done with outside institutions was excluded 
from consideration and I could find no evidence that it was so.  What makes scholars 
avoid each other in location and seek each other out in another? 
     The only explanation I could find was the pervasive security presence.  The very 
presence of a security office at the Faculty seemed to promote an atmosphere of distrust.  
Oddly these same professors trusted each other in other locations.  How might the feeling 
that one is always being watched inhibit horizontal avenues of knowledge production?  
How does the impression of subtle but pervasive control break down the human 
relationships that make up social capital?  Local networks have a difficult time finding 
bridging mechanisms that are not marred by distrust or do not appear to have 
insurmountable access costs. 
     The scholars at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science seemed almost more 
comfortable bridging a hole with colleagues in the West than with each other.  The lack 
of trust cannot be about fearing that another is an informant as the same professors that 
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avoided working with each other at Cairo University might seek each other out 
elsewhere.  Do all Egyptians live with the feeling that Big Brother is watching them 
unless they are in private spaces?  How much might that fear of the state account for 
failures to create bridges amongst intellectuals, masses, and state officials?   
     I cannot prove that fear is a factor in Egypt’s worsening economic and political 
situation.  I can think of no measure that would actually indicate that fear inhibits social 
capital, thereby accounting for much of The Arab Human Development Report’s 
knowledge deficit.  Also, removal of the security apparatus would not result in the 
automatic opening of a free inquiry society.  Society is, in fact, quite conservative and not 
necessarily strong admirers of academic freedom.  Professors informed me that it was 
easier to work with political questions than with ones about Islam.  However, it does 
seem that state and society are reinforcing their own worst aspects when it comes to free 
inquiry and knowledge production—rather than producing the virtuous cycle of 
knowledge envisioned by Mokyr as so essential to the translation of the industrial 




     Within the horizontal dimension of social capital, professors and graduate students 
emphasized networks.  Burt, of course, would not be surprised by this as his argument 
asserts that it is really the structural hole or the gap that is bridged that is most important.  
The structural holes or gaps that are not bridged might be equally important.   
     The classroom discussion issue is as applicable to knowledge dissemination as it is to 
knowledge acquisition.  Students cannot freely voice their opinions.  While the security 
apparatus can certainly cast pall over any kind of free and open discussion, professors 
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may implement their own red lines.  These red lines occur particularly with regard to 
politics and religion.   Professors are also a product of the Egyptian national education 
system and of its conservative society.  In this atmosphere the safest knowledge to 
acquire and consume is of the instrumental sort.   
     Horizontal dissemination acted in favor of a knowledge society only in the case of 
academics.  The senior professor who asserted that intraelite social capital was far more 
likely to occur than spontaneous, bottom up social capital very much had these types of 
horizontal and vertical knowledge flows in mind.  However, what may be missing from 
his conceptualization is that information flows amongst the urban masses also occur.  
This area of a hole that is not bridged is worth some study.  Burt’s contention that it is the 
structural holes that tell us the most may explain this bifurcated perception between 




     Ayubi argues that even fairly well rationalized bureaucracies can be used for regime 
power maintenance through key patronage positions that depend upon pleasing the 
supreme power holder rather than in adhering to proceduralized efficiency.  This problem 
very much confronts the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University.  
The insertion of the security apparatus produces fear and self-censorship while politically 
appointed university rectors and deans are less concerned with the advancement of 
‘knowledge for knowledge sake’ than in the advancement of their own political careers.   
    These problems, as my interviews demonstrate, produce vast problems for a 
knowledge society in its dissemination, acquisition, and production mechanisms.  In 
short, intellectuals are hobbled and constrained by state interests as they try to pursue 
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precisely what caused their interest in an academic life in the first place.  This frustration 
and difficulty in trying to do one’s job and serve society as one sees fit through research 
and instruction leads many to build upon their international networks.  New opportunities 
are facilitated through bridging social capital in international knowledge networks.  Local 
and regional networks appear far less important to the academics I interviewed. 
     While international knowledge networks that exemplify the bridging metaphor of 
social capital have been far more accessible to intellectual elites than the masses, recent 
advancements in communications technology has introduced new knowledge networks.  
These new knowledge networks are primarily inhabited by the young and college 
educated but they are not organized or facilitated by a much constrained and burdened 
university.  In the next chapter I will discuss what has changed in Egypt and how a 
revolution could occur as well as shed some light on why the university was more 










     In December 2010, a man by the name of Mohamed Bouazizi set fire to himself after 
police confiscated his vegetable cart.  Bouazizi’s act of protest set off a string of events 
that is still shaking the Arab World.  His act triggered similar acts of protest in Algeria 
and successfully began the demonstrations that brought down Tunisian President Zine al-
Abidine Ben Ali.  From there protests spread to Egypt.115  Eighteen days of protests in 
Cairo’s Tahrir Square ousted President Mubarak.116 
     The fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was not predicted by anyone and, 
indeed, despite events in Tunisia his ouster was a surprise.  Surprise was less a product of 
the belief that the Egyptian regime was particularly democratic than because Mubarak 
had constructed what appeared to be a particularly resilient and robust authoritarianism.  
Mubarak’s Egypt appeared a bastion of stability with its carefully staged elections, 
clientelism, and strong ability to fragment and co-opt opposition forces.  Hitherto, I have 
examined the balance of forces as they constrained and effected scholarly production in 
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the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University.  Constraints on 
scholars apparently had the desired effect of producing quiescence and scholars pursued 
international contacts in order to gain access to knowledge.   However, the balance of 
power changed in society if not the university and the protests that erupted on January 25, 
2011 in Tahrir Square, brought down Hosni Mubarak’s thirty-year rule. 
 
Framing the Revolution 
 
     Three major frames have been used to explain the momentous events of January and 
February in Cairo.  The first frame utilizes technology and the new media to explain the 
Egyptian revolution.  The focus here is on internet-savvy and well-connected youth and 
the writings of Gene Sharp as well as the contributions made by Serbian youth who 
helped oust Milosevic through nonviolent means.  The second frame advances the 
demonstration effect of Tunisia to explain the surprising outpouring of the Egyptian 
masses onto the streets and into Tahrir Square.  This explanation also usually notes the 
importance of social media as Tunisian activists communicated their experiences and tips 
to Egyptians.  The third explanation advances the frame of economic crises to explain the 
surprising events in Tahrir Square.  The global recession has increased prices of 
commodities—particularly on food.117  Riots for bread or food subsidies are not a new 
occurrence in Egypt and have, successfully, gained concessions from the regime but have 
never made any kind of leadership ouster or regime change. 
     Indeed all three explanatory frames contain truth and contribute towards an 
explanation of the 2011 Egyptian revolution.  However, none are, by themselves, 
adequate to explain the persistence of demonstrators or the ouster of Mubarak.  What is 
                                               




needed is a model to understand what changed in the balance of power between state and 
society.  Bellin’s model of robust authoritarianism, used in Chapter 2 to explore the role 
of the state, is also useful to examining what changed so that robust authoritarianism 
weakened.   
     Bellin’s model of robust authoritarianism and failure to initiate democratic transitions 
relies on Theda Skocpol’s classic work on social revolutions.   Skocpol argues that 
revolution occurs when the state’s coercive apparatus lacked the will and capacity to 
crush revolutionary movements.  Bellin brings Skocpol’s model to democratic transitions 
and, although the events in Egypt are called a revolution, they are more accurately 
described as reformist as actors sought a democratic transition rather than a true social 
revolution.  The Egyptian Revolution may yet qualify as a political revolution, although 
that remains to be seen, but is not a social revolution as understood by Skocpol.  Bellin 
outlines four factors to explain the conditions that will cost a state’s coercive apparatus 
the will or capacity to maintain its grip on power.  These include fiscal health, 




     Fiscal health refers to the maintenance of the security apparatus.  If security personnel 
go unpaid and supplies are threatened, they are far less likely to defend the state’s regime.  
In the case of a security establishment that has been weakened by a prolonged fiscal 
crisis, the security apparatus may be weakened from within and collapse upon 
                                               
118Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism”: 143-146. 
148 
 
confrontation even with a weak society.119  Poor fiscal health is not precisely the problem 
for the Egyptian security apparatus although, admittedly, the economic explanation 
advanced by some analysts is not without merit.  In order to understand the change in 
will, we need to discuss the overall Egyptian economy.    
     As noted in Chapter 2, liberalizing economic reforms changed the patterns of 
patronage from distribution of resources to crony capitalism.  John Sfakianakis’s research 
examines the lack of transparency and accountability in 1990s reform in Egypt.  Elite 
businessmen and bureaucratic elites turned privatization into a means of rent distribution 
in return for political support to the regime.120  The Egyptian Organization for Human 
Rights had urged Mubarak to review his privatization policies that “helped impoverish 
people.”121 
     Anger with corruption was clearly manifest among demonstrators in Tahrir Square.  
While corruption trials of top regime officials and, indeed, Mubarak himself, proceed as 
of this writing, economic stagnation, increased inequalities, and concern over economic 
opportunity provides a more clear explanation as to what brought many protestors into 
the streets.  Egypt’s youthful population is suffering from a lack of opportunity.  The 
problem was recognized in the Egyptian Human Development Report 2010 (hereafter 
EHDR 2010).       
     The EHDR 2010 lists several factors that exclude youth from full participation in 
society; however, the two most important within the context of this dissertation are 
education and unemployment.  The quality of education has declined over the years in 
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Egypt as overcrowding takes its toll.  Limited resources and an overworked and 
underfunded academic staff struggle to disseminate relevant knowledge to an enormous 
cohort of youth.  Education should serve as a mechanism of inclusion and increase 
youthful competitiveness in an increasingly knowledge-driven global economy.122  While 
the failures of Egyptian education contribute to the problem of youthful unemployment, 
those failures are not the only factor associated with youthful unemployment and 
underemployment.   
      The youth cohort of 18-29-year-olds examined in the EHDR 2010 are the most 
educated Egyptian cohort to come of age and enter the work force in modern Egyptian 
history.  Those born in 1985 have an average of ten years of school while those born in 
1950 had attained only an average of four years.  Gender disparities have also 
decreased.123  However, increased education has not, necessarily, led to greater 
employment opportunities.  There is an apparent mismatch between quality and type of 
education in Egypt and the needs of a knowledge-driven global economy.  Lack of 
employment opportunities is not solely a problem of mismatch though.   
     Although the Egyptian economy has grown significantly since IMF mandated reforms 
began nearly two decades ago and macroindicators have stabilized, these gains have 
failed to translate into increased living standards for the general population or increased 
job opportunities for the growing number of Egyptians entering the job market.  The 
Mubarak regime’s propensity to reform the economy while maintaining political power 
has led to increased crony capitalism at the expense of the public welfare. 
                                               




    Unemployment, underemployment, and employment in the informal sector have 
increased even as educational attainment has increased in Egypt.  The withdrawal of the 
state from public services as in Bulaq (see Chapter 2), underfunding for education, and 
the public perception of a poorly performing economy due to a lack of employment 
opportunities contributed to Egypt’s 2011 Revolution and the strong representation of 
youth within that movement. 
     Youth were not the only group disgruntled with neoliberal reforms that catered to elite 
at the expense of the masses though.  Protestors from the working class were also an 
important group amongst the demonstrators who made their voices heard in Egypt.  
Veterans of many attempted strikes and other workplace disruptions for better pay and 
working conditions, industrial laborers understood better than many the need for political 
reform to gain some access to Egypt’s apparent improved economy.124Kienle’s 
observation, discussed in Chapter 2, that economic losers were being systematically 
deprived of their right to resist125 is important to understanding why Egyptian fiscal 
health was not all that it appeared through macro-indicators.  The atrophy of the civilian 
political system in favor of the military and security core of the regime, remarked upon 
by Henry and Springborg,126 caught up with the regime as more sectors of the population 
coordinated and cooperated in massive protests. 
      However, none of this quite explains why a coercive apparatus in good fiscal health 
declined to crush the revolution.  First, the Egyptian revolution was not a revolution in 
the most proper sense of the term.  It was and is a reformist movement.  Protestors’ 
                                               
124 El-Ghobashy, “The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution” http://merip.org/mer/mer258/praxis-egyptian-
revolution 
125Eberhard Kienle, A Grand Delusion; Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt, pp.167-193. 
126Henry and  Springborg Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East. 147. 
151 
 
demands were limited to demands for recognition and political rights.  Second, while 
protestors demanded limitations upon the police and the Central Security Force, the role 
of the army was not threatened.  Finally, as the army is drawn by conscription from 
society, it is likely that they sympathized with protestors.  All of this likely increased the 
calculation of overall cost to crush demonstrators to the military.  Despite being well-
funded and having the capacity to crush demonstrations, the military chose not to do that.  
In other words, capacity was not the problem.  The military lacked the will.  The 
following variables should clarify why and how the calculations of the military changed.   
 
International Support Networks 
     According to Bellin, the robustness of a regime’s coercive apparatus depends upon the 
maintenance of international support networks.  Withdrawal of foreign financial backing 
can devastate the fiscal health of a coercive apparatus while the withdrawal of rhetorical 
support can devastate will as an authoritarian regime may recalculate how to maintain 
itself and international support.127  While American financial support to the military was 
never in question, demonstrators had gained formidable international support networks of 
their own.  The increased international support networks of demonstrators changed cost 
calculations for the coercive apparatus and its own international support networks.   
     The demonstration effect from Tunisia cannot be dismissed.  Similarly to Tunisian 
youth, Egyptian youth were also fed up with corruption and frustrated by the failure of 
the state to promote employment opportunities commensurate with their educations.  The 
link was not as spontaneous as some suppose though. 
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      In 2008, Egyptians and Tunisians had set up online groups that exchanged 
experiences.  The Progressive Youth of Tunisia, formed in the wake of a failed strike, 
linked up with Egyptian activists who had established an online presence to maintain 
momentum from the failed March, 2008 strike in Mahalla, Egypt.  The April 6 movement 
was born from the efforts of youth to link with the industrial workers in Mahalla.  The 
nationwide strike of April 6 turned into a nonevent throughout the nation, although 
workers in Mahalla were violently repressed by police forces.128  Nationwide, the 
solidarity strikes were blocked by police forces.129 
     Clearly another strategy and more planning were necessary and Egyptian activists 
looked beyond simple social networking to learn from successful movements and 
integrate those experiences into their strategic repertoire.  Much has been made of the 
writings of American academic, Gene Sharp.  Sharp’s ideas about the utility of 
nonviolent resistance to police states were, indeed, important but the practical experience 
of Serbian youth in their ouster of Milosevic proved indispensible.   
     In 2009, Egyptian blogger and April 6 movement activist, Mohammed Adel, went to 
Belgrade, Serbia.  Belgrade is home to the Center for Applied NonViolent Action and 
Strategies (CANVAS) and is run by Serbians who had successfully ousted Slobadan 
Milosevic in a nonviolent youth struggle through the organization known as Otpor.  From 
CANVAS, Adel learned how to take organization from the computer and out onto the 
streets.  Upon his return from studying with CANVAS, Adel taught members of the April 
6 movement and Kifaya how to conduct peaceful demonstrations, avoid violence, and 
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confront violence from security forces as well as how to encourage people to move out 
into the streets in protest.130  Organizers also drew lessons from an Egyptian expatriate 
group known as the Academy for Change located in Qatar.  Run by Egyptians in their 
thirties, the group promotes Gene Sharp’s ideas concerning nonviolent resistance.  
Members of the April 6 movement and Kifaya explained that the Academy for Change 
was like Marx and they were like Lenin.131  It was up to youth activists to put ideas into 
practice and with lessons learned from CANVAS, they did just that. 
     While it is clear that online organizing is not enough and ideas must be translated into 
action, Egyptian activists received more online support in the form of Google marketing 
executive, Wael Ghonim.  Although Ghonim says that what he did was build a brand, the 
Facebook site he started and ran “We are All Khalid Said” was instrumental in 
duplicating Otpor’s tactic of making resistance cool and disseminating the skills or 
knowledge people needed to oust Mubarak and bring reform to Egypt.  Ghonim worked 
with Mohammed El-Baradei, better known as the head of the IAEA before the Egyptian 
Revolution, before starting the page “We Are All Khalid Said” which gathered 400,000 
followers on Facebook.132Ghonim thought Facebook an ideal way to disseminate 
information as once a person becomes a fan of a page, the posts put up on the page 
appear in an individual’s newsfeed.  In Ghonim, Egyptian activists found an individual 
who knew marketing and was able to disseminate information far and wide through 
social networking media.  However, it would be a mistake to think that social networking 
media alone make for a revolution.  Ghonim’s Facebook page provided more bridges to 
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more people but actual tactics and strategy came from other internationally located 
groups such as Serbia’s CANVAS and the expatriate Egyptian group in Qatar, Academy 
for Change.  In order to further disseminate information, activists published a twenty-six 
page pamphlet called “How to Protest Intelligently.”133  The pamphlet explained goals 
and urged people to adopt a unified stance as well as educating demonstrators on 
nonviolent strategies.134 
     The “spontaneous” revolution in Tahrir Square, although loosely inspired by Tunisia’s 
success, was years in the making.  International support networks to gain and disseminate 
strategies, tactics, and build bridges ranged from Serbia to Qatar and beyond.  Failed 
demonstrations added to lessons and urged activists to learn from successful agents of 
change such as the former Otpor activists that make up CANVAS.  The Egyptian 
Revolution is a case of bridging social capital wherein new knowledge was brought in to 
make a difference in how demonstration could occur and succeed despite an authoritarian 
state willing to use its coercive apparatus to crush demonstrators.  The Egyptian regime 
did send out police from the Central Security Force known as baltigiyya (thugs) to disrupt 
demonstrations and foment violence.  They failed.  While one reason for the failure is the 
superior organizing skills learned by activists and disseminated to the masses, another 
reason is the decision by the regime’s international support networks to not support them 
this time. 
     American support for continued coercion and violent repression was not forthcoming 
as protests continued to demand Mubarak’s exit from power.  On the one hand, the 
Americans had a hard time justifying continued support to a regime that they had urged 
                                               




to make political reforms for years in the face of demonstrators making demands for 
those self-same reforms.  On the other, the usual regime deployment of opposition figures 
as dangerous Islamists failed to have the desired end of continued American support for 
Mubarak’s rule as a bulwark against extremist Islamists.   
     Demonstrators were clearly not Islamists looking for a sharia driven state.  The youth 
that drove the rebellion had reached out internationally so as to avoid links with 
compromised Egyptian political opposition groups and were able to maintain their 
framing of goals that were democratic and secular.  While the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood eventually joined the movement in Tahrir Square they were not at all 
instrumental in organizing the initial event on Police Day.135  The Muslim Brotherhood, 
like other established political groups, followed the youth and could not take over the 
movement without fatally crippling it.  Many demonstrators exhibited no problem with 
the Brotherhood but said they would never vote for them.  The American President, 
Barack Obama, could hardly back an unpopular regime in contradiction to the expressed 
desires of the people for political reform and within the frame of Islamism as irrelevant.  
Too, the efforts made by demonstrators to split the regime from the military paid off in 
terms of international support to the regime as the demands for political reform hardly 
made for a social revolution damaging to American political interests.  Indeed support for 
Mubarak would have damaged American interests far more than stepping back and 
allowing events to proceed as the Egyptian people willed would have.  While Arab 
autocrats likely feared the ouster of Egypt’s Mubarak more than that of Tunisia’s Ben Ali 
as a possible beginning of the end for robust Arab authoritarianism, Mubarak was largely 
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seen as expendable and efforts were on to maintain the status quo by jettisoning an 
unpopular figurehead and trying to rewrite the elitist neoliberal formula into a 
constitution and law through temporary military rule. 
 
Institutionalization of the State Security Apparatus 
 
     According to Bellin’s model of robust authoritarianism, institutionalization of the 
security apparatus is inversely related to its will to repress initiatives for reform from 
below.  By institutionalization, Bellin means: 
          An institutionalized coercive apparatus is one that is rule-governed, predictable 
          and meritocratic.  It has established paths of career advancement and recruitment; 
          promotion is based on performance, not politics there is a clear delineation  
          between the public and the private that forbids predatory behavior vis-à-vis  
          society; and discipline is maintained through the inculcation of a service ethic and  
          strict enforcement of a merit-based hierarchy.136 
Institutionalization, then, is akin to Feddarke et al.’s rationalization discussed in Chapters 
2 and 5 wherein proceduralization and codification can encourage the type of embedded 
autonomy that promotes development.  An institutionalized coercive apparatus can hold 
enough autonomy from the regime that it can sacrifice that regime without sacrificing 
itself.  However, the institutionalization of the Egyptian security sector is questionable. 
      Although Bellin asserts that the militaries of Tunisia and Egypt are relatively well-
institutionalized, the thin literature on the subject shows a decidedly mixed picture.  
Military conscription is obligatory so soldiers come from all social classes, but promotion 
depends upon connections made by family and social ties (shillas).  Shillas are peer or 
kinship networks that support vertical bonding social capital and promote work 
advancement for individuals.137Shilllas are similar to the dense networks found in 
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137 Said and Bakr, “Egypt Security Sector Reform,” 4.  
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Egyptian traditional families and are duplicated to a certain degree by graduate students 
(T.A.’s) in The Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University.  
Recruitment is well institutionalized but promotion is more dependent on personal 
connections, and, thus, politicized.  Another problem with the Egyptian military’s 
institutionalization comes from a lack of clear delineation between the public and the 
private domains.  The Egyptian military actively competes in the civilian economy.  The 
military operates in the agricultural, tourist, and real estate sectors as well as operating a 
good sized defense industry.  While this is legal, as is crony capitalism everywhere, it is 
quite unclear as to how much military business is subject to outside or civilian 
oversight.138 
     Nonetheless the military is quite distinct from the police and Central Security Force 
that so drew the ire of Egyptian demonstrators in Tahrir Square.  As the police and 
Central Security Force were in charge of controlling public disorder and combating 
extremist forces, they were far more likely to be accused and guilty of brutality towards 
civilians.  Too the Central Security Force is ambiguously defined and under the control of 
the Ministry of Interior.  That particular force may have been perceived as a possible rival 
to the military.139 
     Rivalry between forces as well as a desire to protect certain perquisites enjoyed by the 
military in the civilian economy likely promoted the military’s decision to jettison an 
alliance with Mubarak and certain members of the regime.  The decision was likely 
facilitated by the distinction demonstrators made between the despised police and Central 
Security Force and beloved military forces.  Demonstrator insistence on the ouster of 





Mubarak as a condition for negotiation deepened the divide.  However, the replacement 
of Mubarak with Omar Suleiman, former head of the Ministry of the Interior was not to 
be tolerated either.  A military council took interim power and secular youth appeared to 
trust the army to supervise a transitional period.140 
     Elite division was likely far more important than institutionalization in granting 
protestors in Tahrir Square success.  Demonstrators, schooled in tactics derived from 
Otpor and influenced by the writings of Gene Sharp, exploited that division.  The army 
was given flowers while the police were verbally reviled.  Protestor strategy may well 
have influenced the decision on the part of the military to maintain its access to power 
and economic perquisites by jettisoning key figureheads.  Chants of “the army and the 
people are one hand” from demonstrators meant the military was in fact less risky than 
the regime.  Although the relatively better institutionalization of the military likely helped 
protestors  make such distinctions, elite divisions were far more decisive in gaining 
support for demonstrator demands for the ouster of Mubarak and, then, Suleiman.  The 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is currently overseeing a transition to a democratic 
and elected government.  In the end, the military’s position was less threatened by 
acceding to protestor demands and overseeing a process of transition than by trying to 
maintain the visible alliance amongst top military officers and regime officials.  Such 
distinctions, elite divisions, and promised maintenance of international treaties also likely 
contributed to the American decision to jettison support to Mubarak.   
 
Popular Mobilization 
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     Last in Bellin’s model of robust authoritarianism is the level of popular mobilization.  
A security apparatus may lose the will to repress a reform movement if sufficiently large 
numbers of people are involved in the movement and turn out onto the streets.  The cost 
of repressing large numbers of people mobilized for reform may well be calculated as too 
high—particularly when reform demands are not perceived to be devastating to its 
power.141  The crowds in Tahrir Square had managed to increase popular mobilization, 
improve their strategy and tactics for gaining reform and exploiting possible elite 
divisions, and raised the cost of repression for an Egyptian military. 
     Mona El-Ghobashy identifies three protest sectors that have emerged over the past 
decade in Egypt.  These include:   
The first is workplace protest, including collective action by industrial laborers, 
by civil servants, students and by trade practitioners such as auto mechanics and 
gold traders. The second is neighborhood protest, whether on the scale of a single 
street or an entire town. Protests by Copts, Sinai Bedouins and farmers are often  
organized along residential lines. Associational protest is the third sector. The  
organizing mediums here are professional associations such as lawyers’ and  
doctors’ syndicates; social movements such as the pro-Palestine solidarity  
campaigns, the anti-Mubarak Kifaya movement and the April 6 youth group; and  
the youth wings of political parties such as Ayman Nour’s liberal Ghad, the 
Muslim Brothers, the liberal-national Wafd, the Nasserist Karama and the Islamist 
Wasat.142 
 
Each of these sectors had collected a repertoire of collective action strategies that came 
together with the Police Day protests of January 25, 2011.  This contrasts with the first 
failure to bring protest sectors together on April 6, 2008.  The April 6 movement was 
born out of this failure though but maintained themselves as a group and sought out new 
knowledge. 
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     While the experiences of confronting the police by all protest sectors should not be 
discounted, the knowledge gained from CANVAS and the Academy for Change was also 
important to the success of the Egyptian Revolution.  Protestors eschewed the political 
pranksterism of Otpor but did adopt the advice given by CANVAS, founded by Otpor.  
CANVAS advised April 6 representative, Mohammed Adel, to identify the power centers 
in Egypt and draw support from within those centers.143  Egyptian protestors purposefully 
used tactics to divide elites.  Further they relied on nonviolence as advised by the 
Academy for Change and the writings of Gene Sharp.  Moreover, Egyptians gained 
knowledge from Tunisian activists who sent advice to their Egyptian counterparts 
concerning how such common items as onions, milk, and soda could limit the effects of 
tear gas.   
     Increased coordination of protest sectors with their repertoires of collective action and 
experience with the Egyptian police coupled with new knowledge gained from 
international support networks gained Egyptian the means to identify and exploit elite 
divisions.  Slogans supporting the military were part of a strategy of division.  Seemingly 
minimal demands for political reform meant that key elites could maintain their grip on 
power and economic privilege by simply jettisoning figures most associated with political 
repression and corruption.   
    Faced with higher levels of coordinated popular mobilization, the will of the Egyptian 
security apparatus faltered.  The police came out in force, but were unable to make 
headway into dispersing crowds that had begun to feel their own political power.  The 
military declined to fire on protestors.  Indeed, the high command seemed somewhat 
                                               




worried that soldiers, drawn from a cross-section of society, might join protestors.  Police 
were quickly identified and protestors refused to allow the state security apparatus to 
defuse the movement by instigating violence and using divisions among the population to 
fragment the protests.  The easily repressed pockets of mobilization from industrial 
workers, neighborhood protestors, and associational protestors coordinated to challenge 
the regime. 
     The challenge to the regime rather than the overall state is also key to the relative 
success of the protestors that took over Tahrir Square for eighteen days beginning on 
Police Day, January 25.  President Mubarak was clearly expendable to the state security 
apparatus as were other visible figures.  Protestors, relying on Serbian advice, were 
careful to exploit divisions and rejected any attempts to divide them.  Further demands 
made for political reform are not nearly as problematic for elite that can manage a 
transition as demands for a social revolution would be.  Egyptians were not interested in a 
social revolution in the shape of an Islamic state.  Their demands were for political 
reform.  Egyptians demanded an end to emergency laws and more accountable and 
transparent governance.  Further they acquiesced to a transition managed by the Military 
Supreme Council.  Military officials must have calculated that repression was not worth 




     Bellin’s framework outlining the criteria of robust authoritarianism gives insight into 
the true exceptionalism of Middle Eastern politics.  The strength of the authoritarian 
state’s willingness to use its security apparatus to repress popular movements promotes 
better insight into Middle Eastern failures to initiate democratic transitions than do 
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explanations advanced from cultural or religious frameworks.  The same factors of fiscal 
health, international support networks, institutionalization, and popular mobilization can 
also be used to explain how the balance of power changed in Egypt and a democratic 
transition began with a the possibility of a political revolution as an outcome of the 
protest movement. 
     Key in this account is shifts in international support networks and popular 
mobilization.  New knowledge brought in and coordination amongst mobilization sectors 
changed the cost calculations for repression on the part of the Egyptian security 
apparatus.  In other words social capital played a role in facilitating the influx of new 
knowledge and popular coordination.  The knowledge brought in by April 6 activist 
Mohammed Adel used the experience of CANVAS while other activists brought in 
knowledge disseminated from other sources, such as the Academy for Change, closely 
follows the model of bridging social capital to bring in new knowledge.  Coordination of 
popular sectors and ongoing advice from Tunisians that took place through social media 
were also a form of networked social capital that helped protestors create bridges 
amongst groups.  Social capital then, as a concept, describes networks that can facilitate 
action while social media eases access costs for new information and promotes 
coordination amongst groups.   
     Within this context, though, the social capital of elites fragmented.  Crony capitalism 
is also a form of social capital as are shillas.  Social capital, then, cannot alone explain 
why changes in the balance of power between state and society shifted and elite networks 
divided to take advantage of new popular configurations.  Causal factors lie within the 
state and the state’s security apparatus.  The state and its security apparatus were forced 
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to reconsider power maintenance strategies as societal groups networked with each other 
and groups abroad to gain better knowledge as to how to divide the elites.  The will to 
repress faltered as elites recalibrated how to maintain control and privilege while giving 
into some reformist demands.  Reform and institutionalization of reform is slowly 
occurring but dramatic changes appear unlikely and efforts to find stability and 
reconstruct an equilibrium acceptable to state and society will take time.   
     The university played no direct role.  Law, political appointments, and the use of 
security services rendered the site of the university politically quiescent.  Change in the 
willingness of youth to demonstrate did not come within the gates of a university where 
they were closely watched for political activity but from the opening up of access to other 
discontented youth in Egypt and the region as well as internationally.  The utility of 
social media to promote the type of social capital that bridges structural holes is relatively 
clear.  Formerly fragmented movements were better able to communicate and coordinate 
with one another.  International civil society actors such as CANVAS helped teach that 
the opposition to a particular regime must strategize carefully.  Within this changed 
environment what role was played by the university?  While individuals may have played 
a role and certainly levels of educational attainment played an indirect role, the university 
itself had little to do with youth organization.  The state successfully hobbled the 









     This dissertation examined the climate of repression within which the Faculty of 
Economics and Political Science that seeks to acquire, disseminate, and produce 
knowledge.  The authoritarian state has placed significant constraints upon the university 
that include politically-influenced appointments in key positions by the state, laws aimed 
at regulating what can be taught and how, a security presence on campus that promotes 
self-censorship and can enforce rules against student organization, and controls research.  
Academics within the Faculty are generally concerned with the quality of research and 
education within the context of state repression and tend to seek networks that are outside 
the control of the state.  These knowledge networks are best described within a 
framework of the bridging metaphor of social capital.  Spontaneous organization and 
reformist movements can only escape control of the state by moving outside state 
scrutiny.  The university is heavily scrutinized by the state and, hence, organization 
knowledge networks that bridge holes could not be made at the university.  While many 
mass protests led by youth in the world have originated within universities, this could not 




     The theoretical concepts outlined in Chapter 2 elucidate how the Faculty of 
Economics and Political Science is impacted by an authoritarian state.  In order to fully 
appreciate what confronts the Faculty, we must develop an appreciation of an 
authoritarian state and its sheer persistence in the Arab World.  Universities generally 
seek to acquire, disseminate, and produce information as The2003 Arab Human 
Development Report outlines and this is the mission that led to the founding of Cairo 
University.  The question of how academics seek to accomplish this mission within the 
confines of an authoritarian state that perceives a wholly different function for the 
university was something that I explored through my qualitative case study of the Faculty 
of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University.  Finally, the social capital 
concept helps elucidate both how the state controls the university and how academics as 
well as students try to escape that control.  In the following pages, I will explicate how 
these concepts serve to help us understand the lived reality of academics at Cairo 
University. 
Authoritarian State 
     Structural theories advance explanations of the persistence of the authoritarian state in 
the modern Arab Middle East that do not dismiss Western concepts.  As such, they help 
provide explanations that can explain exceptionalism without relying on huge categories 
such as culture or religion that tend to carry contradictory values in any case.  For the 
purposes of this dissertation, Bellin’s discussion of factors that can inhibit or promote 
democratic transitions provide the best explanatory value.  Arguing that the prerequisites 
to democratization better explain failures to consolidate democracy than to explain 
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failures to initiate democratic transitions, she relies on Skocpol’s argument that 
revolution depends upon state capacity to maintain control over the means of coercion to 
better explain the marked resistance of Middle Eastern regimes to democratic transition.  
Bellin, here, applies Skocpol’s examination of social revolution to the far more frequently 
encountered political revolutions.  She outlines four factors to explain the conditions that 
will cost a state’s coercive apparatus the will or capacity to maintain its grip on power.  
These include fiscal health, international support networks, institutionalization of the 
state security apparatus, and popular mobilization.144 
     In addition to adding explanatory leverage over how and why the political revolution 
of Egypt’s Arab Spring unfolded, these factors also impact the university as my 
interviews and secondary research have shown.   
     Fiscal health generated a great deal of commentary from many of my interview 
subjects at all levels.  While graduate students everywhere complain of lack of funding, 
complaints from Assistant Professors and Full Professors clarify the true dimensions of 
the problem.  Assistant Professors complained of too little pay which drove them to seek 
other sources of income.  The lack of pay is not solely a problem of mismatch between 
perceived worth and pay145 but also impacts the time and attention professors can give to 
students and their own research.  The lack of funds for libraries and databases was 
addressed at all levels and sorely impacts how the university can function.  Lack of 
updated materials and translated materials meant professors struggling to teach relevant 
material and students struggling to understand anything.  Finally, full professors worried 
over the future quality of underfunded and overcrowded institutions.   
                                               
144Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism”: 143-146. 
145 This gap is also a problem.  Overcrowded classrooms and heavy teaching loads are not adequately 
compensated making academia a less and less attractive position. 
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     Keeping the university starved for funds with the state as the sole source of funding 
contributes to the depoliticization of the university.  Research need not be actively 
blocked if academics can be hampered by time constraints due to work overloads and if 
libraries and databases are simply not available.  Self-censorship and censorship of 
students will be undertaken by those who believe in the dissemination of knowledge 
when the choice is between maintaining a job or not.  Further students are taught not to 
question too much in the atmosphere where the state provides free education but 
maintains control over what can be taught and how.  While lack of funding is not in and 
of itself enough to depoliticize the university, it does contribute to a repressive 
atmosphere wherein knowledge must be in service to the state that grudgingly funds the 
university. 
     While international networks serve valuable educational and research purposes for 
graduate students and professors at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, they 
also serve as something of a safety valve.  The most discontented can leave.  When 
money is of most concern, quite often the Gulf states will hire for much more pay than 
Egyptian national universities.  For those most concerned with freedom of inquiry, the 
West may prove alluring and no few Egyptian academics actively seek work in the West.  
Even more frequently professors will seek research positions and pursue networks that 
offer them professional advantages in their efforts to acquire and produce knowledge.  
International networks were profoundly positive for each individual I spoke to, but did 
contribute to depoliticization as those who were most unhappy with the system were 
more likely to seek ways to leave it than to try to change it. 
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     Institutionalization of the security apparatus tells us something about coercive 
capability and will.  Better institutionalized systems generally have fewer personal 
linkages with a particular regime and may not see their futures as particularly linked to 
that of the regime.  However, the security presence on campuses proved deleterious to the 
pursuit of knowledge and inhibited activism.  The threat of security intervention was 
pervasive and promoted self-censorship.  In addition to cumulative achievement as a 
prerequisite to advancement in academia there must also be a very strong awareness of 
the opportunity costs of political activism.  Many choose to avoid political activism or 
pursue activist linkages elsewhere than campus as a means of keeping activism outside 
the control of the state.  Why, however, is the Egyptian state able to exert so much 
control despite high institionalization?  The answer appears to lie in politically strategic 
appointments.  University presidents are appointed by the state and deans are appointed 
by the president.  Security personnel are watched as much as they watch.  A relatively 
well proceduralized system such as the Faculty of Economics and Political Science need 
not be thoroughly corrupted to be disrupted by the state presence and fearful of the state 
security apparatus located in every Faculty at the university. 
     With an active security presence and strategic appointments of certain administrative 
personnel popular mobilization does not have much opportunity to take hold.  While 
undergraduates have tried to stage demonstrations, the costs are very high and they can 
be followed home by security and their futures threatened.  Indeed, a record of political 
activism could destroy an academic future as well as lead to unpleasant consequences for 
a student and a student’s family.  Hence, a real threat of popular mobilization too costly 






     The 2003 Arab Human Development Report cites the knowledge deficit as one of the 
key contributing factors to the failure of strong economic development in the Arab 
World.  Utilizing the concept of the knowledge society, The Report describes the 
knowledge society as one wherein knowledge can be freely acquired, disseminated and 
produced.   
     These functions are ones that are ideally pursued by universities.  Cairo University 
was founded as a liberal arts institution and research was considered a cornerstone of its 
mission.  The Nasserist state most strongly co-opted Cairo University to promote 
technical development and knowledge for the sake of the state.  This cooptation of the 
university by the state has persisted and strongly effects how professors and graduate 
students acquire, disseminate, and produce knowledge.  While cultural obstacles certainly 
exist, the people I interviewed at the Faculty of Economics were most strongly impacted 
by political obstacles. 
     Knowledge acquisition is severely impacted by funding shortages and the presence of 
the security apparatus on campus.  Funding issues are primarily responsible for a 
decrease in the quality of education offered.  Egyptian students are also habituated to the 
learning method of rote memorization well before they enter the university.  Along with a 
lack of resources for education, strategies of rote memorization mean that knowledge is 
acquired purely for instrumental reasons and not simply for the sake of knowledge.  
However with the youth role in the Arab Spring of 2011 now firmly established it must 
be acknowledged that young people are likely more acquisitive concerning knowledge 
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than professors might have thought.  They sought information online and internationally 
instead of through the university, thus making the case for obstacles to knowledge 
acquisition at the university problematic, much firmer than it might have been otherwise. 
     Classroom discussions are as applicable to knowledge dissemination as to knowledge 
acquisition.  Students cannot freely voice their opinions.  While the security apparatus 
can certainly cast a pall over any kind of free and open discussion, professors may 
implement their own red lines.  Knowledge dissemination is constrained by the state in 
two ways.  Fear of security interference limits what can be taught and the exam process 
limits how it can be taught.  Laws dictating scrutiny of imported books are further 
problematic for the knowledge dissemination and acquisition processes.   
     Statistical research, regulated by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and 
Statistics or CAPMAS, as well as other research, is constrained by state regulation and 
interference.  It can be an active interference as with CAPMAS or an indirect interference 
as academics choose not to pursue research that could leave them vulnerable to either 
state or society.  The idea that knowledge should be of immediate use to or in service to 
the Egyptian state further complicates knowledge production.  Initially promoted most 
strongly by Nasserist ideology, the idea that knowledge should serve the state remains an 
obstacle to viewing knowledge and research as goods in and of themselves.  Hence, the 
university within this view should provide knowledge that promotes the power and 
advancement of a developing postcolonial state.  The idea of using knowledge in service 
to one’s country is not necessarily problematic for most academics.  However, many do 
object to the idea that the state should control, oversee, and ultimately determine what 
knowledge is of use.  All too frequently a ruling regime can confuse its own power 
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maintenance with the good of the state and the controls exercised over students and 




    The concept of social capital helps us ascertain the impact of the state upon university 
faculty in two ways.  First through discussion of how proceduralization and 
rationalization146 and trust, we can begin to understand how and why professors and 
graduate students I interviewed learned who and what they could trust.  Procedures 
within the Faculty were quite well rationalized and strongly adhered to and that did 
produce trust in processes but that trust failed where the state could appoint personnel147 
and where the state security apparatus intruded. 
     State security, located within every Faculty, had the power to dismiss the appointment 
of graduate students to T.A. if they had pursued political activism.  My informant knew 
of no such cases but assured me that it was a fear.  Hence, students could choose to be an 
activist or pursue academics.  You cannot do both.  Further graduate students are warned 
away from security personnel as even perceived complicity could cost them trust from 
their peers and professors, thus inhibiting their acquisition and production or learning and 
research of knowledge. 
     The second way social capital promotes our understanding of the lived experiences of 
Cairo University within an authoritarian state is through the metaphor of bridging.  This 
type of social capital, which shows where holes are spanned or bridged in networks, can 
bring in better access to resources is thus very strongly pursued by academics.  However, 
                                               
146Proceduralization and rationalization also contribute to the institutionalization that Bellin asserts as an 
important determining factor concerning democratic transitions. 
147 Indirectly in the case of deans as it is the state appointed university president who appoints deans. 
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due to the constraints of an authoritarian state, many of their most productive networks 
linked to other academics in other countries, to other internationally sponsored research 
centers, and, indeed, simply to other academics.  While professors and graduate students 
often had low regard for the suspicious masses, they also distrusted nonacademics.  The 
state strategy of fragmentation worked fairly well for quite some time. 
 
The Egyptian Revolution and the 
Irrelevance of the University 
 
     Although college-educated youth had a strong presence in the demonstrations at 
Tahrir Square, the university was largely irrelevant.  Activists pursued knowledge from 
international organizations such as the Serbian group CANVAS and linked with other 
protest sectors in order to increase the costs of repression to the military while lowering 
the costs of meeting certain demands.  The university could not be used as a site for 
popular mobilization or serve as a site where activists could acquire the knowledge they 
needed to successfully demand the ouster of longtime president, Hosni Mubarak. 
     State strategies that depoliticized the university were by and large successful.  The 
state security presence and strategic political appointments quelled student activism.  
Self- censorship and known redlines meant that academics were not disseminating useful 
information.  Research into how reform should proceed was also dangerous as the case of 
SaadEddin Ibrahim illustrated.  In short much of what the university had been founded to 
do was lost due to the constraints exercised by an authoritarian state.  Cairo University 
had once been the site of nationalist activism against British rule as well as a site of leftist 
activism and Islamist activism.  An authoritarian state had increased its control over the 
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university and contained activism within the university but failed to completely contain 
opposition to the regime. 
 
Contributions and Suggestions for  
Further Research 
 
     Although the methodology employed for the study of how a university is depoliticized 
is not normally used to create generalizations, this dissertation does yield ideas that 
suggest fruitful lines of research.  A single-N case study is usually inductive in nature and 
research methodologies that rely upon interpretation of complex lived realities can be 
used to generate hypotheses to test across other cases.  This dissertation’s case study of 
the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University is similarly inductive, 
examining the role played by an authoritarian state on the acquisition, dissemination, and 
production of knowledge is no exception.  The subordination of the academy to the state 
as well as the conceptual linkage between bridges and holes suggest further and quite 
productive lines of research. 
 
Subordination to the State 
 
     Strategies that served academic efforts to do what they could to accomplish tasks 
usually associated with a university and articulated as essential to a knowledge society by 
The 2003 Arab Human Development Report promoted depoliticization as wanted by the 
regime.  Comparisons with other authoritarian states within the Middle East as well as 
outside of it could inform us as to whether the specific type of depoliticization found in 
Cairo University is common amongst authoritarian states.  While depoliticization of 
university faculty is common in modern democratic states also, the specific kind of 
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depoliticization found in Cairo University is more strongly associated with state pressures 
than societal ones as may be found in American universities.  Hence, a comparison with 
universities in other authoritarian states might yield useful information.   
     While a comparison with Tunisian universities under the rule of Zine El Abidine Ben 
Ali with Egyptian universities under the rule of Hosni Mubarak would allow a better test 
for the correlation between an authoritarian state and a specific type of depoliticization, a 
comparison of Egyptian national universities under authoritarian rule with some of the 
new universities sprouting up in the Gulf states and the U.A.E. in particular  could yield 
valuable information about whether it is possible to pursue a knowledge economy via the 
university without a commitment to a knowledge society or ‘knowledge for knowledge 
sake.’  States that are currently or previously authoritarian, such as China, South Korea, 
and Taiwan, might be useful as comparisons wherein economic success and integration 
into the world economy occurred with excellent educational systems in authoritarian 
states that were also interested in maintaining a sense of political apathy amongst the 
people.  These states, however, have seen more unrest emerge from within universities 
and, hence, might yield useful understanding of the relationships between authoritarian 
states, universities as knowledge societies, and economic development. 
     Postrevolutionary Egypt and Tunisia could be quite usefully compared with Eastern 
European states and the postcommunist restructuring and reevaluation of universities. 
Possible future trajectories concerning the role of universities and the role of the state 
might be postulated from any such study.  Eastern European universities underwent 
substantial reevaluation as political indoctrination became an anathema in the educational 
system.  Here, again, some East Asian comparisons might be useful and of particular use 
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might be an Egyptian and Indonesian comparison.  The role of a faltering international 
economy and the suffering of the masses are implicated in the Indonesian overthrow of 
Suharto as much as they are implied within the context of the recent Egyptian ouster of 
Hosni Mubarak.  Moreover, both are predominantly Muslim states but contain quite 
different cultures.  The commonality of politics and religion but complete difference of 
culture would yield a useful comparison that could test the relationship between a 
postauthoritarian state and the university. 
     These comparisons with Tunisia or with Eastern European universities or, indeed, 
universities in South Korea where student movements were once vibrant could well 
advance our knowledge about the role of the university in mass social mobilization.  
Democracies contain their own methods for marginalizing academics and university 
students.  Investigation of how marginalization of campus activism might occur amongst 
countries that make the transition from authoritarianism to democracy might provide far 
more insight into how various regime types manage dissent overall and the probability of 
universities becoming permanently marginalized from social movements.  Current events 
surrounding the various branches of the Occupy Wall Street Movement would tend to 
suggest that while activism is strong among university graduates and may occur on 
campus148 it might also take place off campus—perhaps for greater news exposure.  The 
questions that can be asked seem almost endless in their possibilities.  What is the role of 
the university in political activism in the future both within democratic and authoritarian 
                                               
148 Recent events at University of California at Davis might certainly cause us to question just how 
complacent universities and university students really are.  The numbers of university graduates, graduate 
students, and professors at Occupy Wall Street protests around the country might also cause us to question 
the seeming complacency and inertia that has certainly been a part of American academia in recent years. 
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states?  We currently have few answers but many research questions present themselves 
here.   
 
Bridges and Holes 
 
     My work helps us understand the importance of the roles played by the bridging and 
holes metaphors.  While these concepts are not amenable to discovering causal 
relationships, my approach of an interpretive case study using these concepts contributes 
to our understanding of how links or bridges across structural holes (non-related 
institutional networks) can inhibit or promote change.  These concepts help us flesh out 
Bellin’s factors of robust authoritarianism as well--particularly with regard to 
international support networks and institutionalization.  Specifically, the metaphor of a 
bridge spanning a hole has some implications for political unrest or change.  Within the 
context of this dissertation the bridging capability offered by social networking was quite 
crucial to the success of the Egyptian overthrow of Hosni Mubarak.  The role played by 
individuals, such as Mohammed Adel, to bring in new information that helped groups 
strategize better may have been even more crucial.  As many Egyptian protestors now 
turn towards the task of building a civil society that can underpin a democratic state, 
bridges may proliferate.  Studying this postrevolutionary phenomenon may well give 
greater insight into how political protestors turned to building a networked civil society 
once the protests are, largely, over.  However, although Cairo University has recently 
been the site of protests over some of the Mubarak era controls of state appointed 
university presidents who then appoint deans as well as the ubiquitous presence of 
security services, the possibility of the current Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF) maintaining restrictions remains a strong possibility.  Too there is a possibility 
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that regimes, both democratic and authoritarian, will develop stronger sophistication with 
regard to the use of social networking to organize protests and make demands.  The most 
interesting study that could emerge from this type of question though is one that pertains 
to the ongoing struggle between the state and its citizens or the rulers and ruled to exert 
control or to evade control.  Holes and bridges are not new to the new social networking 
technology even though that technology has certainly opened up some bridging 
capabilities.  A comparative historical study of the role of pamphlets, cassette tapes, fax 
machines as well as new social networking technology could yield much better 
information concerning demands for reform, counter-reform, and state mechanisms for 
control. 
     In a different vein, an interesting use of these concepts as they pertain to young 
Afghan college students suggests itself as an interesting study as to how “bridges” might 
be used to span “holes.”  The American University of Afghanistan was founded in 2006 
and is working hard to enroll more female students and graduate the ones already present 
without losing relevance to the young men who are enrolled and already envision shared 
leadership with their female classmates.  Within the context of an Alumni Association 
founded by a member of the graduating class of 2011, a study could be constructed that 
revisits AUAF graduates and the links they have formed with the broader Afghan society 
as well as the broader international community.  As graduates of an American university 
and as a highly educated group of Afghan men and women, they are aware of their own 
uniqueness within Afghanistan and their obligations to building a state out of a war torn 
and desolate area.   
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     The current initial graduating classes are keenly aware of their responsibility to 
Afghanistan and its state and society.  They would be an extraordinarily interesting group 
to test the utility of these concepts of holes and bridges to explain change.  Revisiting this 
extraordinary group of young men and women over the years through an Alumni 
Association could yield quite valuable information concerning the role of educated elites 
in society and politics and how it changes through groups of educated men and women 
reaching out over societal holes.  As these young people increasingly move into 
governmental positions their participation in a longitudinal study may tell us more about 
how the state may place more controls on ICT technologies.  Despite the relative 
backwardness of Afghanistan, the current generation of Afghans is tech-savvy like their 




     The qualitative case study method is designed to elicit a great deal of information 
concerning daily lived realities.  My interview subjects gave a great deal of information 
about how they go about acquiring, disseminating, and producing knowledge within an 
authoritarian state.  The strategies they used to pursue academic careers within those 
constraints made them ineffective at organizing opposition or disseminating knowledge 
as to how to heighten popular mobilization.  Strong popular mobilization can contribute 
to changing perceptions of the costs of repression.  Their strategies also increased their 
detachment from the masses as international networks or bridging social capital that 
could bring them new knowledge and opportunities were pursued far more strongly than 
dangerous local associations.   
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     Theoretical concepts used in my dissertation help explicate how the authoritarian state 
impacts the Faculty of Economics and Political Science.  A university is often ideally 
envisioned as a small knowledge society and the 2003 Arab Human Development 
Report’s factors of acquisition, dissemination, and production help us focus on precisely 
how an authoritarian state can affect the mission of a university.  An examination of the 
authoritarian state promotes understanding of the state and the failure of democratic 
transitions, until the Arab Spring of 2011.  Social capital gains us insight into where 
control is exerted and how it is escaped.  These same factors and concepts also elucidate 
what changed and why in 2011.  It also makes the irrelevance of the university apparent 










1. Could you please describe your educational process? 
2. What made you decide to become a scholar? 
3. What is the hiring process like at this university?  Would you describe your own 
experience?   
4. What are the institutional procedures for promotion and tenure?  Are these 
procedures followed?  Is this a benefit or a problem? 
5. Do you expect any factors other than merit to impact promotion/tenure?  Why or 
why not? 
6. Does the University support your research?  If so, how? 
7. What kind of teaching duties are expected of you?  What do you think is the role 
of the instructor at the university? 
8. Describe for me the ideal relations between instructors/professors and students. 
9. What are your relations and interactions with students like? 
10. Describe for me the ideal relations among junior and senior faculty.  What is your 
experience in this regard?   
11. Are you a member of any academic associations?  Which ones?  How do they 
contribute to your development as a scholar and your career? 
12. Are there any associations you would advise someone junior to you to join or 
steer clear of?  Which ones?  Why? 
13. Have you attended conferences in other countries?  Which ones?  Do you think 
multinational ties among scholars promote understanding and knowledge?  What 
could be done to promote the scholarly exchange of ideas and knowledge, in your 
view? 
14. Describe your relations and interactions with scholars (a) in your department (b) 
faculty (c) university (d) national colleagues (e) regional colleagues (f) 
international colleagues. 
15. In your view what is the support for free academic inquiry and debate at each of 
these sites (see previous question) and the broader non-academic community 
around the university? 
16. In your view, what is the role of the university in the broader community? 
17. Is the university an appropriate place to promote the utility of knowledge in the 




18. What should scholars do, if anything, to contribute to the communities they live 
in? 
19. Do you participate in any community associations?  Why or why not?  Is it 
common for scholars to actively engage with the local community?   
20. What challenges do you see in your own institution of higher education with 
regard to scholarship?  What challenges are presented by local communities?  Do 
you feel constrained concerning academic inquiry?  Where do these constraints 
come from? 
21. What kind of supports are there or encouraging trends towards the support of 
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